UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

10-1-2008

State v. Canyon Vista Family Ltd. Partnership
Clerk's Record v. 2 Dckt. 34485

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"State v. Canyon Vista Family Ltd. Partnership Clerk's Record v. 2 Dckt. 34485" (2008). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 1931.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/1931

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel.,
)
CHARLES L. WINDER, JOHN
MCHUGH, BRUCE SWEENEY, MONTE )
C. MCCLURE, GARY BLICK, NEIL
)
MILLER, AND JOHN X COMBO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, )

SUPREME COURT NO. 34485

,I
1

PlaintiffIAppellant,
vs.
CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J RANCH
INC.,

)
)

1
Defe~idantIRespondent,

)

CLERK'S SUPPLEMENTAL RECORD ON APPEAL
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Twin Falls
HONORABLE NATHAN HIGER
District Judge
Joseph Mallet
Deputy Attorney General
P. 0. Box 7129
Boise, ID 83707-1129

Don Copple
Heather Cunningham
Davison, Copple, Copple & Cox
P. 0 . Box 1583
Boise, ID 83701

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT
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State of Idaho, etal. vs. Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership, etal.

Date

Judge

Code

User

NEWC

DAW

New Case Fiied

DAW

Filing: U - Miscellaneous Fees Use Miscellaneous John C. Hohnhorst
Schedule!!!!! Paid by: State of ldaho Receipt
number: 4032517 Dated: 12/28/2004 Amount:
$.00 (Cash)

COMP

MCMULLEN

Complaint Filed

John C. Hohnhorst

SMlS

MCMULLEN

Summons Issued

John C. Hohnhorst

NOTC

DAW

Notice of Appearance

John C. Hohnhorst

DAW

Fiiing: I I A Civil Answer Or Appear. More Than John C. Hohnhorst
$1000 No Prior Appearance Paid by: Davison, et
a1 Receipt number: 5000763 Dated: 1/11/2005
Amount: $47.00 (Check)
John C. Hohnhorst
Notice of Appearance

John C. Hohnhorst

-

NOTC

DAW

APER

DAW

Defendant: Canyon Vista Family Limited
Partnership, Appearance E Don Copple

John C. Hohnhorst

LlNDQ

Demand for Jury Trial

John C. Hohnhorst

STlP

DENNIS

Stipulation for Possession

John C. Hohnhorst

HRSC

MCMULLEN

John C. Hohnhorst

MCMULLEN

Hearing Scheduled (Status 06/13/2005 10:OO
AM)
Notice Of Hearing

NOAP

DENNIS

Notice Of Appearance

John C. Hohnhorst

HRHD

MCMULLEN

Hearing result for Status held on 0611312005
10:OO AM: Hearing Held

John C. Hohnhorst

CMlN

MCMULLEN

Court Minutes

John C. Hohnhorst

HRSC

MCMULLEN

Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference
05/21/2007 09:OO AM)

John C. Hohnhorst

HRSC

MCMULLEN
MCMULLEN

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 06/05/2007 09:OO John C. Hohnhorst
AM)
John C. Hohnhorst
Notice Of Hearing

ORDR

MCMULLEN

Scheduling Order & Notice of Trial Setting Order John C. Hohnhorst

NOSV

NlELSEN

Notice Of Service

John C. Hohnhorst

ANSW

NIELSEN

Answer and Demand for Jury Trial

John C. Hohnhorst

NOSV

NIELSEN

Notice Of Service

John C. Hohnhorst

NOSV

NIELSEN

Notice Of Service

John C. Hohnhorst

NOSV

RKLINE

Notice Of Service

John C. Hohnhorst

STIP

RKLINE

Stipulation to Amend Complaint

John C. Hohnhorst

COMP

RKLINE

First Amended Complaint

John C. Hohnhorst

NOSV

NlELSEN

Notice Of Service

John C. Hohnhorst

NOSV

NIELSEN

Notice Of Service

John C. Hohnhorst

NOSV

NIELSEN

Notice Of Service

John C. Hohnhorst

NOSV

NIELSEN

Notice Of Service

John C. Hohnhorst,

John C. Hohnhorst

[; 6

Date:

,

d2008

Fifth Judicial District Court - T w i n Falls County

Time: 04:15 PM
Page 2 of 16

ROA Report
Case: CV-2004-0006336 Current Judge: Nathan W. Higer
State of Idaho, etal. vs. Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership, etal.

Date

Code

User

NOSV

NIELSEN

Notice Of Service

John C. Hohnhorst

NOTC

MCMULLEN

Notice of Party Substitution

John C. Hohnhorst

MOTN

MCMULLEN

Motion to amend Scheduling Order

John C. Hohnhorst

ORDR

MCMULLEN

Order to Amend Scheduling Order

John C. Hohnhorst

NOSV

NIELSEN

Notice Of Service

John C. Hohnhorst

NOSV

NIELSEN

Notice Of Service

John C. Hohnhorst

NOSV

NIELSEN

Notice Of Service

John C. Hohnhorst

REQU

NIELSEN

Request for Pre-Trial Conference

John C. Hohnhorst

MODQ

FERCH

Motion for Disqualification without cause

John C. Hohnhorst

ORDR

MCMULLEN

Order to Disqualify Without Cause

John C. Hohnhorst

ORAS

TUBBS

Order Of Assignment

G. Richard Bevan

CHJG

TUBBS

Change Assigned Judge

G. Richard Bevan

HRSC

COOPE

Hearing Scheduled (StatusIADR 05/07/2007
09:02 AM)

G. Richard Bevan

CONT

COOPE

Continued (Pretrial Conference 05/21/2007
1030 AM)

G. Richard Bevan

SCOR

COOPE

Amended Scheduling Order, Notice of Trial
Setting & lnitiai Pretrial Order

G. Richard Bevan

AFFD

NIELSEN

Affidavit of Gary L. Young
fax

G. Richard Bevan

AFFD

NIELSEN

Affidavit of Joseph D. Mallet in Support of Motion G. Richard Bevan
to Consolidate

MEMO

NIELSEN

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Consolidate G. Richard Bevan

MOTN

NIELSEN

Motion to Consolidate

G. Richard Bevan

NOHG

NIELSEN

Notice Of Hearing for Motion to Consolidate

G. Richard Bevan

NOSV

NiELSEN

Notice Of Service

G. Richard Bevan

HRSC

COOPE

G. Richard Bevan

NOHG

NIELSEN

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 03/26/2007 09:OO
AM) to Consolidate
Amended Notice of Hearing for Motion to
Consoiidate
fax

G. Richard Bevan

NOSV

NIELSEN

Notice Of Service

G. Richard Bevan

SUBR

NIELSEN

Subpoena Duces Tecum and Notice of
Deposition for Mark Butler

G. Richard Bevan

SUBR

NIELSEN

Subpoena Duces Tecum and Notice of
Deposition for Greg Kelley

G. Richard Bevan

SUBR

FERCH

Subpoena duces tecum and notice of deposition
for F Patrick Dobie Returned

G. Richard Bevan

SUBR

FERCH

Subpoena duces tecum and notice of deposition
for Mark W Richey Returned

G. Richard Bevan

SUBR

FERCH

Subpoena duces tecum and notice of deposition
for Roger L Dunlap Returned

G. Richard Bevan

0"l
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Date

Code

User

SUBR

FERCH

Subpoena duces tecum and notice of deposition
for Christy Williams Returned

OBJC

QUAM

Defendants' Objection To Motion To Consolidate G. Richard Bevan

MOTN

QUAM

Brief In Opposition To Plaintiff's Motion To
Consolidate

G. Richard Bevan

AFFD

QUAM

Affidavit Of Mark L. Butler In Opposition To
Plaintiff's Motion To Consolidate

G. Richard Bevan

AFFD

QUAM

Affidavit Of E. Don Copple In OppositionTo
Plaintiff's Motion To Consolidate

G. Richard Bevan

MEMO

NIELSEN

Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's First Motion G. Richard Bevan
in Limine

NIELSEN

Plaintiff's First Motion in Limine

NIELSEN

Second Affidavit of Joseph D. Mallet in Support of G. Richard Bevan
Motion to Consolidate

NIELSEN

Brief in Support of Motion in Limine to Exclude All G. Richard Bevan
Testimony and Evidence Regarding Cost of Cure

MOTN

NIELSEN

Defendants' Motion in Limine to Exclude Any
Evidence and Testimony Regarding the Cost to
Cure Method

G. Richard Bevan

CMlN

COOPE

Court Minutes Hearing type: Motion to
Consolidate Hearing date: 3/26/2007 Time: 8:34
am Court reporter: Virginia Bailey

G . Richard Bevan

HRHD

COOPE

Hearing result for Motion held on 03/26/2007
09:OO AM: Hearing Held to Consolidate

G . Richard Bevan

HRSC

COOPE

Hearing Scheduled (Motion in Limine
05/07/2007 09:OO AM)

G. Richard Bevan

HRSC

COOPE

Hearing Scheduied (Hearing Scheduled
03/29/2007 09:OO AM) Ruling on motion to
consolidate hearing by phone with Mr. Mallet to
initiate to 7354372

G. Richard Bevan

COOPE

... .

Notice Of Hearing

m-

G. Richard Bevan

G. Richard Bevan

G. Richard Bevan

CMlN

COOPE

Court Minutes Hearing type: Hearing Scheduled
Hearing date: 3/29/2007 Time: 9:00 am Court
reporter: Virginia Bailey

G. Richard Bevan

HRHD

COOPE

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on
03/29/2007 09:OO AM: Hearing Held Ruling on
motion to consolidate hearing by phone with Mr.
Mallet to initiate to 735-4372

G. Richard Bevan

NOSV

NIELSEN

Notice Of Service

G. Richard Bevan

NOTR

NIELSEN

Notice Of Preparation Of Transcript & Filing

G. Richard Bevan

MOTN

NIELSEN

Motion in Limine to Exclude References to Taxes, G. Richard Bevan
Taxpayers and Public Funds

MOTN

NIELSEN

Motion in Limine to Exclude Appraisal Reports

G. Richard Bevan

NIELSEN

Disclaimer of Interest from Lazy J Ranch, Inc.

G. Richard Bevan

MCMULLEN

Notice Of Service (fax)

G. Richard Bevan

,

, .
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41912007

HRSC

COOPE

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 0412312007 09:OO
AM) to enlarge to time

G. Richard Bevan

NIELSEN

Trial Brief - Part I (Condemnation Law issues

G. Richard Bevan

NIELSEN

Brief in Support of Motion in Limine to Exclude AII G. Richard Bevan
Testimony and Evidence Regarding Special
Benefits

NIELSEN

Defendants' Motion in Limine to Exclude ail
Evidence and Testimony Regarding Secial
Benefits

G. Richard Bevan

AFFD

NIELSEN

Affidavit of Heather Cummingham in Support of
Motion in Limine to Exclude all Testimony and
Evidence Regarding Special Benifits

G. Richard Bevan

SUBR

NIELSEN

Subpoena Returned Duces Tecum and Notice of G. Richard Bevan
Deposition for Linda Wills

AFFD

NIELSEN

Affidavit of E Don Copple in Support of Motion in G. Richard Bevan
Limine to Allow Deposition Testimony of Clarence
Pomroy at Trial

SUER

NiELSEN

Amended Subpoena Duces Tecum and Notice of G. Richard Bevan
Deposition for F. Patrick Dobie

NiELSEN

Brief in Support of Motion in Limine to Aliow into
Evidence the Deposition Testimony of Clarence
Pomroy

MOTN

NIELSEN

Defendants' Motion in Limine to Allow Deposition G. Richard Bevan
Testimony of Clarence Pomroy at Trial

CONT

COOPE

AFFD

NIELSEN

MOTN

NIELSEN

NOSV

NlELSEN

NOHG

NiELSEN

Continued (Motion in Limine 0512112007 09:OO G. Richard Bevan
AM) defendant.
Affidavit of Heather A. Cunningham in Support of G. Richard Bevan
Motion to Extend Time Set for Trial
fax
Motion to Extend Time Set for Trial
G. Richard Bevan
fax
G. Richard Bevan
Notice Of Service
fax
G. Richard Bevan
Notice Of Hearing

NOHG

NIELSEN

Notice Of Hearing

G. Richard Bevan

NOSV

QUAM

Notice Of Service
04/06/07

G. Richard Bevan

QUAM

Trial Brief-Part II
(Taking Of Access)

G. Richard Bevan

ORAS

TUBBS

Order Of ReAssignment

Nathan W. Higer

CHJG

TUBBS

Change Assigned Judge

Nathan W. Higer

411 212007

BREF

COOPE

Trial Brief - Part li (Taking of Access)

Nathan W. Higer

411 312007

NOSV

WALLS

Nathan W. Higer

411612007

NOTR

NIELSEN

Notice Of Service
04113107
Notice Of Preparation Of Transcript & Filing

NOSV

NIELSEN

Notice Of Service

Nathan W. Higer

411012007

G. Richard Bevan

.

Nathan W. Higer

.
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Date

Code

User

411812007

HRSC

COOPE

Hearing Scheduied (Motion in Limine
05/07/2007 09:OO AM) both plaintiff and
defendant

G. Richard Bevan

HRVC

COOPE

Hearing result for Motion held on 04/23/2007
09:OO AM: Hearing Vacated to enlarge to time

G. Richard Bevan

HCAN

COOPE

Hearing Cancellation Notice

Nathan W. Higer

ORDR

COOPE

Order on Plaintiff's Motion to Consolidate

Nathan W. Higer

NOSV

NIELSEN

Notice Of Service

G. Richard Bevan

NOHG

NIELSEN

Notice Of Hearing

Nathan W. Higer

MOTN

NIELSEN

Defendants' Motion to Compel

Nathan W . Higer

AFFD

NIELSEN

Affidavit of Heather A. Cunningham in Support of Nathan W. Higer
Defendats' Motion to Compel

412012007

NOSV

NIELSEN

Notice Of Service

Nathan W. Higer

412312007

NOSV

NIELSEN

Notice Of Service

Nathan W. Higer

NOHG

NIELSEN

Notice Of Hearing

Nathan W. Higer

AFFD

NIELSEN

Affidavit of E Don Copple in Support of Motion in
Limine to Exclude Ail Testimony and Evidence
Regarding Special Benefits

Nathan W. Higer

NIELSEN

Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion in Limine Nathan W. Higer
to Exclude all Evidence, Testimony and Argument
Regarding the Development of Subject Property
with Adjacent Properties
a
Nathan W. Higer
Affidavit of Mark L. Butier in Support of
Defendant's Motion in Limine to Exclude all
Evidence, Testimony and Argument Regarding
the Development of the Subject Property with
Adjacent Properties
Affidavit of E Don Copple in Support of Motion in Nathan W. Higer
Limine to Exciude all Evidence, Testimony and
Argument Regarding the Development of Subject
Property with Adjacent Properties
Nathan W. Higer
Defendants' Motion in Limine to Exclude ail
Evidence, Testimony and Argument Regarding
the Development of Subject Property with
Adjacent Properties
Nathan W. Higer
Notice Of Hearing

411912007

AFFD

NIELSEN

AFFD

NIELSEN

MOTN

NIELSEN

NOHG

NiELSEN
NIELSEN

AFFD

NIELSEN

Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion in Lirnine Nathan W. Higer
to Exclude ail Evidence and Testimony Regarding
Defendants' Knowledge of the State's Project
Affidavit of Christy Williams in Support of Motion Nathan W. Higer
in Limine to Exclude all Evidence, Testimony and
Argument Regarding Defendants' Knowledge of
the State =S Project

,
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Date

Code

User

4/23/2007

AFFD

NlELSEN

MOTN

NIELSEN

NOSV

NIELSEN

NOHG

NiELSEN

NOTR
NOTR

Affidavit of E Don Copple in Support of Motion in
Limine to Exclude all Evidence, Testimony and
Argument Regarding Defendats' Knowledge of
the State's Project
Defendant's Motion in Limine to Exclude all
Evidence, Testimony and Argument Regarding
Defendants' Knowledge of the State's Project
Notice Of Service

Nathan W. Higer

Nathan W. Higer

NIELSEN

Amended
Notice Of Hearing
Notice Of Preparation Of Transcript & Filing

Nathan W. Higer

NIELSEN

Notice Of Preparation Of Transcript & Filing

Nathan W. Higer

NIELSEN

Supplemental Affidavit of E Don Copple in
Support of Motion in Limine to Exciude ail
Evidence, Testimony and Argument Regarding
the Development of Subject Property with
Adjacent Properties
Supplemental Affidavit of E Don Coppie in
Support of Motion in Limine to Exciude ail
Evidence, Testimony and Argument Regarding
Defendants' Knowledge of the State's Project
Notice of Non-Opposition to Defendants' Motion
to Extend Time Set for Trial
fax
Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to
Compel
fax
Brief In Opposition to Defendants' Motion in
Limine to Allow Into Evidence the Deposition
Testimony of Clarence Pomroy
fax
Affidavit of John R. Diilman
fax
Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to
Exclude all Evidence and Testimony Regarding
Speciai Benefits
Third Affidavit of Joseph D. Mallet

Nathan W. Higer

NIELSEN

NOTC

NlELSEN

NIELSEN

NIELSEN

AFFD

Judge

NIELSEN
NIELSEN

AFFD

NiELSEN

CONT

COOPE

CONT

COOPE

CONT

COOPE

Nathan W. Higer

Nathan W. Higer

Nathan W. Higer

Nathan W. Higer

Nathan W. Higer

Nathan W. Higer

Nathan W. Higer
Nathan W. Higer

Nathan W. Higer

Continued (Motion in Limine 05/18/2007 10:30 G. Richard Bevan
AM) both plaintiff and defendant ail motions to be
heard on May 7,2007 and May 21,2007 to be
heard today
Continued (StatusIADR 05/18/2007 10:30 AM) G. Richard Bevan
Continued (Motion in Limine 05/18/2007 10:30
AM) defendant

G . Richard Bevan
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Date

Code

User

51312007

BREF

NIELSEN

Brief
Nathan W. Higer
in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Exciude Ail
Evidence, Testimony and Argument Regarding
the Development of Subject Property with
Adjacent Properties

COOPE

Notice Of Hearing

Nathan W. Higer

NOHG

NiELSEN

Notice Of Hearing

Nathan W. Higer

NOHG

NIELSEN

Notice Of Hearing

Nathan W. Higer

AFFD

NIELSEN

Fourth Affidavit of Joseph D. Mallet

Nathan W. Higer

NIELSEN

Plaintiff's Brief in Support of Motion in Limine to
Exclude the Testimony of Roger Dunlap
Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Second Motion in
Limine

Nathan W. Higer

5/4/2007
51712007

Judge

NiELSEN

Nathan W. Higer

NOSV

NIELSEN

Notice Of Service

Nathan W. Higer

MOTN

NiELSEN

Plaintiff's Motion in Limine to Exclude the
Testimony of Roger Dunlap

Nathan W. Higer

NOSV

NlELSEN

Notice Of Service

Nathan W. Higer

AFFD

NIELSEN

NOHG

NIELSEN

Affidavit of E Don Copple in Support of Motion in Nsthan W. Higer
Limine for an Order that a Partial Settlement in a
Adjacent Property on the State's Project Cannot
be Testified to by one of the State's Appraisers,
John Dillman
Nathan W. Higer
Notice Of Hearing

MEMO

NiELSEN

MOTN

NIELSEN

MOTN

COOPE

Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine for Nathan W, Higer
an Order that a Partial Settlement in to an
Adjacent Property on the State's Project Cannot
be Testified to by one of the State's Appraisers,
John Dillman
Defendants' Motion in Limine for an Order That a Nathan W. Higer
Partial Settlement in a Adjacent Property on the
State's Project Cannot be Testified to by One of
the State's Appraisers, John Dillman
Nathan W. Higer
Plaintiff's Second Motion in Limine

NOHG

COOPE

Notice Of Hearing

Nathan W. Higer

51912007

NOSV

NIELSEN

Notice Of Service

Nathan W. Higer

511012007

MOTN

NIELSEN

Nathan W. Higer

NOHG

NIELSEN

Nathan W. Higer

MOTN

NIELSEN

Motion to Shorten Time
fax
Notice Of Hearing
fax
Plaintiff's Motion to Bifurcate

NIELSEN

Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Bifurcate

Nathan W. Higer

NIELSEN

Notice Of Hearing

Nathan W. Higer

NOHG

Nathan W. Higer

Date:
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Date

Code

AFFD

NiELSEN

NOTR

NlELSEN

Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion in
Limine to Exciude all Evidence, Testimony and
Argument Regarding
Defendants' Knowledge of the State's Project
fax
Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion in
Limine to Exclude References to Taxes,
Taxpayers and Public Funds
fax
Brief in Oppsition to Defendants' Motion in Limine
to Exciude Appraisal Reports
fax
Affidavit of Joseph D. Maliet in Support of
Plaintiff's Motion to Bifurcate
Notice Of Preparation Of Transcript & Filing

AFFD

NIELSEN

Amended Fourth Affidavit of Joseph D. Maiiet

NIELSEN

Defendants' Brief In Support of Motion to Compel Nathan W. Higer
-John Diliman
Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion in Limine Nathan W. Higer
to Allow Evidence and Testimony Regarding a
Collateral Issue
Nathan W. Higer
Notice Of Hearing

511 112007

NIELSEN

NIELSEN

NlELSEN

511412007

Judae

User

NIELSEN

Nathan W. Higer

Nathan W. Higer

Nathan W. Higer

Nathan W. Higer
Nathan W. Higer
Nathan W. Higer

NOHG

NIELSEN

REQU

NIELSEN

Request to Take Judicial Notice of This Courts
Nathan W. Higer
Flies Records in State V. KLS&M
L.P., Et AL., State V Lazy J. Ranch, Inc. and State
V. BCMW Limited Partnership Pursuant to idaho
Rules of Evidence, Ruie 201

NIELSEN

Brief in Opposition to Piaintiff's Second Motion in Nathan W. Higer
Limine 0 Order of Condemnation
Memorandum on Estoppei and Res Judicata in
Nathan W. Higer
Support of Motions in Limine to Exciude Aii
Evidence, Testimony and Argument Regarding
the Deveiopment of Subject Property with
Adjacent Properties and Cost to Cure Method
Suppiementai Memorandum on Estoppei and Res Nathan W. Higer
Judicata in Support of Motions in Limine to
Exclude ail Evidence, Testimony and Argument
Regarding the Deveiopment of Subject Property
with Adjacent Properties and Cost to Cure
Method
Nathan W. Higer
Defendants Pre-Trial Statement

MEMO

NIELSEN

MEMO

NlELSEN

NIELSEN
NiELSEN
AFFD

NiELSEN

Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Exciude Nathan W. Higer
the Testimony of Roger Dunlap
Affidavit of Roger Duniap in Opposition to
Nathan W. Higer
Piaintiff's Motion in Limine to Exciude the
Testimony of Roger Dunlap
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Date

Code

511412007

NIELSEN

NIELSEN

AFFD

NIELSEN

NIELSEN
NIELSEN

511612007

Judae

User
Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion in
Limine to Exclude any Evidence and Testimony
Regarding the Cost to Cure
Method
fax
Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion in
Limine for an Order that a Partial Settlement in a
Adjacent Property on the State's Project Cannot
be Testified to by One of the State's Appraisers,
John Dillman
fax
Affidavit of Joseph D. Mallet in Opposition to
Defendants' Motion in Limine for an Order that a
Partial Settlement in an Adjacent Property on the
State's Project Cannot be Testified to by One of
the State's Appraisers, John Diliman
fax
Plaintiff's Pre-Trial Memorandum
fax
Brief in Response to State's Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendants' Motion in Limine to
Exclude ail Evidence Testimony and Argument
Regarding Defendants' Knowledge of the State's
Project

Nathan W. Higer

Notice Of Service
fax
Subpoena Duces Tecum and Notice of
Deposition for James Macdonaid
Subpoena Returned Duces Tecum and Notice of
Deposition for Michaei Bingham
fax
Affidavit of Biily Ray Strite in Opposition to
Defendants' Motion to Exclude All Evidence,
Testimony and Argument
Regarding the Development of Subject Property
with Adjacent Properties
fax
Defendants' Memorandum inopposition to
Plaintiff's Motion to Bifurcate

Nathan W. Higer

Nathan W. Higer

Nathan W . Higer

Nathan W. Higer
Nathan W. Higer

NOSV

NlELSEN

SUBR

NIELSEN

SUBR

NIELSEN

AFFD

NIELSEN

MEMO

NlELSEN

OBJC

NIELSEN

Defendants' Objection to Plaintiff's Motion to
Bifurcate

Nathan W. Higei

NOSV

NiELSEN

Nathan W. Higer

NOSV

NiELSEN

Notice Of Service
fax
Notice Of Service
fax

NIELSEN
LETT

COOPE

Brief on Cumulative Evidence
fax
Letter from Don Coppie

Nathan W. Higer
Nathan W. Higer

Nathan W. Higer

Nathan W. Higer

Nathan W. Higet
Nathan W. Higer

4

1. i i
Nathan W. Higer

Date: 8/-
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Judge

Date

Code

User

511712007

ORDR

COOPE

Order

Nathan W. Higer

511812007

CONT

COOPE

Nathan W. Hlger

CONT

COOPE

Continued (Pretriai Conference 05/18/2007
10:30 AM)
Continued (Jury Trial 06/04/2007 09:OO AM)

CMIN

COOPE

HRHD

COOPE

HRHD

COOPE

HRVC

COOPE

HRHD

COOPE

HRSC

COOPE

NOSV

NIELSEN

Hearing result for StatusIADR held on 05/18/2007 Nathan W. Higer
10:30 AM: Hearing Vacated
Nathan W. Higer
Hearing result for Motion in Lirnine heid on
05/18/2007 10:30 AM: Hearing Held both
plaintiff and defendant ail motions to be heard on
May 7,2007 and May 21,2007 to be heard today
Nathan W. Higer
Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
06/01/2007 09:OO AM) Jury selection
Nathan W. Higer
Notice Of Service

NOSV

NIELSEN

Notice Of Service

ORDR

COOPE

Order Regarding Both Plaintiffs' and Defendants' Nathan W. Higer
Motions in Limine and Motions to Exclude

NIELSEN

Amended Subpoena Duces Tecum and Notice of Nathan W. Higer
Deposition for Richard Evans
fax

NIELSEN

Amended Subpoena Duces Tecum and Notice of
Deposition for Gale Pooley
fax
Subpoena Duces Tecum and Notice of
Deposition for Michael Mongelli
fax
Stipulation to Amend the Exchange of Exhibits
fax
Defendant Canyon Vista's Proposed Jury
Instructions Filed (CD also)
Defendants' Witness List
fax
Defendants' Proposed Exhibit List
fax
Piaintifi's Trial Brief
fax
Plaintiff's Witness Lis
fax

Nathan W. Higer

Plaintifi's Exhibit iist

Nathan W. Higer

5/21/2007
5/23/2007

'

'

NiELSEN

5/25/2007

STIP

NIELSEN

JUIN

COOPE

W ITN

NiELSEN
NIELSEN
NiELSEN

WiTN

NIELSEN
NIELSEN

Nathan W. Higer

Nathan W. Higer
Court Minutes Hearing type: Motions, Pretrial
Conference Hearing date: 511812007 Time: 10:48
am
Hearing result for Pretriai Conference held on
Nathan W. Higer
05/18/2007 10:30 AM: Hearing Held
Hearing result for Motion in Limine held on
Nathan W. Higer
05/18/2007 10:30 AM: Hearing Held defendant

Nathan W. Higer

Nathan W. Higer

Nathan W. Higer
Nathan W. Higer
Nathan W. Higer
Nathan W. Higer
Nathan W. Higer
Nathan W. Higer
,

.

j.5
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Date

Code

User

5/29/2007

MlSC

COOPE

Piaintiff's Exhibit List

Nathan W. Higer

WiTN

COOPE

Piaintiff's Witness List

Nathan W. Higer

NiELSEN

Plaintiff's Preliminary Jury Instructions and Jury
Verdict Form

Nathan W . Higer

NIELSEN

Notice Of Service
fax

Nathan W. Higer

NiELSEN

Defendant's Amended Exhibit List
fax
Notice Of Service

Nathan W. Higer

NOSV

513012007

Judge

Nathan W. Higer

NOSV

COOPE

JUlN

COOPE

Amended Piaintiff's Proposed Jury lnstructions
Fiied

Nathan W. Higer

SUBR

NIELSEN

Amended Subpoena Returned and Notice of
Deposition for James Macdonaid
fax

Nathan W. Higer

NiELSEN

Plaintiff's Amended Exhibit List

Nathan W. Higer

5/31/2007

CMiN

HALSTEAD

Court Minutes Hearing type: Jury Selection
Hearing date: 5/31/2007 Time: 10:OO am

Nathan W. Higer

6/1/2007

CMlN

COOPE

Court Minutes Hearing type: Jury Selection
Hearing date: 6/1/2007 Time: 9:16 am Court
reporter: Maureen Newton

Nathan W. Higer

BREF

COOPE

Bench Brief RE: Evidence of Bias to Impeach
Credibiiity

Nathan W. Higer

MiSC

COOPE

Jury Panel

Nathan W. Higer

MlSC

COOPE

Peremptory Chaiienges

Nathan W. Higer

HRHD

COOPE

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduied held on
06/01/2007 09:OO AM: Hearing Held Jury
seiection

Nathan W. Higer

CMiN

COOPE

Court Minutes Hearing type: Jury trial day 1
Hearing date: 6/4/2007 Time: 9:13 am Court
reporter: Maureen Newton13 PM Sue Woif

Nathan W. Higer

MlSC

COOPE

Final Jury Panel

Nathan W. Higer

MlSC

COOPE

Preliminary Jury instructions

Nathan W. Higer

JTST

COOPE

Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 06/04/2007
09:OO AM: Jury Triai Started

Nathan W. Higer

CMlN

COOPE

Court Minutes Hearing type: Jury Trial Day 2
Hearing date: 6/5/2007 Time: 9:04 am Court
reporter: Sue Woif

Nathan W. Higer

AFFD

COOPE

Affidavit in Support of Motion to Exclude
Testimony of District Engineer, Devon Rigby

Nathan W. Higer

MOTN

COOPE

Defendant's Motion to Exclude the Testimony of
District Engineer, Devon Rigby

Nathan W. Higer

MEMO

COOPE

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Exclude
Evidence and Testimony

Nathan W. Higer

AFFD

COOPE

Affidavit of Pat Dobie in Support of Motion to
Exclude Evidence and Testimony

Nathan W. Higei

6/4/2007

6/5/2007

Date: 812
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Date

Code

User

6/5/2007

AFFD

NIELSEN

Affidavit of Karl D. Vogt

AFFD

NIELSEN

Affidavit of Karl D. Vogt For in Camera Review of Nathan W. HigelDocuments

COOPE

Defendant's Supplemental Proposed Jury
lnstructions Filed

Nathan W. Higer

CMlN

COOPE

Court Minutes Hearing type: Jury Trial Day 3
Hearing date: 6/6/2007 Time: 9:02 am Court
reporter: Sue Wolf

Nathan W. Higer

CMIN

COOPE

Court Minutes Hearing type: Jury Trial Day 4
Hearing date: 6/7/2007 Time: 9:02 am Court
reporter: Sue Wolf

Nathan W. Higer

BREF

COOPE

Brief RE: Zones of Value

Nathan W. Higer

CMlN

COOPE

Court Minutes Hearing type: Jury Trial Day 5
Hearing date: 6/8/2007 Time: 9:09 am Court
reporter: Sue Wolf

Nathan W. Higer

CMIN

COOPE

Court Minutes Hearing type: Jury Trial Day 6
Hearing date: 611 112007 Time: 9:05 am Court
reporter: Sue Woif

Nathan W. Higer

CMIN

COOPE

Court Minutes Hearing type: Jury Trial Day 7
Hearing date: 6/12/2007 Time: 9:05 am Court
reporter: Sue Wolf

Nathan W. Higer

CMIN

COOPE

Court Minutes Hearing type: Jury Trial Day 8
Hearing date: 6/13/2007 Time: 9:07 am Court
reporter: Sue Wolf

Nathan W. Higer

NIELSEN

Judge
Nathan W. Higer

Plaintiff's Supplemental Proposed Jury instruction Nathan W. Higer

- Larger Parcel

NIELSEN

Court Minutes Hearing type: Jury Trial Day 9
Hearing date: 6/14/2007 Time: 9:02 am Court
reporter: Sue Woif
Notice Of Preparation Of Transcript & Filing

Nathan W. Higer

NOTR

NIELSEN

Notice Of Preparation Of Transcript & Filing

Nathan W. Higer

MlSC

COOPE

Final Jury Instructions

Nathan W. Higer

VERD

COOPE

Special Verdict Form

Nathan W. Higer

MlSC

COOPE

Roll Call

Nathan W. Higer

NlELSEN

Statement of Interest Due on Jury Verdict
Through June 20,2007

Nathan W. Higer

HRSC

COOPE

Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Attorney fees and Nathan W. Higer
Costs 0712412007 01:30 PM)

NOHG

NIELSEN

Notice Of Hearing

Nathan W. Higer

AFFD

NIELSEN

Nathan W. Higer

AFFD

NIELSEN

Affidavit of Fredric V. Shoemaker in Support of
Defendant's Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs
Affidavit of E Don Coppie in Support of
Defendant's Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs

MOTN

NIELSEN

Defendant's Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs

Nathan W. Higer

NIELSEN

Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion for
Attorney Fees and Costs

Nathan W. Higer

CMlN

COOPE

NOTR

Nathan W. Higer

Nathan W. Higer

,

.

I
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User

612912007

AFFD

NIELSEN

MEMO

NIELSEN

71212007

HATCH

HATCH

71312007

71612007

71912007

711112007

Judae
Affidavit of Attorney Fees (Heather A.
Cunningham)
Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements

Nathan W. Higer
Nathan W. Higer

Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any Nathan W. Higer
File Or Record By The Clerk, Per Page Paid by:
Cindy Rowland Receipt number: 7016230 Dated:
71212007 Amount: $10.00 (Cash)
Miscellaneous Payment: Copy Cd Paid by: Cindy Nathan W. Higer
Rowland Receipt number: 7016230 Dated:
7/2/2007 Amount: $12.00 (Cash)
Nathan W. Higer
Notice and Agreement RE: Purchase of audio
recordings of district and magistrate court
proceedings.

NAAR

HATCH

JDMT

COOPE

Judgment on Verdict

Nathan W . Higer

CDlS

COOPE

Nathan W. Higer

CONT

COOPE

MOTN

COOPE

Civil Disposition/Judgment entered: entered for:
Canyon Vista Famiiy Limited Partnership,,
Defendant; State of Idaho, Plaintiff.
order date: 71312007
Continued (Motion for Attorney fees and Costs
0711712007 01 :30 PM)
Motion to Shorten Time

NOHG

COOPE

Notice Of Hearing

Nathan W. Higer

AFFD

COOPE

Affidavit of Joseph Mallet in Support of Motion to
Vacate Hearing and Motion to Shorten Time

Nathan W. Higer

NOHG

COOPE

Notice Of Hearing

Nathan W. Higer

MOTN

COOPE

Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate

Nathan W. Higer

CONT

COOPE

Continued (Motion for Attorney fees and Costs
0711912007 09:OO AM)

Nathan W. Higer

Nathan W. Higer
Nathan W. Higer

COOPE

Notice Of Hearing

Nathan W. Higer

BREF

COOPE

Brief in Support of Motion to Vacate Hearing

Nathan W. Higer

OBJC

COOPE

Objection to Judgment on Verdict and Amended
Judgment on Verdict

Nathan W. Higer

OBJC

NIELSEN

Nathan W. Higer

NOHG

NIELSEN

Objection to Judgment on Verdict and Amended
Judgment on Verdict
fax
Amended Notice Of Hearing

NOHG

NiELSEN

Amended
Notice Of Hearing
fax
Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Disaliow
Certain Requested Attorney Fees and Costs

Nathan W. Higer

Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for
Attorneys Fees and Costs
fax

Nathan W. Higer

NIELSEN
NiELSEN

Nathan W. Higer

Nathan W. Higer

Date:'
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MOTN

NIELSEN

Plaintiff's Motion to Disallow Certain Requested
Attorneys Fees and Costs
fax

AFFD

NIELSEN

Affidavit of Joseph D. Mallet in Support of Motion Nathan W. Higer
to Disaiiow Certain Requested Attorneys Fees
and Costs
fax

AFFD

NIELSEN

Affidavit of Heather A. Cunningham in Opposition Nathan W. Higer
to Plaintiff3 Motion to Vacate Hearing and
Response to Objection to Judgment on Verdict

NiELSEN

Supplemental Affidavit of Attorney Fees (Heather Nathan W. Higer
A. Cunningham).

MOTN

NIELSEN

Motion to Shorten Time for Hearing

Nathan W. Higer

NOHG

NIELSEN

Notice Of Hearing

Nathan W. Higer

MOTN

NIELSEN

AFFD

NIELSEN

Motion for Protective Order and Motion to Quash Nathan W. Higer
Subpoena of Heather A. Cunningham
Affidavit of Heather A. Cunningham in Support of Nathan W. Higer
Motion for Protective Order and Motion to Quash
Subpoena of Heather A. Cunningham

AFFD

NIELSEN

Affidavit of John T. Lezamiz

Nathan W. Higer

SUBR

NIELSEN

Subpoena Returned
and Notice of Deposition for Heather A.
Cunningham

Nathan W. Higer

NOSV

NIELSEN

Notice Of Service

Nathan W. Higer

NIELSEN

Response to Plaintiff's Motion to Disaliow
Attorney Fees and Costs

Nathan W. Higer

AFFD

NIELSEN

Affidavit of Pat Dobie in Opposition to Disaliow
Certain Requested Attorneys Fees and Costs

Nathan W. Higer

CMlN

COOPE

HRHD

COOPE

Court Minutes Hearing type: Motion for Attorneys Nathan W. Higer
Fees and Costs Hearing date: 711912007 Time:
9:12 am Court reporter: Candy Chiiders Audio
tape number: Ct rm 2
Nathan W. Higer
Hearing result for Motion for Attorney fees and
Costs heid on 0711912007 09:OO AM: Hearing
Heid

OPlN

COOPE

Memorandum Decision and Order

ORDR

COOPE

Order on Defendant's Motion for Protective Order Nathan W. Higer
and Defendant's Motion to Quash Subpeona of
Heather A. Cunningham

STJD

COOPE

Satisfaction Of Judgment on Verdict Pursuant to
I.C. 7-717

SATJ

NIELSEN

Nathan W. Higer
Satisfaction Of Judgment
fax
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any Nathan W. Higer
File Or Record By The Clerk, Per Page Paid by:
.
Hepworth, Lezamiz and Janis Receipt number:
7019500 Dated: 81712007 Amount: $2.00 (Cash)

SAVE

Judge
Nathan W. Higer

Nathan W. Higer

Nathan W. Higer

.

9
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Code

User

MOAM

FERCH

Plaintiffs Motion To Amend memorandum
decision and order

STlP

FERCH

Stipulation To Amend memorandum decision and Nathan W. Higer
order

ORDR

COOPE

Order

Nathan W. Higer

JDMT

COOPE

Supplementai Judgment on Verdict

Nathan W. Higer

NTOA

COOPE

Notice Of Appeal

Nathan W. Higer

APSC

COOPE

Appealed To The Supreme Court

Nathan W. Higer

CCOA

COOPE

Clerk's Certificate Of Appeal

Nathan W. Higer

BONT

COOPE

Bond Posted for Transcript (Receipt 7020356
Dated 811512007 for 100.00)

Nathan W. Higer

BNDV

COOPE

Bond Converted (Transaction number 7002610
dated 811512007 amount 100.00)

Nathan W. Higer

NIELSEN

Satisfaction of Supplemental Judgment on Verdict Nathan W. Higer
Pursuant to I.C. 7-717

SCDF

COOPE

Supreme Court Document Filed- Filing of Clerk's Nathan W. Higer
Certificate

SCDF

COOPE

Supreme Court Document Filed- Notice of Appeal Nathan W. Higer
(T)
Satisfaction of Payment of Post Judgment
Nathan W. Higer
Interest

NIELSEN

Judae
Nathan W. Higer

Supreme Court Document Filed- Document Filed Nathan W. Higer

SCDF

COOPE

SCDF

COOPE

Supreme Court Document Filed- Clerk's Record
& Transcript Due Date Reset

Nathan W. Higer

LODG

COOPE

Lodged Transcript (Newton)

Nathan W. Higer

LODG

COOPE

Lodged Transcript (Wolf)

Nathan W. Higer

REQU

QUAM

Request For Additional Transcript And Record

Nathan W. Higer

CCOA

COOPE

Amended Clerk's Certificate Of Appeal

Nathan W, Higer

SCDF

COOPE

Supreme Court Document Filed- Document(s)

Nathan W. Higer

SCDF

COOPE

Supreme Court Document Filed- Amended
Clerk's Certificate

Nathan W. Higer

SCDF

COOPE

Supreme Court Document Filed- Clerk's
RecordIReporter's Transcript -Suspended-

Nathan W. Higer

STlP

COOPE

Stipulation for Additional Transcript and Record

Nathan W. Higar

ORDR

COOPE

Order on Request for Additional Transcript and
Record

Nathan W. Higer

SCDF

COOPE

Supreme Court Document Filed- Document(s)

Nathan W. Higer

SCDF

COOPE

Supreme Court Document Filed- Clerk's Record
&Transcript Due Date Reset

Nathan W. Higer

LODG

COOPE

Lodged Transcript

Nathan W. Higer

COOPE

Supreme Court Document Filed- Notice of
Transcript Lodged

Nathan W. Higer ,

SCDF

- All Due Dates Suspended

,2.g
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712 112008

SCDF

COOPE

Supreme Court Document Filed- Clerk's Record
&Transcript Due Date Reset

Nathan W. Higer

811 112008

STIP

NIELSEN

Second Stipulation and Request for Additional
Clerk's Record

Nathan W. Higer

ORDR

COOPE

Order on Second Request for Additional Clerk's
Record

Nathan W. Higer

SCDF

COOPE

Supreme Court Document Filed- Document(s)

Nathan W . Higer

8/25/2008

.Judoe

E DON COPPLE - ISB ki 1085
HEATHER A. CUNNINGI-IAM - ISB # 5480
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COX
Attorneys at Law
Washington Mutual Capitol Plaza
199 North Capitol Boulevard
Suite 600
Post Office Box 1583
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 342-3658
Facsimile:
(208) 386-9428
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Attorneys for Defendants
Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership
and Lazy J. Ranch, Inc.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS

1
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel.,
CHARLES L. WINDER, JOHN MCHUGH )
BRUCE SWEENEY, MONTE C.
1
MCCLURE, GARY BUCK, NEIL
1
MILLER and JOHN X COMBO,
1
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
)
Plaintiff,
VS.

CASE NO. CV 04-6336
TRIAL BRIEF-PART I
(CONDEMNATION LAW ISSUES)

1
1
)
)

1
CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED
)
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J. RANCH, )
INC.
1
)
Defendants.
1

DEFENDAhTS' TRIAL BIUEF-PART I (CONDEMNATION LAW ISSUES) - 1

I. INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . .
11. BACKGROUND FACTS. .

111. LEGAL ISSUES
A. Court Decides All Issues Except Value

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6.

Under Idaho case law, the Court decides all issues in an eminent domain
proceeding except the amount ofjust compensation due. Therefore, all issues
apart from valuation and just compensation, if any arise, will need to be
determined by the trial court.
B. RighttoO~enai~dClose
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7.
Ordinary burden of proof issues are not at play in condemnation cases, but the
Defendants as property owners bear the burden of persuasion. As the burdened
party, the property owner should have the right to open and close. Idaho law
recognizes that it is appropriate to allow the condemnee to open and close, and
Defendants request that the court rule that the condemnee inay do so in this case.
Oppositioil from the Plaintiff on this issue is not anticipated.
C. Date of Taking As Valuation Date . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
.
Value is measured as of the date the summons is issued.
D. JustConipensation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12
.
Idaho Code $7-711 defines just compensation. Although just compensation
considers a number of items, including the value of the land taken and severance
damages to the remainder, the actual amount of just compensation can be arrived
at by taking the fair market value of the entire parcel as of the date of taking, and
subtracting the fair market value of the remainder and adding any temporary
easement value. This is the easiest method for the juiy to use in arriving at a just
compensation figure, and objection from the State of Idaho as to this method is
not anticipated.

E. Hiehest and Best Use1 Reasonable Probabilitv of Rezone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
Property taken by condemnation is valued with consideration of the highest and best use
for the property as of the time of taking. The highest and best use, as contrasted with the
current use, is that which is: 1) legally permissible, 2) financially feasible, 3) maximally
profitable and 4) physically possible. If a rezone of a property is reasonably probable, the
rezone may be considered in valuation.
F. Special v. General Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15.
Special benefits are benefits from the condemnation project which are unique and
peculiar to the subject property and directly benefit the remaining property at issue.
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General benefits are benefits which accrue to the area or neighborhood in general, and
cannot be offset against severance damages.
G. Worst Case Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..20
In considering the value of the property after the taking, the "worst case scenario" is to be
considered, because the property owner is paid for all damages, once and for all time.
Therefore all damages, in a "worst case scenario," are to be considered.

H. Comparable Sales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 2 7
When evidence of comparable sales is offered on direct examination of a valuewitness, the fact that the similarity of the comparable sales to the subject property
may be questioned by the State of Idaho does not bar their admissibility.
I. Use of I-Iearsay by Expert Witnesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..28
Experts in eminent domain cases frequently rely on hearsay evidence to support
their opinions of value. This practice has been found acceptable by many courts.
The expert witnesses in this case, on both sides, will offer hearsay evidence.
Unlike a normal trial, this hearsay is not normally objectionable and is typically
admitted.
J. Burden of Proof. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 9
Defendants request that no burden of proof instruction be given, as the traditional
burden of proof is not at play in eminent domain cases, as various courts have
held. In the alternative, the Defendants request that an instruction be given which
makes it clear that the Defendants have only the burden of persuading the trier of
fact that the just compensation due is more than the amount advocated by the
State of Idaho.

K. Illustrative Exhibits. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34
.
Exhibits may be admitted for illustrative purposes, but still go to the jury room.
L. Proiect Influence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..3 6
"Project Influence" in eminent domain cases reflects the concept that, in the interests of
fairness, valuation of a defendant landowner's property does not take into consideration
any influence on value attributable to the project, whether such influence is good or bad.
In determining proper just compensation, the land is valued before the taking as if the
project never existed. The comparable sales which are utilized in valuing the subject
property must also be unaffected, positively or negatively, by project influence. Evidence
regarding comparable sales which reflect project influence should therefore be excluded
by the trial court.
M. Comparable Sales Sold after the Date of Taking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 8
Comparable sales which have occurred since the date of taking, December 28,
2004, may still be used as comparables to the subject property. As long as they
are comparable in character, close in time, and in a location which would be
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probative of the value of the subject property, they should be allowed by the court.
It is expected that experts from both sides will rely on sales after the date of
taking.

N. Severance Damages & Cost to Cure: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 8
The cost to "cure" or "fix" problems created by the State's project is not the
proper measure of damages in a condemnation case.
0. Value Testimony Does Not Reauire Compliance with USPAP Standards:

.. . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6

Expert opinion testimony on fair market value of appropriated property are not
founded w o n methods orescribed bv the Uniform Standards of Professional
Appraisal Practice, known as USPAP.
I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this Trial Brief is to set forth for the convenience of the Court the
applicable law regarding the legal issues which Defendants anticipate may arise during the trial
of this matter. Eminent Domain or condemnation cases are unique in the law and a number of
special rules, not in at issue in other civil cases, have therefore evolved.
Eminent domain cases arise when an authorized governmental entity, the condemning
authority, takes private land for a public purpose. The right of eminent domain is grounded in
the United States Constitution' and in the Idaho State Constit~tion.~
Hand in hand with this
power of the government to acquire land is the obligation of the government to pay just
compensation to the property owner for the taking.
The date of the taking is the date the condemning authority (in this case, the State of
Idaho) filed suit to acquire the private property and the summons was issued. (In this case,
December 28,2004). In a partial taking case, the Government entity acquires a portion of the
subject property (the part "taken") and the property owner is left with a portion (the

U.S. Const., Art. V

Idaho Const., Art. I, $ 14
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"re~nainder"). In partial taking cases the condemning authority must pay fair market value for the
land taken plus any damages caused to the remainder property as a result of the taking and the
construction of the project. Just compensation and damages are assessed horn the date of
Summons pursuant to I.C. 5 7-712.
In detennining just compensation, the property is first valued as of the date of summons
assuming the State's project was never planned, designed or constructed. This value is typically
referred to as the "before take value" or the "before value." The property is then valued as of the
date of taking, assuming that the State's project has been planned, designed and constructed and
is complete, having taken a portion of the owner's property. This is often referred to as the "after
take value" or "after value." The difference between the before value and the after value should
therefore take into account the value of the land acquired by the State and any severance damages
to the remainder.

In valuing the property both before and after the taking, the highest and best use of the
property is considered, not its current use. The "highest and best use" means the use which is
legally possible, physically possible, econo~nicallyfeasible and maximally profitable. The
highest and best use is utilized because in determining value, the property owner in a
condemnation case is entitled to receive the highest price he could get in an open market, with a
willing buyer and a willing seller.
The amount of just compensation is assessed pursuant to LC. 5 7-71 1, and is the only
issue to be determined by the jury when a jury trial is requested.
11. BACKGROUND FACTS

The Defendants in this case own the property located on the South side of Pole Line Road,
approximately one-quarter mile east of Washington Street in Twin Falls, Idaho. The property
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currently contains roughly 66 manufactured home spaces, or approximately half of the homes in the
Lazy J Mobile Ranch. The property was zoned R-4, but the Comprehensive Plan designates the site
for future commercial development, with southern part of property in a Collage of Southern Idaho
plan.
In the before condition, the property had four separate physical and historical points of
access. If the property were to develop before the taking, the Defendant's witnesses believe that
there would have been two or three direct access points allowed to Pole Line Road. In the after
condition, it is uncontradicted that there is no direct access to Polc Line Road and there would be
no access to the property until Cheny develops to the South.
The States' appraiser, John Dillman, opined in 2003 that the amount of just compensation
owing to the Defendants was $327,000. Mr. Dillman recently reduced his opinion of just
compensation to $202,230. Mr. Paul Hyde is another appraiser retained by the State. He opines that
just compensation is $264,000. Defendant's witness have determined that the amount of just
compensation due is the following:
1.

Appraiser Mark Richey

$2,155,000.00

2.

Appraiser Roger Dunlap

$3,064,500.00

3.

Appraiser Greg Kelley

$2,575,000.00
111. ARGUMENT

A. COURT DECIDES ALL ISSUES EXCEPT VALUE
Eminent domain cases are unique in the law, and therefore unlike other civil actions in a
number of respects. There is only one factual issue for the jury in an eminent domain proceeding,
and that is the amount of just compensation to be awarded. All other issues are for the court to
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decide. In Rueth v. State, 100 Idaho 203, 596 P.2d 75 (1978); rehrg denied, (1979), the Idaho
Supreme Court explained:
The eminent domain proceeding is founded in the constitution, and whether the proceeding
is initiated by the party seeking to condemn, or by the property owner who claims his
property or rights have been taken, it is not an ordinary civil proceeding. Hence in either
case all issues, other than just compensation, are for resolution by the trial court.
In holding that only the issue ofjust compensation is properly resolved by a jury, we are not
to be understood as saving
. that a bifurcated trial of issues is always necessary. Conceivably,
in the interests of economy, and depending on the particular circumstances of each case, as
may be unfolded in pre-trial discovery, or at pre-trial conference, the trial court may
determine to impanel a jury and have all issues presented at one time. In any event, however,
the trial court will make the determination of the taking issue which will be reflected, as in
California, in instructions which advise the jury that there has been a taking, and the nature
of the property right taken where the court concludes that there is less than the fee.
Additionally, and as it appears to be the practice in California, it is desirable that the trial
court enter findings and concIusions pertinent to that issue, and pertinent to any issue other
than that of just compensation. Id. at 222-23.

-

Therefore, the trial court will need to decide any and all issues which may arise, other than valuation
and just compensation.
The Defendants do not anticipate any factual disputes other than just compensation.
Determining just compensation also involves determining the highest and best use of the subject
property, the validity of comparable sales, the weight to be given each witness' opinion of value,
and the relevant characteristics of the subject property both before and after the taking,

B. RIGHT TO OPEN AND CLOSE
Condemnation cases are somewhat "backwards," in that the Defendants bear the burden of
persuasion rather than the Plaintiff. As a result, the Defendants normally inquire of the jury panel
first during voir dire, open first, present their case first, and then have closing argument first and a
final rebuttal before the case is submitted to the jury. We are, in fact, not aware of any case in which
the condemnee has not been allowed to "go first and last" as discussed above. It is therefore not
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anticipated that this order of proof and argument will be contested by the State of Idaho.
Nonetheless, the law on this issue is discussed below, in case there becomes an issue.
In an eminent domain action in which the issue is the amount of just compensation, the
property owner is entitled to open and close the evidence. Instate v. McGill, 79 Idaho 467,321 P.2d
595 (1958), 73 A.L.R.2d 613 the Idaho Supreme Court discussed and recognized that the trial court
had the authority to change the order of proof in certain cases, and that in condemnation cases, the
court has the discretion and authority to change the order of argument: However, the problem
presented here is not one of varying the order of proof, but rather varying the order of argument. It
seems all too clear that although no Idaho case specifically requires the district judge to vary the
order of argument, there is ample authority recognizing the discretion. Id, at 470.
In McGill, the issue was whether the trial court, in refusing to change the order of argument
to allow Defendants to open and close, committed reversible error. The Idaho Supreme Court held
that under the specific facts of the case, the trial judge's ruling did not rise to the level of reversible
error because the parties stipulated to allow the State to proceed first with its case. Id. at 470-71.
However, the Court further stated and acknowledged that the better procedure in a condemnation
action was to allow the property owner to open and close his case. The Court did not find error on
the trial court because the parties stipulated to allow the State to proceed first with its case. 79 Idaho
at 471.
To come to grips with the ultimate problem, we must determine whether the trial
court committed error by refusing to change the order of argument, under the facts
of this case. Although the better procedure in a case such as this is to allow the
defendant to open and close, we cannot say reversible error was committed by the
trial court's refusal to follow such procedure, and especially so in view of the
stipulation by the appellants that the respondents should proceed with the
presentation of proof when no proof was required. Id.
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The Court, quoting an Eminent Domain treatise, set forth that the general rule of law regarding the
choice of argument is that the owner has the right to open and close:
In 5 Nichols on Eminent Domain, Third Edition, sec. 18.5(2), pp. 205-207, the
conflict of the decisions is summed up:
The general rule is that the right to open and close goes to the one on
whom the burden of proof lies in the first instance -- upon the party
who would suffer defeat if no evidence should be given on either
side. It consequently follows from what has been already stated that
the owner should have the right to open and close, and this is
generally the law. The failure of the trial court to follow this rule is
not, however, necessarilyground for setting aside the verdict if it does
not appear that the owner was hanned. In somejurisdictions it is held
that the right to open and close rests in the discretion of the trial court,
while in several other states the fact that the condemnor is petitioner
or plaintiff on the record in the whole case has led the courts to give
that party the right to open and close, even on the issue of damages.
Id.
Two Justices dissented from the majority opinion, including the Chief Justice, holding that
the owner's right to open and close was so vital that denial of such was reversible error, and that the
right to do so was not subject to the discretion of the trial court. "The right to open and close
argument is a substantial, legal right," wrote Chief Justice Keeton, "the denial of which constitutes
reversible error." Id. at 473 (Keeton, J., dissenting).
The right to open and close is a legal tool afforded the party who carries the burden of
persuasion and who is therefore subject to defeat should no evidence be given on either side. In a
condemnation case, the landowner is constitutionally entitled to just compensation whether any
evidence is presented or not. The issue in a condemnation trial is the amount of compensation
owing, and the burden carried by the landowner is that of establishing the amount of just
compensation where it asserted that the condemnor's proffered value is insufficient. Since this
burden of persuasion lies with the landowner, the owner should be entitled to open and close.
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McGill unequivocally recognizes this and allows the trial court to rule that the property owner has
the right to open and close.
In the majority of jurisdictions, the general rule is followed that in a condemnation
proceeding where the only issue to be determined is damages or the value of the land damaged, the
condemnee bears the burden ofproof as well as the right to open and close the evidence at trial. See
United States v. Crary, 2 F.Supp 870 (Dist. Ct. Va 1932); Springjeld d: M.R. Co. v. Rhea, 44 Ark.
258 (Ark. 1884); Colorado C.R. Co. v. Allen, 22 P. 605 (Colo 1889);Stuart v. Colorado Eastern R.
Co., 156P. 152 (Colo. 1916);Kirlwoodv. SchoolDist. No. 7,101 P. 343 (Colo. 1909);Indianapolis
& Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Wiles, 91 N.E. 161,729 (Ind. 1910); Burt v. Wigglesworth, 117 Mass

302 (Mass. 1875);Minneapolis- St. Paul Sanitary Dist. v. Fitzpatrick, 277 N.W. 394 (Minn. 1937);
Kansas City & G.R. Co. v. Haake, 53 S.W.2d 891 (Mo. 1932); Western Farmers Electric Co-op. v.
Smith, 288 P.2d 729 (Okla. 1955); Phillips v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 559 S.W.2d 464
(Tex. Ct. App. 1977).
The followingjurisdictions similarly follow the above described rule that a condemnee who
bears the burden of proof has the right to open and close the evidence at trial: Rice v. City of Fort
Lauderdale, 281 So. 2d 36 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1973); Department of Public Work and
Buildings v. Dixon, 229 N.E.2d 679 (1967); Village ofPenn Yarz Udan Renewal Agency v. Penn
Yan Realty Corp., 294 N.Y.S.2d 66 (Ill. 1968); State By and Through State Highway Commission
v. Nelson, 353 P.2d 616 (Or. 1960); Phillips v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 559 S.W.2d 464 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1977); Wagonerv. City ofcirlington, 345 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. Ct. App. 1961); Keifferv. King
County, 572 P.2d 408 (Wash. 1977); Loeb v. Board ofRegents of University of Wis., 138 N.W.2d
227 (Wis. 1965).
The primary purpose for the majority rule of allocating the burden of proof on the landowner
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or condemnee, and allowing the condemnee the right to open and close, is because the condemnee
must prove his or her position regarding valuation when it is in conflict with the government. In
Village ofPenn Yan Urban RenewalAgencyv. Penn Yan Realty Corp., 294 N.Y.S.2d 66 (N.Y. Dist.
Ct. 1968), the court explained that when the taking agency is a governmental subdivision, it is
presumed in the first instance that the agency has made a fair offer for the value of the condemned
land. Id. If the condemnee does not accept the condemnor's valuation of the land, he must go
forward with proof that "just compensation" requires a sum greater than the amount offered by the
condemnor. Id. Explained another way, "[a] party seeking judicial process to advance his position
carries the burden of proof. Loeb v. Board ofRegents of the Univ. Of Wis., 138 N.W.2d 227 (Wis.

In some jurisdictions, denying a condenvlee the right to open and close the argument can be
reversible error. See Phillips v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 559 S.W.2d 464 (Tex. Ct. App.
1977); Wagoner v. City ofArlington, 345 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. Ct. App. 1961). The court in Phillips
discussed the importance of the order of argument in a condemnation trial:
The right to open is important. ~tenablesthe party to give direction to
the case, very often to choose the ground on which the battle shall be
fought. And the right to conclude is more important still. Even in fair
and legitimate argument, the party concluding has the advantage of
knowing precisely the line ofhis opponent, and thereforeofdirecting his
attention to it, and arraying everything in the case, that fairly illustrates
and sustains his view of it. (Citation omitted) The denial of the right to
open and conclude the argument to the jury to the party entitled thereto
is cause for a new trial.
Id. 141 S.E.2d at 591.
Some landowner or condemnees have argued that mandating that the condemnee open and
close the evidence presents a clear, present and continuing disadvantage for the condemnee. See Penn
Yan Realty Coup., 294 N.Y.S.2d at 67. However, when presented with this argument, courts have
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consistently held that it is fundamental that in any adversarial approach, the person who claims
damages has the burden of proving those damages. Id. at 68.
Defendants therefore respectfully requests that they be allowed to conduct voir dire first, open,
present their case in chief, close, and offer rebuttal to the Plaintiffs arguments, as is the normal
procedure in condemnation cases.
C. DATE OF TAKING AS VALUATION DATE

The State of Idaho filed this action and issued the Summons on December 28,2004.

A property owner's right to compensation is constitutionally vested and is to be measured as
of the time of the taking, when the damage has accrued and fixed. Idaho Code 5 7-712 specifically
provides as follows:
7-712. Damages - Date of accrual. - For the purpose of assessing compensation and
damages, the right thereto shall be deemed to have accrued at the date of the
summons, and its actual value, at that date, sha1I be the measure of compensation for
all property to be actually taken, and the basis of damages to property not actually
taken, but injuriously affected, in all cases where such damages are allowed, as
provided in the last section. No improvements put upon the property subsequent to
the date of the service of summons shall be included in the assessment of
compensation or damages. The compensation and damages awarded shall draw
lawful interest from the date of the sunlmons.

In State ex re1 Moore v. Bastian, 97 Idaho 444, 546 P.2d. 399 (1976), our Supreme Court
recognized that the damages that will accrue do so as of the date of the issuance of the summons:

In Idaho, the value of the property actually taken in an eminent domain proceeding
and the damages which will accrue to the remaining property by reason of the
severance are computed as of the date of the issuance of the summons, not the date
that the property is actually taken. Id. at 449 (citing I.C. 5 7-712).
D. JUST COMPENSATION
The only issue to be determined by the jury is the amount of just compensation to be paid to
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Defendants. Idaho Code Section 7-711 establishes how the trier of fact is to determine just
compensation:
7-711. Assessment of damages. -- The court, jury or referee must hear such
legal testimony as may be offered by any of the parties to the proceedings, and
thereupoil must ascertain and assess:

The value of the property sought to be condemned, and all
1.
improvements thereon pertaining to the realty, and of each and every separate estate
or interest therein; if it consists of different parcels, the value of each parcel and each
estate or interest therein shall be separately assessed.

2.
If the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a
larger parcel, the damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be
condemned, by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be condemned, and
the construction of the improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff.
Separately, how much the portion not sought to be condemned, and
3.
each estate or interest therein, will be specially and directly benefitted, if at all, by the
construction of the improvement proposed by the plaintifc and if the benefit shall be
equal to the damages assessed, under subdivision 2, the owner of the parcel shall be
allowed no compensation except the value of the portion taken; but if the benefit shall
be less than the damages so assessed, the former shall be deducted from the latter, and
the remainder shall be the only damages allowed in addition to thevalue. This formula
can be hard to follow, but the same result is obtained by computing the total value of
the property before the taking, subtracting the total after the taking, and adding to
value of temporary easements, if any.
This fonnula can be hard to follow but the same result is obtained by computing the total
value of the property before the taking, subtracting the total value after the taking, and adding the
value of temporary easements, if any
E. HIGHEST AND BEST USE
Property in condemnation is valued assuming its highest and best use. Evidence regarding
an opinion of value of the subject property not based upon its highest and best use, but rather an
alternative, lesser use for which the property is adaptable, is inadmissible and contrary to the law in
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Idaho. Idaho courts have consistently followed the general principle that compensation inust be paid
based upon the property's highest and best use.
In State ex rel. Symms v. City of Mountain Home, 94 Idaho 528, 493 P.2d 387 (1972), the
Idaho Supreme Court expressly set forth the guidelines for the valuation of property in question:
The compensationwhich must be paid for property taken by eminent domain does not
necessarily depend upon the uses to which it is devoted at the time of the taking;
rather, all the uses for which the property is suitable should be considered in
determininginarket value. (citations omitted). The highest and best use for which the
property is adaptable and needed or likely to be needed in the reasonably near future
is to be considered, not necessarily as a measure of value, but to the'full extent that the
prospect of demand for such use affects the market value of the property. (citations
omitted). It inust be shown that the use for which the property is claimed to be
adaptable is reasonably probable. (citation omitted). Furthermore, in order to
establish adaptability, the owner must prove the economic feasibility of the suggested
use. (citations omitted). If, as a matter of fact, the parcel taken is part of a larger tract
held by the same owner, it is error to consider such parcel as if it constituted an entire
tract separate and apart from other property in the possession of the same owner; the
amount awarded for the land taken must reflect any enhanced value arising from its
availability for use in conjunction with the land not taken. (citations omitted). Id. at
530-31.
Other Idaho cases that followed this same principle are City of Caldwell v. Roark, 92 Idaho
99,437 P.2d 615 (1968), Ada County Highway District v. Magwire, 104 Idaho 656, 662 P.2d 237
(1983), and Eagle Sewer District v. Hormaechea, 109 Idaho 418,707 P.2d 1057 (1985).
Testimony regarding the value of the property based on a use other than the highest and best
use for which the property can be devoted to is contrary to the constitutional requirement of
ascertaining just compensation. This evidence undermines fundamental principles of the law of
eminent domain and the State of Idaho. Allowing testimony of one's opinion of value not based on
the highest and best use ofthe property would be prejudicial to Defendants' constitutional right to just
compensation. Furthermore, evidence of an opinion of value based upon a use that is not a
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consideration of the property's highest and best use is irrelevant in determiningthe co~npensationthe
property owner is entitled to.
Highest and best use is that use of a property which is: 1) legally permissible, or there is a
reasonable probability of getting the legal permission necessary, 2) physically possible, 3)
economically feasible, and 4) maximally profitable.
F. SPECIAL V. GENERAL BENEFITS
In calculatingseverance damages to alandowner's remaining property, the amount of damage
to the remaining property value may be offset by any special benefits to the property. LC. § 7-71 l(3);
Orofino v. Swayne, 95 Idaho 125,128,504 P.2d 398 (1972).
Special benefits are benefits from the condemnation project which are unique to the subject
property and which directly benefit the remaining property at issue. See Rich v. Fonburg, 80 Idaho
269, 280, 328 P.2d 60 (1958); Stale v. ex re]. Symms v. Collier, 93 Idaho 19, 24, 454 P.2d 56, 61
(1969).
Idaho Code Section 7-71 l(3) states that the jury must decide:

...how much the portion not sought to be condemned, and each estate or interest
therein, will be s~eciallvand directly benefitted [sic], if at all, by the construction of
the improvement proposed by the plaintiff... (emphasis added).
Condemnation law distinguishes such special benefits from general benefits. General benefits from
the condemnation project are benefits which are general in nature and benefit the public generally
rather than confer a discrete benefit directly upon the remaining property at issue. See Fonburg, 80
Idaho at 280.
The State of Idaho, if they, as condemnor assert a special benefit, has the burden of proof to
show that the benefits are unique to the remaining property, and that those benefits directly flow to
the remaining property as a result of the condemnation project before such benefits may offset
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severance damages. State ex. rel. Dep 't of Highways v. Pinson, 207 P.2d 1105, 1110 (Nev. 1949);
See State of Louisiana Dep't, of Highways, 3 19 So.2d 808, 81 1 (La. Ct. App. 1975).
It is logically necessary to analyze the benefits to both the subject property, as well as the
neighborhood properties, to determine whether the benefit is unique and directly flows to the
Defendants' remaining property or generally benefits the neighborhood. See I.C. $7-71 1 (3).
If condemning authority's experts fail to analyze abutting neighborhood property, their
determination of special benefits is incomplete, and such testimony must be barred and not admitted
for the purposes of offsetting severance damage. Daniels v. State Road Dep 't, 170 So. 2d 846,854
(Fla. 1964), Limmiatis v. Canal Auth., 253 So.2d 912, 914 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971); City of
Jaclnonville v. Yerkes, 282 So.2d 645, 646 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
In Daniels, the Defendant argued that the State's evidence did not show the benefit described
was special or peculiar to the remaining property or any different than the benefit received by the
general public. 170 So. 2d at 854. The Supreme Court of Florida stated:
Thus, insofar as "enhancement in value" is concerned, evidence thereof would not be
admissible without proof that the increase in value resulted directly and peculiarly to
the landowner's remaining land as a result of the improvement, over and above that
enjoyed by neighboringproperty which might or might not be on the highway. "The
question in each case is whether or not the special facilities afforded by the
improvementhave advanced themarket value ofthe property beyond the mere general
appreciation of property in the neighborhood." Daniels, 170 S.2d at 854 (quoting
Pittsburgh B&B Ry. Co. V. McCloskey, 1 A. 555,556) (emphasis added).

In Limmiatis,theCourt of Appeals reversed a special benefit determinationbecause the State's
appraiser failed to contrast any specific benefit to the property at,issue to a general benefit to the
neighborhood. 253 So.2d at 914. The Court stated:
We do not feel that Smith's testimony regarding enhancement was based upon any
specific benefit to appellant's property as contrasted to other property in the
neighborhood. On the contrary, Smith's testimony indicates that if there was
enhancement at all, the enhancement is general to the neighboring properties and not
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special to the appellant's parcel. Where it appears that the testimony of the
condemnor's appraiser is based upon an erroneous concept of law, it is error for the
trial court not to strike such testimony. Limmiatis, 253 So.2d at 914. (citing Finkel
v. State Road Dep't, 216 So.2d 463 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
In Yerkes, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision to strike the State's
evidence of special benefit:

...before evidenceof enhancement can be introduced it inustbe proven that the
increase in value resulted directly and peculiarly to thelandowner's remaining
land and not just to the neighborhood as a whole. No such evidence was
proffered in the instant case. Therefore, it appears that the judge was
eminently correct in striking the testimony as to enhancement. Yerkes, 282
So.2d at 646 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
In no event can general benefits (such as road widening, sidewalks, sewer lines, landscaping
or street lights) be offset against severance damages to reduce just compensation.
l'raftic, In~prg\.edl ' r a ? P d i t i o n s
and Increased Business ?'r&
are General Benefits \\'l~ich
Be Offset from the 1)arnapes to Remainder.
Increased
-

cam

The distinction between general and special benefits has been carefhlly defined and delineated
by the courts. However in practical application, distinguishingbetween the two types ofbenefits has
been a daunting task for the courts and generally depends on the particular facts and circumstances
of each case as noted by one court.
There is probably more judicial discord as to what is or is not a special benefit than
in any other area of the law of eminent domain. Where there is an actual physical
improvement to the property, such as the draining of a swamp, it is easy to see a
special benefit. It is equally easy to recognize, at the other end of the spectium, a
general benefit such as an improved system of highways, since everybody in a
community benefits from such an improvement. The difficulty lies in the amorphous
grey area between these two extremes.
Taylor v. State ex re. Herman, 467 P.2d 251,254 (Az.1970),
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Notwithstanding, a review of case authority reveals that most jurisdictions recognize that an
appreciation in the value of the remainder property caused by an increased traffic flow and conditions
by the property is a general benefit which cannot be offset against severance damages.
In State Highway Comrn'n v. Parlcer, 387 S.W.2d 505 (Mo. 1965), the Missouri Supreme
Court held as follows:

-

The fact that more traffic mav be 'knnelled' from the new limited access hirrhwav
onto the 'Belt' and past condemnees' property is not a special benefit accruing directly
and oroximatelv thereto hvreason of the construction of the road. The increased flow
of traffic would benefit the area generally and not specifically condemnees' property.
(Citations omitted).
Id. at 507.
Relying on language from prior decisions, the Court quoted: "[tlhis court has held that
increastd facilities for the travel and transportation of the general public are not such benefits as may
be deducted from the compensation and damages." Id. (quoting State Highway Commission v.
Vorhof-Duenke Co., 366 S.W.2d at 339). "Upon the more general subject, we have said that 'traffic,
great or small, is merely an incident of streets and highways and cannot be considered &as an
element of damages or benefits."Id (quoting State Highway Commission v. Turk, 366 S.W.2d at
422) (emphasis added).

In State Dept. Of Trans. v. Montgomery Ward Dev., 7 19 P.2d 507, 5 13 (0r.App. 1986), the
Oregon Court of Appeals held, "[Elvidence of increased traffic volume is not evidence of a special
benefit and should not have been admitted."
InNew Jersey TurnpikeAuth. v. Herrontown Woods,Inc., 367 A.2d 893,897 (1976), theNew
Jersey Supreme Court held that "benefits arising from increased facilities of travel, such as the
increase in value from increased population and trade which such facilities bring, are general
benefits." (quoting Sullivan v. North Hudson R.R. Co., 18 A. 689 (1889)).
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See Petkus v. State Highway Comm'n, 130 N.W.2d 253 (1964) (A benefit must be to the
condemnee's land, not his business).
A good test to determine whether a benefit is special is whether the alleged benefit results in
a vested right. In Idaho, the law is clear that aproperty owner involved in a condemnation action does
not have a claim for damages due to the installation of traffic control devices which divert the traffic
flow or pattern. State v. Bastian, 97 Idaho 444, 546 P.2d 399 (1976) (Courts have traditionally
recognized that governmental acts primarily concerned with public safety and arbitration of social
conflict are entitled to great weight in that scale). By the same token, this follows as an inescapable
corollary that increased flow of traffic is not regarded as a special benefit. State by Mattson v. Colon,
194 N.W2d 574 (Minn.1972). See also, State Highway Comm'n v. Parker, in&., State Dept. Of
Trans. v. Montgomery Ward Dev., infra, New Jersey Turnpike Auth. v, Herrontown Woods, Inc.,
infra.
Whether or not a condemnation action is commenced, governmental acts performed under the
police power for the public health, safety and welfare, including but not limited to regulating traffic
and installing traffic control devices, are legitimate functions of government which do not necessarily
invoke its eminent domain power or trigger co~npensationto landowners whose property may be
affected by the action.
Acknowledgingthis well established legal proposition, which is recognized in most, if not a11
the jurisdictions, courts have consistently held that the benefits that may accrue kom a particular
improve~nent,i.e. a traffic control device (for example, a signalized intersectio~l)for which the land
was taken results in a benefit to the whole comn~unityas opposed to a special and direct benefit to
the remaining property involved.
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As the old adage goes, "What's good for the goose, is good for the gander." Since property
owners do not have a vested right nor are they entitled to damages arising from traffic conditions,
governmental agencies cannot assert that its acts perfonned under its police power for the benefit of
the public health, safety and welfare constitute a special benefit for which damages to the remainder
may be offset.
The reasoning and rationale in the constitutional sense to offset special benefits against the
severance damage to the remaining property is best explained in Nichols:
The rationale for this view is the coilstitutionai requirement for payment of just
compensation which has generally been interpreted to mean fair and adequate
monetary compensation for land actually taken regardless of any benefits to the
remainder. To offset benefits against the part taken would discriminate unfairly
against the condemneebecause aneighboring owner whose land was not condemned
would get the benefits of the public improvement while the condemnee would not
only have some of his land taken, but would he forced to pay for his benefits by
receiving a reduced sum or potentially no compensation for his property taken.
Likewise, to charge the owner for general benefits to his remainder, which he and his
neighbors equally enjoy, would unfairly discriininate against the condemnee on the
sole basis that a portion of his land was taken while his neighbors was not.
Themaiority of jurisdictions do not permit neneral benefits to set offdanaees because
the citizen whose propertv is taken cannot be coinvelled to bear more of the cost of
thevublic improvement and general benefits result in^ therefrom than is borne by other
provertv owners whose provertv is not taken. Thus. special benefits have been
narrowlv conceived in order to avoid unfairness of making one man pav in land
for which another receives free. (Emphasis added).
3 Nichols $ 8A.02[1], p. 8A-26.

6. WORST CASE SCENARIO
In this case, the State of Idaho has condemned Defendants' frontage on Pole Line Road.
1. Idaho Cases Have Established the Rule that Damages to the Remainder Are to be
Assessed Rased Uoon the Most Iniurious Use by the Government of the Land Taken Which is
Reasonably Possible.
Five Idaho case have so held. The first case to address this issue was decided in 1911, in
Idaho- Western Railway Co. I: Columbia Conference ofEvangelical Lutheran Augustana Synod, 20
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Idaho 568, 119 P. 60 (191 1). In that case, a portion of property which was then being used for a
college campus was condemned for a railroad line. There were many issues on appeal and the
decisioil is lengthy. The Idaho Supreme Court, in addressing severance damages, quoted the statute
relating to assessment ofjust compensation which was then in effect, Section 5220 of the Revised
Codes. The language in that section relating to severance damages read as follows:
If the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a larger parcel, the damages
which will accrue to the portion not sought to be condemned,by reason of its severance froin
the portion sought to be condemned, and the construction of the improvement in the manner
proposed by the plaintiff. Id. at 580.
That language has remained unchanged since 1911 and is now codified in Idaho Code Section 7-71 1.
The Court then discussed the statute as follows:
Our statute therefore provides for the assessment of damages and benefits sustained and
received by the remaining parcel of land after the severance, and which is caused 'by reason
of its severance from the property sought to be condemned' and the 'construction of the
improvement proposed' by the condemnor. Under this statute, it was proper for the land
owner to introduce such evidence and proofs as were available, tending to show the
depreciation in value which would result to the remaining- portion
of its land after the
severance ofthis particular tract, and in doing so the statute specifically authorizes taking into
in the manner proposed
by the plaintiff.'
consideration 'the construction of the improveme~~t
- This latter provision of the statute clearly authorizes the land owner to introducLevidence
showing the damage and injury that the particular improvement or structure for which the
condemnation is sought will cause to the remainder of his property. The statute requires the
condemnor to disclose the purpose for which he is seeking to condemn the property and the
general nature and character of the improvement or structure he expects to erect in order to
bring hiinselfwithin the constitution and the statute. (Sec. 14, art. 1., Const.; sec. 5210, Rev.
Codes), and entitle him to maintain his condemnation proceeding. Id. at 581-582.
Elsewhere in the decision, the Court addressed the complaint by the colldemnor that the
property owner introduced evidence regarding additional damages that could be caused if the railroad
installed a double track rather than a single track or used the property acquired for a switching yard.
The condemnor's plans included only a single tract. The Court set forth the issue and the applicable
rule of law as follows:
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The appellant also co~nplainsof the action of the court in allowing witnesses on behalf
of the appellant to testify as to the probable annoyance and damage that would be
produced to the school and school property by the use of this land for railroad
purposes in the event it should lay a double track or should use the ground for
switching purposes. The objection made to this line of evidence was based on the
grounds that it did not appear in the case that the railroad company intended to do
anything more than build a single line of track over this ground. As weunderstand the
rule in such cases, the company might have bound itself by its original pleadings and
proceedings, or by stipulation, in the action to maintain only a single track and not to
use the ground for switching purposes. It did not, however, see fit to do this. It was
competent, therefore, for the land owner to prove the damage that it would probably
sustain by reason of the most numerous and injurious use to which the condemning
party might lawfully put the property under its condemnation for railroad purposes.
Id. at 588-589 (citation omitted).
The "most injurious use" issue next arose in Idaho in the 1925 case of Crane v. City of
Harrison, 40 Idaho 229,232 P. 578 (1 925), in which an owner of property abutting a public street
sued the City for damages caused by a change in grade of the sheet. The Court cited the IdahoWestern Railway case and, based in part thereon, determined that the owner was not entitled to
damages:
In the case ofIdaho etc. Ry. Co. v. Columbia etc. Synod, 20 Ida. 568,119 Pac. 60, which was
an action brought under the eminent domain statutes for the purpose of determining the value
of the property sought to be talcen and damage to the property not taken, in the course of that
opinion it was held that damages should be assessed once and for all time and should be based
upon the most injurious use to which the conde~nnormay lawfully put the property. If this
is a correct statement of the rule, at the time the municipality acquired the right of way for
street purposes, appellant or his predecessor was given damages once and for all time, based
upon the most injurious use of the land reaso~iablypossible to which the city might lawfully
put it. Id. at 234.
The Crane decision was cited at length and approvingly, including the portion quoted above,
in the 1935 Idaho Supreme Court case Powell v. McKelvey, 56 Idaho 291,53 P.2d 626 (1935). The
case was again considered in Foster's inc. v. Boise City, 63 Idaho 201, 118 P.2d 721 (1941). In
Foster's, Inc., the City installed parking meters and the property owner complained in part that the
meters amounting to taking the property of the abutting owner without due process of law. The
Supreme Court disagreed saying:
DEFENDANTS' TRIAL BRIEF - 22

The first proposition is hereinbefore answered, to the effect that: Dedication or
condemnation of a street contemplatesthe most onerous and injurious mode of use to
which it can be lawfully devoted. [citations omitted]. For illustration, we held in
Crane v. City of Harrison, supra, that the lowering of a grade in front of Crane's
residence, and thereby destroying his water and sewer pipes, was covered and
contemplated by the original condemnation; and any resultant injuries were damnum
absque injuria.
In Powell v. McKelvey, supra, we held that the construction of an underpass below
the street grade, in front of an abutting property owner, was covered by the original
condemnation and not a cause of actionable damage to the abutting land owner. In the
later case Mr. Justice Givens reviewed the Doyle and Crane cases and many opinions
from other courts holding the same effect.
If it be urged that the construction and erection of parking meters along the street in
front of abutting property could not be foreseen or contemplated when the streets were
laid out, we answer that, while they may be true, there is as muchreason for supposing
they were contemplated as to suppose that traffic on the street would ever be
conducted by motor cars; or that there would ever be occasion to park such
mechanisms on the street. Such as always, however, within the range of possibility
and, therefore, a possible use. Id. at 213.
The Court then went to cite case decisions from other states involving parking meters.
The issue did not arise in appellate decisions again until 1991, with the case of Reisenauer v.
State, 120 Idaho 36, 8 13 P.2d 375 (1 991), a Court of Appeals case. The Reisenauer case involved
the change of a State roadway. Additional lanes were added and the road moved closer to the
Reisenauer's property, although none of their property was acquired or condemned and the State
utilized only existing right of way. The Reisenauer Court quoted the Powell v. McKeh~eydecision,
including the portions thereof which quoted the Idaho Western Railway decision from 1911. The
Court then followed the rule that just compensation was assessed once and for all, based upon the
most injurious use of the property possible, finding that the Reisenauers were therefore not entitled
to any compensation, as their predecessors in interest were compensated for the most injurious use
the State could make of its right of way when the right of way was origiiially purchased several years
earlier
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The Reisenauer Court cited additional authority for the rule as follows:
As additional support for this conclusion, we adopt the language from American
Jurisprudence 2d which the district court cited in its opinion:
Often, after land has been taken for a particular public use and devoted to that use in
the customary manner for a number of years, an increase in the public requiremeilts
makes an altered or increased use of the land desirable. In such a case, if the new use
is of the same character as the use for which the land was taken, and merely amounts
to the advancement of the original purpose, as when the wrought portion of a highway
is widened so as to include the whole of the original location, or a second track is laid
upon a railroad right of way, there is only an exercise of the easement which had been
taken in the first place, and the owner of the fee has no ground for complaint, even if
he is deprived of privileges in the land taken which he had previously enjoyed, or his
remaining land suffers damages froin the increased use by the public from which it
had previously been exempt. All these damages were paid for when the original
taking was made, and the owner's good fortune in not suffering injury for several
years for which he had been filly paid cannot be the basis of a property right protected
by the Constitution, or entitle him to be paid both when the right to inflict the damage
is acquired by the public and when the damage is actually inflicted.
26 Am.Jur.2d Eminent Domain 5 206, at 889 (1966) (emphasis added). Because it is clear
thattheReisenauers 'predecessors in interest were paid just compensationfor the right-of-way
acquiredby the state in 1937, the Reisenauers cannot obtain any additional compensation for
alleged inverse condemnation. Id. at 40.
Reisenauev was addressedinKillinger v. Twin Falls Highway District, 135 Idaho 322,17 P.3d
266 (2000):
In taking cases, as long as the basic character of the government's use does not
change, an expanded use of the government's right of way in not compensable. See
Reisenauer v. State Dept. of Highways, 120 Idaho 36, 40, 813 P.2d 375, 379
(Ct.App. 1991) (concluding that "if the new use is of the sane character as the use for
which the land was taken" the new use is only an advancement upon the original
taking and is not grounds for additional compensation). Where the government's use
does, however, constitute a fundamental change in the character of use from its
original use, the government's conduct amounts to a taking requiring compensation.
In Reisenauer, the Court of Appeals was faced with a situation where, in 1937, the
state of Idaho purchased a right-of-way to a strip of property from a landowner to use
in rea1igningU.S.Highway 95. The Reisenauers subsequently purchased the property
adjacent to the strip in 1943. In 1978, the state added a passing lane to the highway,
which moved the highway closer to the Reisenauev S property but was still within the
right-of-way strip of property. The Reisenauers initiated an inverse condemnation
action to recover compeilsation for several incidents where cars left the highway and
ended up on the Reisenauers' lawn. The Court ofAppeals determined the Reisenauers
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were not entitled to cornpensation because the state had already provided just
compensation to the previous owners and the subsequent addition of a passing land,
while changing the degree of use, was not a substantial change in the type of use.
See Reisenauer, 120 Idaho at 40-41, 813 P.2d 379-80 (finding the redesign of the
highway was not a change in the basic character of the type of use even though the
degree of use increased).
In this case, however, the property was formerly used by the abutting landowners as
an Access Road. The Killingers, in particular, used the Access Road for parking and
maneuvering large vehicles in connection with their business. Transforming the
property into a buffer zone without compensating the landowners for the loss of their
use of the property as an Access Road is a taking. The Access Road is no longer
usable for the same purposes as promised to the Killingers, but now is part of the state
highway system. Such a change in the type of use from which the property had
originally been set aside amounts to a taking requiring compensation.
Therefore, we hold that creation of the buffer zone constitutes a change in character
ofthe type ofuse and thus, a taking. Killinger, 135 Idaho at 270-217.
2. The "most iniurioususe" rule does not conflict with LC. 6 7-71 1(2), and the two have been
intemreted consistently
At first glance, it may appear as though LC. $7-711(2) conflicts with the most injurious use
rule because the statute states that damages are to be assessed considering the constructionof the
improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff, and the most injurious use rule states that
damages are to be assessed assuming a worst case scenario. An analysis of the two rules however,
reveals that they are completely consistent.
In Idaho-Western Railway, the Idaho Supreme Court specifically discussed both the exact
language of what is today LC. 5 7-71 1 and the most injurious use rule. I11 that case, the condemning
railroad had a plan to construct a single line of railroad track on the part taken. The Court therefore
reasoned that it was wholly appropriate for the owner to consider damages sustained from the railroad
use, such as noise, dust, etc. The Court interpreted the statute as requiring the condemning authority
to set out the general nature and character for which the property was being condemned. According
to the Court, the phrase "the construction of the improvement in themanner proposed by the plaintiff'
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did not refer to the particular plan of the plaintiff to construct one railroad track, but instead referred
to the plaintiff's proposed improvement of the property taken for railroad purposes. The owners
could therefore consider in assessing damages the problems associated with railroad uses, such as
noise and dust disturbances. See Idaho- WesternRailway Co. v. Columbia Conference ofEvangelical
Lutheran Augustana Synod, 20 Idaho at 581-582.
In that same case, the owners were also allowed to consider damages which would arise from
use of the property taken for a double track railroad, or the use of the property as a railroad
switchyard. Such considerations were appropriate, concluded the Court, because the condemnor had
not limited or committed itself in the original pleadings and proceedings to only use the property
taken for a single track. Once the condemnor acquired the property, even though the immediate plan
might be to lay a single track, the railroad would be within its fee simple property rights to use the
land for a second track or a switchyard, or other railroad purposes. Since damages are assessed only
once and for all time, if an expansion of use for the same purposes is not considered in assessing just
compensation, the owner will never receive compensation for those additional damages.
The intentions of the condemning authority are not relevant in assessing damages; rather,
damages are assessed based on what rights the condemnor acquires and not how he uses them. When
property is acquired for railroad purposes, therefore, all possible railroad purposes may be considered.
It is possible for the condemning authority to narrowly define the taking and set forth a particular use,
i.e. one single track, but where this is not done, damages from the general type of use and the most
injurious use are properly considered. See Idaho- WesternRailway Co. v. Columbia Conference of
Evangelical Lutheran Augustana Synod, 20 Idaho at 588-589.
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Since the Idaho- WesternRailway decision in 1911, the Idaho Courts have not interpreted I.C.

5 7-71 1 and the most injurious use rule together. The case is still good law, and therefore, the Court's
interpretation and reasoning in that case is binding in this case.

H. COMPARABLE SALES
Value witnesses often arrive at their opinions based in part on an analysis of sales of property
which they consider to be comparable to the subject property. One of the issues which may arise is
whether a "comparable sale" truly does compare to the subject property so that it may be accurately
deemed "comparable." The general rule is that evidence of allegedly con~parablesales should not be
excluded when offered on direct examination.
In State Ex. Rel. Symms v. Collier, 93 Idaho 19,454 P.2d 56 (1969); rehr'g denied, the Court
considered an appeal by the State in an eminent domain proceeding where the State alleged that
comparable sales used by the Defendant's experts werenot sufficientlysimilar to the subject property.
In stating the issue the Court wrote:
Appellant...objected to admission into evidence of expert testimony considering so-called
comparable sales of other property in the area. On appeal it is urged that the comparables,
were developed to a greater extent, were smaller in acreage and, in one instance, were located
in a different area, than the subject property. Most jurisdictions follow the rule cited in Hays
v. State, 342 S.W.2d 167, at 170, 171 (Tex.Ct.Civ.App. 1960):
'Evidence of sales of comparable properties may be offered under three conditions:
(I) on direct examination of expert or lay witnesses as independent substantive
evidence of the value of the property to which the comparison relates, or (11) on direct
examination of the value-witness to give an account of the factual basis upon which
he founds his opinion on the issue of value of the real estate in controversy, or (111) on
cross-examination of the value-witness to test his knowledge, experience and
investigation and thus affect the weight to be given to his opinions.'
Accord, State v. 0.0673 Acres of Land, Etc., 224 A.2d 598 (Dela. 1966); State Highway
Commission v. McNiSf, 395 P.2d 29 (Wyo. 1964); 5 Nichols, The Law of Eminent Domain,
5 21.3 [3] (1962).
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The Court found that in the case in question, the testimony regarding the comparable sales had been
introducedlmder category two (11) above. The court held that the introduction ofthe comparable sales
on direct was proper and the trial court had committed no abuse of discretion in allowing it to be
admitted. Quoting another opinion, the Court explained the standards for admissibility of comparable
sales as follows:
'The criteria of sirnilarity varies in diminishing degree for each category. The strict
foundation requirements, apply when evidence of comparable sales is offered as substantive
proof of the value of property taken. A lesser foundation of comparability is required when
evidence of other sales is offered in support of, and as background for, opinion testimony and
not as independent substantive evidence of value. The reasons of relevancy, which require
that a foundation of similarity be laid for direct examination, vanish when, evidence of other
sales is elicited upon cross-examination to impeach an expert.' State v. 0.0673 Acres ofland,
Etc., supra, 224 A.2d at 601. (citations omitted) [underlining added for emphasis].
Therefore, so long as evidence of comparable sales is offered on direct examination of a valuewitness, the fact that the siinilarity of the comparable sales to the subject property may be questioned
by the State of Idaho does not bar their admissibility
I. HEARSAY EVIDENCE
Unlike in most cases, hearsay is generally admitted (under limited circumstances) in eminent
domain cases. An expert witness is permitted to rely upon hearsay in which he uses to make up his
opinion. McElligott v. Freeland, 33 P.2d 430, 139 Cal.App. 143 (1934); United States v. 5139.5
Acres ofland, 200 F.2d 659 (1952); Covina Union High Sch. Dist. o f l o s Angeles Co. v. Jobe, 345
P.2d 78, 174 Cal.App.2d 340 (1959); 12 ALR3d 1064. Each of the defendant's experts, and to the
same extent the Plaintiffs experts, have relied on hearsay in part to aid thein in arriving at their
conclusions. This is common practice in the real estate and development business, and it is necessary
in aniving at the expert's final opinion of value.
Hearsay evidence should be allowed specifically with regards to comparable sales and prices
paid for property. Two factors need to be considered in order to allow this type of testimony: it must
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be shown that the witness is an expert and that the sales are comparable and recent. State Highway
Commission v. Greenjeld, 399 P.2d 989,145 Mont. 164 (1965). Idaho Rule of Evidence 702 (Expert
Witnesses) states that a witness may testify as an expert witness if they possess scientific, technical,
or other specialized knowledge which will assist the trier of fact. Each of the Defendant's witnesses
possess some sort of technical skill and specialized knowledge which will aid the trier of fact in
determining just compensation. Furthermore, all of the comparable sales are recent in time. The
witnesses, for the Defendants and for the State, should be allowed to testify to comparable sales that
they each investigated.
It is in the discretion of the trial court to allow an expert to render an opinion based upon
hearsay. An expert may rely on hearsay as long as he testifies to the specific basis of his opinion and
reaches an opinion through his own independentjudgment. Duty v. Bishara, 123Idaho 329,848 P.2d
387 (1992). Each of the witnesses base some portion of their opinion on hearsay evidence, but the
final opinion of each witness is based on their own independent judgment. The court should allow
such testimony, as well as exploration into the basis for each experts opinion on cross-examination.
Limited hearsay has been admitted by the Court in each case. Obviously, not all types of
hearsay are admissible in condemnation cases, only that upon which the experts normally rely.

J. BURDEN OF PROOF
Normal burden of proof rules do not apply in condemnation cases. In State v. McGill, 79
Idaho 467, 321 P.2d 595 (1958), the Idaho Supreme Court cited State v. Dunclick, 77 Idaho 45,
286 P.2d 1112 (1955), and stated the rule that the burden of proving the amount of damages
sustained, i.e., the value of the land taken and resulting damage to the remainder, is to be borne by
the conde~nnee. However, since that time a number of jurisdictions have ruled that the general
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doctrine of burden of proof is inapplicable in a condemnation action, and Idaho would probably do
the same if the issue were presented.
In City of Wichita v. Jennings, 199 ICan. 621,433 P.2d 351 (1967), the Supreme Court of
Kansas specifically held the general doctrine of burden of proof was inapplicable in a condemnation
case.
The appellants contend the trial court erred in instructing the jury that: 'The burden
of proof is upon the landowners to establish the amount of compensation to be paid.'
They suggest that K.S.A. 26-513 provides:
'Private property shall not be taken or damages for public use without
just compensation.'
and the trial of a condemnation action violates the statute and constitutional
prohibitions unless just compensation is awarded regardless of the burden of proof.
There is much merit to appellants' suggestion.
The instruction as given above is the same as that placed in the Pattern Instructions
for Kansas. (P.I.K. 11.02.) However, the committee drafting such instructions
expressed the belief "that because of the special nature of the land condemnation case
a burden ofproof instruction is not practical or helpful."
There is no uniformity among the authorities as to the necessity of giving such an
instruction or the nature of the instruction that should be given.
If the appraisers' award were disclosed to the jury, the burden of proof could well be
placed on the landowner to prove a higher value and on the condemner to prove a
lesser value. However, since the appraisers' award is not so disclosed and in view of
the fact that in condemnation proceedings there is no formal joinder of issues, we
conclude that the general doctrine of burden of proof is inapplicable. A general
discussion of the question, with annotations, will be found in 5 Nichols on Eminent
Domain, 3d Ed., 5 18.5 p. 300. It should be understood we do not find such an
instruction standing along to be sufficiently prejudicial to justify a reversal.
What has been said as to the burden of proof in no way reflects on the rule requiring
the landowner to go forward with the evidence. Orderly and consistent procedure
requires that one of the litigants be required to so proceed in all cases.
The Jennings case was reaffirmed in City of Wichita v. May's Company Incovpouated, 510 P.2d 184
(1973), where the Supreme Court of Kansas said:
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The city argues some responsibility rests on the landowner to introduce evidence
sufficient to submit to a jury. Since our decision in City of Wichita v. Jennings, 199
Kan. 621, 433 P.2d 351, eliminated the burden of proof doctrine in condemnation
proceedings, this argument fails. We hold there is an equal duty and responsibility on
the parties to supply the evidence required by the statute. Justice requires that a new
trial be ordered when each of the parties to a condemnation appeal fails to provide
sufficient admissible evidence as a basis for a jury verdict.

In State v. 45,621 Square Feet of Land, 475 P.2d 553 (Alaska 1970), the Supreme Court of
Alaska specificallyruled that the landowner does not have the burden of proving by a preponderance
of the evidence the just compensation to which he is entitled.

In a condemnation proceeding such as the case at bar where the sole issue is
determination ofjust compensation, procedural rules involving the concept of risk of
failure to persuade are inapposite. Here the focal point of the trier of fact's inquiry is
the ascertainment ofjust compensation. Thus, regardless of whether the condemning
agency or the property owner meets a given burden of persuasion, Alaska's
constitutional mandate requires that the owner be awarded just compensation for the
property he has lost. In the usual condemnation case, the jury is confronted with
conflicting opinions as to value. The jury is not faced with the necessity of finding a
varticular value or no value at all. As to the issue of fair market value, both the
condemning agency and the property owner may produce competent evidence of the
fair market value of the condemned -property.
- - Absent the production of such evidence
by either party, the triers of fact will determine fair market value solely from the other
party's evidence. The burden of production facet of burden of proof, rather than the
risk of non-persuasion aspect, is the more meaningful concept in the trial of a
condemnation proceeding.
Other courts have reached similar conclusions regarding the inappropriateness of burden of proof
instructions, in the risk of non-persuasion sense for condemnation purposes. Since 1920 the courts
of Ohio have held that the doctrine of burden of proof has no application to condemnation
proceedings. Martin v. City of Columbus, 101 Ohio St. 1, 127 N.E. 411 (1920); Ellis v. Ohio
Turnpike Commission, 70 Ohio Law Abst. 417, 124 N.E.2d 424, 432 (Ct.App. 1955); In re
Appropriation by Director ofHighways, 120 Ohio App. 273,201 N.E.2d 889, 894 (Ct.App. 1963).
In reaching this conclusion, the Ohio courts have placed emphasis on the absence of adversary
pleadings, and the jury's paramount function of ascertainingjust compensation for the property taken.
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The 45,621 Square Feet of Land case was reaffirmed in Ketchikan Cold Storage Company
v. State, 491 P.2d 143 (Alaska 1971) as follows:

In State v. 45,621 Square Feet of Land, 475 P.2d 553, 555 (Alaska
1970), we held that 'instructions on burden of proof . . . are
inappropriate in condemnation actions.' On retrial of the case at bar
that decision will be controlling. We note here only that the
instruction given below on burden of proof exacerbated the injury
done appellant's case by the trial court's improper severance of the
coilcept of highest and best use from the other indicia of property
value.
In State v. Amunsis, 61 Wash. 2d 160,377 P.2d 462 (1963), the Supreme Court of Washington
acknowledged that an instruction placing the burden of proof on the property owner should not be
given:
It is, however, as we have said, an inappropriate instruction in such a
case, and we express the hope that the state will cease to ask for it and
that trial judges will cease to give it.
The following quotation from Martin v. City of Columbus (1920), I01 Ohio
St. 1, 127 N.E. 41 1 (see note 3), admirably expresses our own views:
'The considerations touching the burden of proof between the parties
to a condemnation case, upon the question of value, have all been
based upon the assunlption that there is a burden of proof. If there is
a burden of proof, the question properly arises as to whom shall meet
it, who shall carry it, and if there be a shortage in that respect, as to
whom shall fail.
Very properly, however, the question that first is entitled to our
consideration is this: Is there any 'burden of proof,' as that phrase is
used and defined in the practice of the Iaw touching cases of this
character?
It may be helpful at this stage of the case to consider what is meant by
the technical phrase 'burden of proof.'. . . .
It then quotes fi-om 16 Cyc. 926, and 23 Cyc. 368, and continues:
'From the foregoing texts it is quite apparent that there is no technical,
formal, legal issue relating to the value of the property in question, to
which the technical phrase 'burden of proof may intelligently and
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reasonably be applied. There is no definite, concrete, particular issue
of fact to be submitted to the jury, which is affirmed on one side and
denied upon the other. The nature of the controversy between the
parties is such that it does not permit or admit of any such simplicity
of statement, of any such definiteness of controversy, of any formula
of fact, which is claimed on one side and denied upon the other.

In order to raise such form of technical issue, to which rules arising out
of burden of proof would apply, it would be necessary for the one
party to determine upon a definite, particular proposal as to value,
which definite proposal would be affirmed by one party and denied by
the other. Such unusual proposal would doubtless furnish the
necessary technical issue to which the technical rules applicable to
burden of proof would apply; but such would be most unusual in a
condemnation case, where the witnesses for the condemnor, was well
as for the property owner, will vary thousands of dollars as to what the
fair market value of the property is at the time of the inquiry, so that
the jury would have before it no definite issue to which it could
logically and reasonably apply the doctrine known as 'burden of
proof. '

* * * You might as well undertake to fit a hat to a headless man as to
fit the doctrine of burden of proof to a proceeding of this character,
which is absolutely wanting an issue to which such dochille can be
applied.'
For the reasons indicated, there should hereafter be no suggestion that either the property
owner or the condemner, in such a case, has to prove the fair market value at the time of trial
of the property being condemned. After the condemner has met the burden of going forward
with the evidence as to value, it is a question for the jury on the probative effect of all the
evidence regardless of who offered it, and the jury should be so instructed.
For additional authority, see Bellevue v. Stedman, 63 Ohio Ap. 150, 16 Ohio Op. 423,25 N.E.2d 695
(1939); United States v. 4.105 Acres of Land, 68 F.Supp. 279 (1946); Patterson Redevelopment
Agency v. Bienstoclc, 123 N.J. Super. 457,303 A,2d 598 (1973); and Morrisseui v. Commonwealth
Department ofHighways, 424 Pa. 87,225 A.2d 895 (1967).
Based on the foregoing, the property owner has only the burden of going forward with the
evidence. Defendants request that no burden of proof instruction be given. In the alternative, the
Defendants request that an instruction be given which makes it clear that the Defendants have only
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the burden of persuading the trier of fact that the just compensation due is more than the amount
advocated by the State of Idaho.

K. ILLUSTRATIVE EXHIBITS
Listed below are the relevant sections of the Idaho Rules of Evidence that address the
admissibility of demonstrative and illustrative evidence:
I.R.E. 402 - Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence inadmissible.
All relevant evidence is admissible except as otherwise provided by these rules or by
other rules applicable in the courts of this state. Evidence which is not relevant is not
admissible.
I.R.E. 403 -Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste
of time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation
of cumulative evidence.
I.R.E. 901 -Requirement of authentication or identification
(1) General provision. The requirement of authentication or identification as a
condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a
finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.
Listed below are the relevant sections of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure that address
whether or not the jury may take demonstrative or illustrative evidence into the jury room.
1.R.C.P 47(0) - Notes by jurors.
Unless prohibited by order of the court, a juror may take or make written notes during
a trial and take them with the juror when the jury retires for deliberation. The court
shall give the jury appropriate admonishments at the beginning of the trial and at such
other times as the court determines necessary to enforce this rule.
I.R.C.P. 47@) -Taking documents and exhibits to jury room.
Upon retiring for deliberation the jury shall, ifpractical, take with them all writtenjury
instructions and exhibits which have been admitted as evidence in the trial, except
depositions.
1.

Distinction between Demonstrative and Illustrative Evidence
"Courts interchangeably use the terms 'demonstrative evidence' and 'illustrative
evidence' to refer to evidence which is offered to assist the jury in understanding
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the testimony of a witness or other evidence, such as the use of a diagram, map,
model, photograph or chart to which a witness refers while testifying." D. Craig
Lewis, Idaho Trial Handbook 258 (1995).
2.

Admissibility of Demonstrative Evidence
'The admission of an exhibit for demonstrative purposes depends on whether the
exhibit supplements the testimony of witnesses or assists the jury in obtaining a
better understanding of facts in issue." Masters v. Dewey, 109 Idaho 579, 709 P.2d
149 (1985). "Admission or exclusion of relevant demonstrative evidence is
detennined by the trial court through balancing the probative value of the evidence
against the dangers of unfair prejudice, distraction, confusion of issues and waste
of time. I.R.E. 403." Id.
"A diagram offered for il~ushativepurposes needs only to be relevant to illustrate a
witness's testimony; it does not have to be shown to be precisely accurate or
consistent with the testimony of other witnesses." Idaho Trial Handbook at 259
(citing State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 864 P.2d 596 (1993) in which diagram
was properly admitted where not to scale and admittedly inconsistent with another
witness's testimony)
"An illustrative exhibit based on hearsay evidence may be admissible where the
underlying evidence qualifies under a hearsay exception" Id. (citing Cosgrove v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, I17 Idaho 470, 788 P.2d 1293 (1989) in which an
illustrative exhibit summarizing records was properly admitted where data on
which exhibit was based qualified under business records, public records, and
market report hearsay exceptions).

3.

Taking Documents and Exhibits to J u r ~
Room.
The Idaho Courts have addressed taking documents and exhibits to the jury room. In

Powell v. Sellers, 130 Idaho 122,937 P.2d 434(Ct. App. 1997), the court determined that the
failure to submit three illustrative exhibits to the jury during deliberations was error. However,
the court further determined that "the error in failing to submit the three exhibits was harmless in
light of the fact that other exhibits adequately satisfy the illustrative purpose behind their
admission." Id. at 127.
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In Sears v. Lyndon, 5 Idaho 358,49 P. 122 (1897), the Idaho Supreme Court held that it
was error to refuse to allow the jury to take with them a certified copy of a writ of attaclment
under which a seizure was made.
In short, the only foundation required for illustrative/demonstrative evidence is a showing
that it will assist the witness in testifymg. Further, according to 1.R.C.P 47(p), if the exhibit has
been admitted into evidence, it should go to the jury room during deliberations. Consequently, all
exhibits admitted into evidence are to be taken to the jury room.
L. PROJECT INFLUENCE
Project Influence in eminent domain cases reflects the concept that, in the interests of
fairness, valuation of a landowner's property in the "before take" conditioil does not take into
consideration any influence on value attributable to the project, whether such influence is good or
bad. In determining proper just compensation, the land is valued in the "before take" condition as
if the project never existed. The rationale behind this principle is that neither the landowner nor
the government should benefit from the project's influence on land values. If the value of the land
is enhanced as a result of the project, the landowner should not be allowed to use the increased
value in detennining the before value and just compensation. Likewise, if the value of the land is
diminished as a result of the project, the government should not be allowed to use the lower value
in determining before value and just compei~sation.
There are no cases dealing with project influence in Idaho. However, the project influence
principle is well recognized in eminent domain law. In City ofPhoenix v. Clauss, 177 Ariz. 566,
869 P.2d 1219 (1994), the Arizona Court of Appeals stated:
The "project influence doctrine" (also referred to as "project enhancement") holds that
property may not be charged with a lesser or greater value at the time of taking, when the
change in value is caused by the taking itself or by anticipation of appreciation or
depreciation arising from the planned project. See State v. Hollis, 93 Ariz. 200,206,379
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P.2d 750,753 (1963) ("property cannot be charged with a lesser value at the time of taking
when the decrease in such value is occasioned by the taking itself,"); Uvodich v. Arizona
Board ofRegents, 9 Ariz. App. 400,405,453 P.2d 229,234 (1 969). [further citations
omitted]. Id. at 1221-22.
The effects of project influence can extend to comparable sales as well. Using sales of
land which are affected by project influence, beneficially or adversely, as comparables would be
as inappropriate as taking such influence into consideration in the valuation of the Plaintiffs land,
as the court went on to explain:
The doctrine also excludes evidence of "comparable" sales that reflect an enhanced or
reduced value due to the governmental plan or project that occasioned the taking of the
property in question. Ruelas, 19 Ariz. App. at 532, 508 P.2d at 1176. Id. at 1221-22.
The Arizona Court of Appeals also discussed the project influence doctrine when
considering whether zoning changes were brought about by project influence in Town of Paradise
Valley v. Young Financial Services, 177 Ariz. 388, 868 P.2d 971 (1 993); rev, denied, stating:
An important limitation on the rezoning exception is the "project influence doctrine." This
principle excludes all references to the probability of changes in value which occur
because of a proposed project of the condemning authority. See State v. Hollis, 93 Ariz.
200,206,379 P.2d 750,753 (1963); Uvodich v. Arizona Board of Regents, 9 Ariz. App.
400,405-06,453 P.2d 229,234 (1969). In Kansas City Power &Light Co. v. Jenln'ns, 648
S.W.2d 555,560 (Mo. App. 1983), the court stated:
'Zoning generally falls within the project influence doctrine. "The probability of
rezoning (or even an actual change in zoning) which results from the fact that the
project which is the basis for the taking was impending, cannot be taken into
account in valuing the property in the condemnation proceeding [emphasis
deleted]." 4 Nichols, Eminent Domain at 12.322[1] at 12-655 (3rd ed. 1981).'
The rule thus neutralizes the effect of the project for which the property was condemned.
The condemnee neither gets the benefit of increased valuation nor is left with decreased
valuation due to the condemnation project. Id. [referring to Nichols].
Although not referring to the "project influence doctrine" by that name, the Arizona
Supreme Court approved the doctrine in Hollis, 93 Ariz. at 206,379 P.2d at 753, in which
it stated:
It is competent to show the value of property as it would have been if no such
[project] had been contemplated. In other words, the property cannot be charged
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with a lesser value at the time of taking when the decrease in such value is
occasioned by reason of the taking itself. [Citations omitted.] See Uvodich, 9 Ariz.
App. at 405-06, 453 P.2d at 234, citing Hollis, Id. at 974-975.
Property, for eminent domain purposes, must be valued as if the government project which
results in the taking was neither contemplated nor carried out. See City of Sparks v. Armstrong,
748 P.2d 7, 103 Nev. 619, rehr'g denied.
M. COMPARABLE SALES SOLD AFTER TEIE DATE OF THE TAKING
Comparable sales which have taken place after the date of valuation (December 28,2004)
should be admissible as the basis for the opinion of an expert witness regarding the value of the
subject property. Courts have held that the use of cornparable sales occumng after the date of
valuation are admissible at the discretion of the trial judge. State ex rel. State Highway Corn. v.
Wertz, 478 SW2d 670, State, By Atty. Gen. v. Pioneer Co., Ltd., 637 P.2d 1131 (1980), Mette v.
Kemp, 69 P.2d 947 (1985), Davis v. Reed, 88 So 2d 857 (1956).
Comparable sales occurring after the date of valuation must be suEciently comparable in
character, close in time, and in a sufficiently similar location to be probative of the value of the
subject property. State Dep't of Highways, Div. ofHighways v. Silerthorne, 707 P.2d 1017
(Colo.App.), State v. Kunimoto, 617 P.2d 93 (1980).
It is anticipated that both sides may offer evidence of comparable sales occurring after
December 28,2004.

W. SEVERANCE DAMAGES AND COSTS TO CURE
Just compensation is to include payment for land taken and severance damages to the
remainder, if any.
I.C. § 7-71 1 determines the measure of damages in a condemnation case. Subsection 1
provides that the value of the property sought to be condemned is to be assessed and Subsection 2
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provides for severance damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be condemned by
reason of its severance from the portion to be condemned and the construction of the project by
the condemning authority.

" 1.

The value of the property sought to be condemned, and all improvements thereon pertaining to the realty, and of each and every separate estate or
interest therein; if it consists of different parcels, the value of each parcel and each
estate or interest therein shall be separately assessed. For purposes of ascertaining
the value of the property, the assessed value for property tax purposes shall be used
as the minimum amount for damages unless the court, jury or referee finds the
property has been altered substantially.
2.
If the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a
larger parcel, the damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be
condemned, by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be condemned,
and the construction of the improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff."

There is no provision in LC. 5 7-71 1 for "cost to cure" damages as opposed to severance
damages. Despite the recited statutory measure of just compensation, eminent domain case law
has developed a concept which recognizes that fair market value adjusts to consider the possibility
of restoring the damaged property to its before taking condition by expending the cost of curing
the damages to the remaining property. A fbll description of the cost to cure and how it is applied
is found in 5 Nichols on Eminent Domain, 6 18.18:
Generally, the evidence of damage in the case of a partial taking of property is used
to establish that a decrease in the market value of the land and improvements has
occurred as a result of the taking and to show the use to which the condemnor
intends to put the property. However, inasmuch as market value adjusts to
consider the possibility of restoring the damaged property to the same relative
position in which it stood before the taking, the courts have recognized the
admissibility of evidence of the cost of curing damages to the remaining property.
The criterion of damage adopted will be the one that produces the lesser damage
figure.
Several general rules of law have developed with regard to the concept of
cost to cure:
(1)

Evidence of the cost of restoring the remaining property as far as
possible to its original relative position is admissible only when the

DEFENDANTS' TRIAL BRIEF - 39

evidence of such cost is no greater in amount than the decrease in
market value of the property if it is left uncurred. In other words,
the cost to cure cannot exceed the damage to the remaining
property.
(2)

It is incumbent upon the owner to offer evidence of the damages
suffered by the remaining property prior to offering evidence of the
cost of curing such damages.

(3)

Evidence offered to establish the prospect of restoring the remaining
property to its original condition cannot be speculative. The ability
to cure damages to the remaining prooerty must be reasonably

certain.
In keeping with the requirement of certainty and nonspeculation with regard
to a proposed cure for the remaining property, it is well-established that any
proposed restoration must be contained within the existing boundaries of the tract.
The owner's right to compensation cannot be made to depend upon the speculative
premise that adjacent land could be purchased, thereby curing the damage.
It should be noted that the general rule is that the property owner is entitled to severance
damages. There are two exceptions to this general rule:
1. severance damages may be offset by special (as distinguished Erom general) benefits

which flow to a property as a direct result of the taking and the project, so if special
benefits equal or exceed severance damages, the property owner would not receive
compensation for severance damage; or
2. where it is possible to completely "cure" or "fix" the severance damages such that the
property in the after condition is restored to the same relative condition it was in before the
taking, the "cost to cure" may be awarded to the property owner in place of severance
damages. This is only true, however, where:
a) the cost to cure amount is less than the amount of severance damages; AND
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b) the "cure" or "fix" can be accolnplished wholly within the boundaries of the
remainder tract of property and cures, rather than mitigates, the damage. B & B
Food Corp. v. State, 96 A.D.2d 893 (1983).
In Sute v. Dunclick?, Inc., 77 Idaho 45,286 P.2d 1112 (1955), a condemnation action, the
State of Idaho advocated and offered testimony that other land adjacent or contiguous to the
property to be condemned, which was not owned by the Defendant on the date of taking, could be
acquired and substituted for the land taken. The Idaho Supreme Court held that this was not a
proper measure of damage in a condemnation case:
An examination of the transcript clearly indicates that it is respondent's
theory that other land adjacent or contiguous to appellant's plant, not owned by it,
could be acquired by appellant and substituted for the land taken. Further parts of
the transcript and testimony admitted could be quoted indicating this theory.
Respondent in its brief argues that such testimony of the availability and
substitution of other land for that taken is a proper matter to be submitted to the
jury.
Under our constitution and statutes, Art. 1, 5 14, Idaho Constitution and
sections 7-71 1 and 7-714 I.C., a defendant in a condemnation suit is entitled to be
paid in money the value of the property so taken and the damages which will
accrue to the part not taken because of its severance. Ryan v. Weiser Valley Land
& Water Co., 20 Idaho 288, 118 P. 769; Jeffery v. Chicago & M.Electric R. Co.,
138 Wis. 1,119 N.W. 879; 29 C.J.S., Eminent Domain 5 191b, p. 1089.
The condemnor cannot force an exchange of land, nor require the
conde~nneeto purchase other lands in lieu of that taken, nor pay for the land taken
and damages to the remainder in anything except cash. The law applicable to the
damages which appellants will sustain due to the taking does not contemplate an
exchange of property, nor can respondent require that appellants purchase or accept
other land in lieu of that taken or move the plant, or any part of it, to a new
location. The evidence proving damage which will besistained by appellants and
testified to by respondent's appraisers was all based on the theory that there was
other suitable available land: In St. Patrick's Church v. State, 294 N.Y.S.2d 275 (1968), the church acquired land for the
purpose of erecting a church, school, rectory and convent. Fourteen months after the taking, the
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church bought some adjacent property for $25,000. The state then claimed that the house on the
new property was worth $20,000 and that the church was therefore damaged only to the extent of
$5,000. The New York court specifically rejected this form of a cost to cure theory:
However, even if we were to assume the validity of the claimed values of
this land and the residence, we are unable to adopt the "cost to cure" theory
advanced by the State or to agree with its contention that the court erred in making
the award, which appears to be within the range of the testimony.
We are not here dealing with any mitigation of damages by something that
occurred or could occur upon the property remaining after the appropriation as in
Mayes Co. v. State of New York (18 N.Y.2d 549), where the "cost to cure" theory
was allowed because the cure was to occur within the bounds of the claimant's
lands. Sound reason requires that the theory cannot be used in cases of subsequent
acquisitions of lands outside the bounds of the appropriated property; not should a
condemnee's right to compensation be made to depend upon whether adjacent land
could easily be purchased. These established principles are clearly recognized in 4
Nichols, Eminent Domain (3d ed.) ($14.22, p. 525) where, in referring to the rule
of cost of restoration, it is stated that "the restoration must be possible without
going outside the remaining portion of the tract in controversy"; and again in
Section 14.2472 (p.683), "It has recently been held that whether premises of a like
description to those taken are readily available or whether it was owner's intention
to seek siinilar property was not relevant to the question of the fair market value of
condemned premises" (citing Jones v. Providence Redevelopment Agency, 92 R.I.
285). That ihe adoption of the novel theory advanced by the State, illogical in its
foundation, might well lead to confusion and havoc in the use of well-reasoned and
judicially founded principles of providing just compensation for the taking of a
citizen's lands, is all too evident.
Our attention has been called Edgcomb Steel ofNew England v. State, (100
N.R. 480), which is not aparallel to the case under consideration for there the
additionally purchased land considered by the court had been contracted for prior
to and pending the taking. In any event, that court reaffirmed the doctrine that
damages for the taking are measured by the before and after values, measured at
the time of taking.
Additionally controlling upon the facts here presented is the wellestablished doctrine that claimant's right to compensation is constitutionally vested
and should be measured as of the time of the taking when its damage had become
acccrued and fixed. (Wolfe v, State of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 292; Minesa Realty
Co. v. State of New York, 26 A.D.2d 592).
Id. at 277.
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In Department ofHighways v. Intermountain Term. Co., 435 P.2d 391 (Colorado 1968),
the property consisted of a highly specialized truck complex of improvements. The property
owner believed that after the taking, the remainder was useless for truck terminal operations of a
major motor carrier and ten days after the condemnation was filed, purchased 4.26 acres of land
that was immediately adjacent.
The Colorado Highway Department advocated that the other properties purchased by the
property owner should be considered as a part of the tract which was damaged by the
condemnation proceedings to decrease the amount payable by reason of diminution in the market
value of the residue. The Colorado Supreme Court disagreed:
The ipse dixit of the Highway Department is that the other property
purchased by P.LE, should be considered as a part of the tract which was damaged
by the condemnation proceedings, to decrease the amount payable by reason of
diminution in the market value of the residue.
P.I.E. was not required by law to expend a large suin of money to
[I]
avoid the consequences of the predicament in which the Department of Highways
placed it through the expropriation proceedings. The business acumen of P.I.E. in
the discovery of the opportunity to buy other property and the expenditure by it of
$260,000 for acquiring such property with a subsequent sale of a part of it should
not inure to the benefit of the Department o f Highways. This 'other property' was
not damaged by the condemnation proceedings and, therefore, was not residual
property. Department ofHighways v. htermountain Term. Co., 435 P.2d at 393.

In Utah Department of Transportation v. Rayco Corp., 599 P.2d 481,488-89 (Utah 1979),
the Utah Supreme Court recognized that the cost of replacement ground was not a proper element

-

and that restoration, cost to cure, must be possible without going outside the remainder citing the
Nichols Treatise:
In 4A Nichols on Eminent Domain (3rd Ed.), 5 14.22 states:
When the damage to the owner's remaining property can be avoided
by grading or repairs, and the reasonable cost of such work is less than the
decrease in the market value of the real estate, such cost forms the measure
of damages. . . .
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Also restoration must be possible without going outside the remaining
portion of the tract. The owner's right to compensation cannot be made to
depend upon the question of whether adjacent land could be easily bought.
Moreover, at least one court has held that the fact that, after the vesting of
titles, in a partial-taking case, the owner (whose remainder area is rendered
unusable for its established use) acquires an adjoining tract to restore
usability, this does not inure to the benefit of the condemnor so as to reduce
the consequential damages to the original remainder area.
The principal set forth in 5 14.22 of Nichols is illustrated in St. Patrick's
Church, Whitney Point v. State ofNew Yorlc, wherein it is stated:
We are not here dealing with any mitigation of damages by
something that occurred or could occur upon the property remaining after
the appropriation as in Mayes Co. v. State of New York, 18 N.Y.2d 549,277
N.Y.S.2d 393,223 N.E.2d 881, where the "cost to cure" theory was allowed
because the cure was to occur within the bounds of the claimant's lands.
Sound reason requires that the theory cannot be used in cases of subsequent
acquisitions of lands outside the bounds of the appropriated property; nor
should a condemnee's right to compeilsation be made to depend upon
whether adjacent land could be easily be purchased. . .
The philosophy to support the foregoing principle is expressed in
Department of Highways v. Intermountain Terminal Company (quotation omitted)
In Mulkey v. State of Florida, 448 S.2d 1062 (Florida 1984), the court recognized the law
that the cost to cure theory was limited to restoration on the remaining portion of the tract (note
that Florida allows business damages):
When the state, through the exercise of its power of eminent domain, takes
private property for public use, the landowner must receive full comnpensation for
his loss. Art. X, 5 6, Fla. Const. A landowner must also be compensated for
damage to his property when less than an entire parcel is taken. 73.071(3)(b), Fla.
Stat.(1981); Kendry v. Division ofAdministration, Slate Department of
Transportation, 366 S.2d 391, 393, Florida (1978); Lee County v,Exchange
National Bank of Tampa, 417 S.2d 268,269, Florida 2d DCA (1982), review
denied, 426 S.2d 25, Florida (1983). These damages, so-called severance damages,
are generally measured by the reduction in value of the remaining property.
Kendry, supra, at 393. However, the courts have recognized that this general
measurement of damages may be replaced by a cost-to-cure approach in instances
where such cost is less than the decreased value of the remainder. See generally 4A
P. Nichols, The Law ofEminent Domain at 14.04, Rev. 3d ed (1981).
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In Gluckman v. State o f N I < ,325 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1971), the state project divided the land
into two separate parcels. The state contended that one of the parcels was not landlocked because
a service road could be extended to the parcel and the damages should be the cost of the service
road---not the severance damages. The New York court held that this measure of damage was
incorrect because the damages accrued at the time of filing and that the cost to cure theory could
not be used because the cure must be accomplished without going outside the tract in controversy.
Claimant's right to compensation for the property appropriated accrued at the time
of the taking, and it is at that time that the amount of damages became fixed
(Chester Litho V. Palisades Interstate Park Comm., 27 N.Y.2d 323; Wolfe v. State
of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 292). At that time, claimant's land, insofar as industrial
use was concerned, was landlocked. The easement by which access was available
to the tap street was concededly restricted to residential traffic. No other access
was present and claimant could not be required to construct an exterlsion of the
service road to his land. The extension would have to be constructed over a public
right of way and claimants neither had a permit from the town to complete the road
nor even a permit or any document or other evidence that the Sate, as of the date of
appropriation, had granted them a right to complete the road. The assertion that
claimants need only apply to the State for a permit and it would be granted, since to
deny such would be an abuse of discretion, is certainly not equivalent to a right of
access to the parcel (see Windham v. State of New York, 34 A.D.2d 590, mot. for
lv. to app. den. 27 N.Y.2d 481). In sum, claimants cannot be required by the State
to create a public road over a public right of way to provide new access to the
remainder of their property, when an appropriation of part of the property by the
State has destroyed such access (see WoEfe v. State ofNew York, supra). We also
note that the cost to cure theory, the method of computing consequential damages
which the Sate seeks to use to require claimants to extend the service road to their
property, may not be used here since the cure must be accomplished without going
outside the tract in controversy. (St. Patrick's Chuvch v. State of New Yorl, 30
A.D.2d 473; 4A Nichols, Eminent Domain [3d ed.], $ 14.22.) Judgment affirmed,
with costs.
Any modifications off of the Canyon Vista property in the after condition which could
serve to mitigate or cure damage to the remainder property are therefore not relevant as a matter of
law to the ascertainment of just compensation. Further, any proposed "cures" which don't actually
cure damages should not be admitted or considered in assessing just compensation.
Compensation is vested as of the time of taking and is to be measured in terms of severance
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damage or the cost to cure, only if the cure can be completed and accomplished within the
boundaries of Defendant's property. In addition, costs to cure may not replace or offset severance
damages, as that is not how just compensation is to be computed. Any claims or evidence to the
contrary offered by the State should therefore not be admitted.
0 . VALUE TESTIMONY DOES NOT REQUIRE COMPLIANCE WITH USPAP
STANDARDS
In condemnation cases, MA1 appraisers are typically retained to testify as to their opinions
of the fair market value of the condemned property. MA1 appraisers' prepare appraisal reports in
accordance with USPAP standards for compliance. However in assessing just compensation in a
condemnation case, expert testimony of fair market value by non-appraisers is admissible and do
not require that their opinions be founded upon the methods prescribed by the Uniform Standards
of Professional Appraisal Practice, known as USPAP
This proposition was succinctly stated by the Ohio Court of Appeals. In City ofNonvood
v. Burton, 841 N.E.2d 393 (2005), reversed on other grounds, - N.E.2d - (2006), 2006 WL

2585512, where the Court held:
We have ureviouslv held that neither statutont nor case law restricts expert opinion
testimonv on the fair market value of apuropriated property to those opinions
founded w o n the methods prescribed bv the USPAP. Rather, in determining the
amount of compensation, or the market value of the property taken, each case must
be considered in the light of its own facts, and every element that can fairly enter
into the question of value, and which an ordinarily prudent business [person]
would consider before forming [his] judgment in making a purchase, should be
considered. (Emphasis added).
841 N.E.2d at 399. See also, City ofCincinnati v. Banks, 757 N.E.2d 1205 (2001) and Sowers v.

DEFENDANTS' TRIAL BRIEF - 46

Although no Idaho appellate court has addressed this specific issue, the Idaho Supreme
Court's holding in Boel v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 137 Idaho 9,43 P.3d 768 (2002), clearly infers
that expert testimony in litigation does not require compliance with USPAP standards.
Stewart Title argues that the district court erred in allowing three real estate agents
or brokers, who were not licensed real estate appraisers, to testify as to the value of
the Boels' property. Under Idaho Rule of Evidence 702,
[ilf scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise.
The real estate agents wlxo testified were qualified to testify to things outside the
common knowledge of the jury by virtue of their specialized lcnowledge and
experience. However, Stewart Title argues that the Idaho Real Estate Appraisers
Act (the Act), I.C. (ig 54-41 01-41 19, prohibits persons not licensed as real estate
appraisers from giving an opinion as to the value of property.
The Act was amended in 1999 in order to, among other things, make it unlawful
for a person to perform an appraisal in this state if that person is not licensed or
certified by the Real Estate Appraiser Board. . .
Prior to the 1999 amendment, this Court approved the practice of allowing real
estate agents or brokers to testify as to valuation. (Citations omitted). While the
legislature amended the Act in 1999 to provide a general prohibition against giving
an opinion as to value, it did not specifically address the court-approved practice of
allowing expert testimony in litigation. In fact, nowhere does the Act mention the
giving of expert testimony in litigation. . . Consequently, we hold that the
legislature did not intend to alter or contradict the provisions of LR.E. 702 in
enacting the Idaho Real Estate Appraisers Act. A real estate agent, if properly
qualified under I.R.E. 702, may testify as to value of the property in the course of
litigation. The district court's decision to allow the real estate agents to testify is
affirmed.

Id. at 14-15.
Implicit in the Boel decision, the standard for testifying to an opinion of value is not based
on USPAP, but instead, I.R.E. 702
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I. INTRODUCTION
In some of the previous cases along Pole Line Road, notably, State ofIdaho vs. Billiar,
Case No: CV -04-4348, ITD has completely ignored the fact that it is condemning the property
owner's access rights along frontage on Pole Line Road. This issue was the subject of a Motion
for Summary Judgment brought by the State in the Billiar case. Judge Hohnhorst denied the
Motion when it was a g e d , but the case settled before his formal written opinion was issued.
ITD, in that case, confused direct and inverse condemnation cases and rules of law and
inappropriately attempted to apply cases that deal with police powers to a direct condemnation
case. We anticipate, based on comments from witnesses in depositions and comments of
counsel, that similar arguments will be made in this case. Because this issue of access will be
critical in this case and the law on the subject is voluminous, Defendants provide this brief for
the Court's reference.
State v. lionburg, 80 Idaho 269,328 P.2d 60 (1958), is the Idaho case most directly on
point. There is a line of cases which hold that when a conventional roadway is widened and
converted into a limited access roadway, access rights of abutting owners must be acquired
though condemnation and cannot be regulated away without compensation under the State's
police powers. Idaho cases have cited approvingly to a Kansas case squarely on point, Smith v.
State Highway Commission, 185 Kan. 445,346 P.2d 259 (1959), and to an Arizona case squarely
on point, State ex rel. Morrison v. Thelberg, 87 Arizona 318,350 P.2d 988, (1960). There is a
great weight of authority that access rights for limited access highways must be acquired and paid
for, they cannot be regulated away under the State's police powers.
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There is also an Idaho statute, I.C. $ 40-3 11, which provides that access rights shall be
purchased, condemned or otherwise acauired by ITD for controlled access roadways. Access to
and from Pole Line is a property right (an easement appurtenant to the land) of Canyon Vista
which must be, and is being, condemned. The issue is now comnpensation. The State cannot
avoid compensation by claiming the use of police powers and attempting to recast what is being
taken from the property owner as a mere administrative regulation rather than a condemnation.
Access cases are difficult to research and can be confusing because without an
understanding of this area of the law, it would seem cases find both compensable takings and
non-compensable uses of police power on very similar facts. It must be remembered that access
cases can be either direct condemnation cases, in which a right is being acquired, or inverse
condemnation cases, where the property owner is alleging their rights have been so impacted that
there is a compensable taking. There is also the question of what rights are at issue in each case,
an abutting owner's right to direct access to a pre-existing road, claimed access rights to a newly
constructed road, or issues relating to traffic flows on the road, such as medians or stop signs. A
thorough review of the case law reveals that there are four basic categories that access cases can
be broken into which help to make sense of the morass, and determine which cases are on point
in this particular case now before the Court.

11. RELEVANT FACTS
A. Taking of Canyon Vista's Access Rights
The facts will be only very briefly summarized herein for the Court. We should clarify at
the outset that no damages are being claimed by Canyon Vista due to the installation of center
lane medians, multi-lane configuration, or intersection signalization. Those portions of the
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project have not been identified by any defense witness as forming a basis of his opinion of
severance damages. The Order of Condemnation and the Amended Complaint in this case
condemn Canyon Vista's access rights to Pole Line Road. This taking of direct access rights
results in severance damages to the remainder in the view of Defendants' experts.
ITD may portray the Type IV access limitation on Pole Line Road in the after condition
as a mere non-compensable regulation of traffic flow, ignoring the fact that access rights of
abutting property owners must be acquired for the project. ITD's Order of Condemnation in this
case, Paragraph 4, determines that Canyon Vistas' access rights are needed for public use for the

U.S. 93 .AlternateProject. See Exhibit A, Order of Condemnation, attached hereto.
The Amended Complaint in this matter is consistent with the Order of Condemnation and
condemns Canyon Vistas' access rights to Pole Line Road except for one temporary 28' access
point to serve the existing and interim use, providing access to a shop and a manufactured home.
The Amended Complaint, paragraph VIII and Exhibit B to the Amended Complaint clearly show
access rights are condemned.
B. Specific Areas of Anticipated Factual Disputes Relevant to the Access Issue
1. Canyon Vista Has Enjoyed A Half-Century of Access to Pole Line Road

At trial the evidence will show that the property owners have, since the 195O8s,enjoyed
free access along Pole Line Road to and from their property. There were four visable and
improved physical accesses to and from the property and Pole Line Road before the taking.
2. The State Interfered With Canyon Vista's Access Rights

Witnesses on both sides agree that in recent years the highest and best use of the property
has changed from agricultural to commercial. If the Canyon Vista properly were to develop
TRIAL BRIEF- PART 11(TAKING OF ACCESS) - 5
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commercially, the property owner would have the right to direct access to and from Pole Line
Road which conforms to the City of Twin Falls policy.
Canyon Vista requested direct access points to Pole Line Road in the after condition from
the State during right of way negotiations, but was turned down. The State made the
determination that access would only be allowed at the half mile point and the quarter mile (not
on the subject property) due to the U.S. 93 Alternate Project. The evidence will show that the
State had asked the City of Twin Falls to impose access control along Pole Line Road for the
impending project and allow only access consistent with the goals of the project, and the City had
agreed to do so. ITD and the City were actively imposing access limitations on Pole Line Road
as a direct result of the U.S. 93 Alternate Project, as of at least 1998.

3. Commercial Access Absent Project Influence
If the Canyon Vista property had been developed for commercial use as of December 28,
2004, the date of taking, Pole Line Road would have been in the jurisdiction of the City of Twin
Falls. In determining the highest and best use of the property absent the influence of the U.S. 93
Alternate Project, it is necessary to consider what type of commercial development would have
been reasonably probable for the site, including what access to and from Pole Line Road would
have been reasonably probable. While experts on both sides agree that the property would have
developed as a C-l commercial PUD, and that is the highest and best use as of the date of taking,
there is a difference of opinion regarding the access which would have been permitted by the City
in the before condition.
Experts retained by ITD have opined that no access or public road intersections on Pole
Line Road would have been permitted and approved to the Canyon Vista property as of the date
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of taking, absent the project. Defendants witnesses have opinions that between one and two full
movement driveways and one public road intersection (at the one-third mile, opposite the
existing Canyon Crest) on Pole Line Road would have been approved as of the date of taking,
absent the project.
4. Access After the Taking Changes the Highest & Best Use

Defendants witnesses will opine that as a result of the taking of all access rights to Pole
Line from Canyon Vista, the development potential of the property is reduced, and the highest
and best use is changed. The site can no longer accommodate a commercial development, and
will likely need to remain a manufactured home park.
No access to the remainder from Pole Line Road leaves the property land locked and is
not reasonable to serve the property after the taking. This results, according to Defendants
witnesses, in severance damages because the entire property, after the taking, is worth less in the
after condition than in the before condition. ITD's witnesses have found no damages caused by
the taking of access.
111. ARGUMENT
A. ITD is Taking Access Rights, For Which it Must Pay Just Compensation

1. The Limited Access Highway
The limited access highway came into being in the early 1950's. The National Highway
System was evolving and there was increased dependence on the automobile. State legislatures
around the county enacted legislative provisions authorizing their various state highway
departments to construct or designate highways as access controlled facilities. In the 1950's and
1960's there were numerous cases throughout the various states involving the condemnation of
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property for limited access highways.
The rules which evolved were that if an existing roadway was being coilverted into a
limited access roadway, abutter's access rights were being destroyed and compensation must be
paid therefore. However, where a new roadway was created where none had existed before, it
could be designated as a limited access roadway and no abutter's access rights would come into
being (and thus were not being taken).
The limited access cases all address the problem of the taking of access rights for
controlled access facilities. State highway departments in several states sought to avoid
compensating property owners for taking their access rights, often claiming the rights were
simply being regulated under the state's police powers. Many courts looked to state statutes
relating to controlled access roadways and noted that the statutes generally require acquisition of
access rights, therefore compensation is required. Other courts have reached the same conclusion
(that compensation is warranted) applying traditional property law concepts. Uniformly the
Courts have rejected government attempts to destroy access for limited access facilities and not
pay for doing so.
2. Idaho Case Law on Point, State v. Fonburg, 80 Idaho 269,328 P.2d 60 (1958)
There is an Idaho case which considered whether or not the taking of access rights for
construction of a limited access highway was permissible, State v. Fonburg, 80 Idaho 269,328
P.2d 60 (1958). Of all Idaho access cases, this one is the closest factually to the present case.

In Fonburg, the State was taking 12.76 acres of a farm. The owner had access to the
existing highway 95 which was being taken; the property owner was not going to be allowed any
access rights to the new four lane, limited access highway. The State was condemning access
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rights to the existing roadway, as it had determined those rights were necessaty for its project.
On a hearing had in the district court the trial judge held that the use to which the
property sought to be condemned will be put is a public use and one authorized by law;
that the necessity for the taking was established, and 'There is also condemned and taken
herein all rights bf access to a& from all prope&iesabutting upon the above described
parcel No. 24 [land of defendant, which the road crosses], and such rights of access, if
existing heretofore are extinguished and the usage of any such access is hereby
prohibited.'

any,

State ex rel. Rich v. Fonbuvg, 80 Idaho 269, 274-75,328 P.2d 60, 62 (1958). The property owner

challenged the State's right to condemn access rights along with the property taken in fee.
The Court looked to Idaho statutes then in effect to hold that the State was authorized to
acquire the owner's access rights as part of a fee simple taking for the new access controlled
highway 95, as follows:
We shall first address our attention to the contention that the State has no
authority to prohibit access to a public road by a landowner through whose land the road
is constructed.
By the provisions of subd. 9, Ch. 260, 1955 S.L., the Board of Highway Directors
is empowered to purchase, condemn, or otherwise acquire real property in fee, including
rights of direct access from property abutting highways with controlled-access, deemed
necessary by the Board for present or fUture state highway purposes.
This provision was amended by Ch. 227, p. 520, 1957 S.L., now codified as Sec.
40-120 I.C. (Supp.), by the terms of which the Idaho Board of Highway Directors is given
power to:
'(9) Purchase, condemn or otherwise acquire (including exchange), * * * any real
property, either in fee or in any lesser estate or interest, rights-of-way, easements
and other rights * * * and rights of direct access from the property abutting
highways with controlled-access, deemed necessary by the board for present or
future state highway purposes. The order of the board that the land sought is
necessary for such use shall be prima facie evidence of such fact.'
The amendment was not in effect when this action was commenced, February 1, 1957,
but was in effect when the action was tried.
By the provisions of Sec. 7-701, I.C., among the uses that the right of eminent
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domain may be exercised, specifically provided, among other things, for the construction
o f roads.
It appears from a reading o f these statutes that the State is authorized to do what it
proposes to do in this proceeding, namely, to condemn land to be used for a limited
access highway and acquire the fee title to privately owned property, limiting or curtailing
entry o f an adjoining landowner which would ordinarily be appurtenant to the land not
taken. The statute quoted specifically provides for the taking o f land for a controlledaccess highway, deemed necessary by the Board o f Highway Directors.
State ex rel. Rich v. Fonburg, 80 Idaho 269,275-276, 328 P.2d 60,62 - 63 (1958).

The Court then considered the owner's argument that he was not being provided access to
the new highway, and should receive damages therefore. The Court found that the owner had no
right to access a newly constructed road which was not previously in existence:
There is no inherent right of access to a newly relocated highway. The new
highway not being in existence prior to the present construction, the landowner would
suffer no coinpensable damages because his access to the new construction was denied
him. The condemnee never having had access to the new highway there is no easement or
access taken in this proceeding. There can only be compensable damages for an existing
easement, and when one does not exist, there is none to take.
State ex rel. Rich v. Fonburg, 80 Idaho 269,277-278,328 P.2d 60,64 (1958). However, with

regard to the owner's right to compensation for the taking o f his access rights to the existing
roadway, the Court found that loss o f access was to be considered by the jury in determining just
compensation. Also, the reduction in accessibility to the nearby railroad caused by the taking
was an appropriate consideration in assessing severance damages, though those rights were not
taken in the condemnation action, because all inconveniences resulting to the remaining land are
to be considered in valuation:
Where a part ofthe owner's contiguous land is taken in a condemnation
proceeding, all inconveniences resulting to the owner's remaining land, including an
easement or access to a road or right o f way formerly enjoyed, which decrease the value
o f the land retained by the owner, are elements o f severance damage for which
TNAL BRIEF- PART I1 (TAIUNG OF ACCESS) - 10
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compensation should be paid. 29 C.J.S. Eminent Domain $ 105, p. 910; 29 C.J.S.
Eminent Domain 5 163, p. 1033; State ex rel. Rich v. Dunclick, Inc., 77 Idaho 45,286
P.2d 1112; State v. S@ner, 58 Idaho 233,72 P.2d 699, and in Creasy v. Stevens
(Marshell v. Stevens), D.C., 160 F.Supp. 404,405, the Court held:
'The right of access to a public highway is a property right which cannot be taken
or materially interfered with without just compensation.'
However, the instructions given to the jury contained no outline of the elements of
damages that the jury should consider. Throughout the instructions given, the trial judge
instructed the jury that it should award defendant damages for the land taken, and
severance damage to the remainder. The jury was nowhere in the instructions given
advised as to the claimed severance damages because of destroyed or curtailed access to
highway No. 95, as formerly enjoyed, nor was it advised that the improvements and
access to the railroad right of way was an element to be by it considered.
Accessibility to the railroad formerly enjoyed, which because of the taking of a
part of defendant's land, is limited and restricted, thereby decreasing the value of the
remainder, if it does, is an element of severance damage to be submitted to and
considered by the jury.
State ex rel. Rich v. Fonburg, 80 Idaho 269, 278-279,328 P.2d 60, 64 - 65 (1958).
The Court held that a requested jury instruction regarding consideration of loss of access
should have been given rather than refused, and finally, held that it was proper to allow the jury
to consider all elements of damage, including loss of direct access and loss of accessibility.
We think the jury should have been instructed as to the elements of damage
claimed to have been suffered by defendant, and supported by any proof, because of the
taking of the land and the construction of the improvement in the manner proposed.
These elements of damage consist of the reasonable market value of the land taken,
together with all improvements thereon located and taken in this proceeding, severance
damage to the remainder, through which the road runs due to its severance from the
whole, which severance damage would include, among other damage sustained, the
curtailment and restriction of access to highway No. 95, as formerly enjoyed, and access
to the railroad as enjoyed prior to the construction of the new road. 29 C.J.S. Eminent
Domain $ 105, p. 910; Creasy v. Stevens (Marshell v. Stevens), D.C., 160 F.Supp. 404.
The elements of damage which must be ascertained and assessed are provided for
in Sec. 7-71 1. I.C.
State ex: rel. Rich v. Fonburg, 80 Idaho 269, 280,328 P.2d 60,65-66 (1958).
Clearly, in Fonburg, the Idaho Supreme Court found it was instructive to look at the
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Order of Condemnation, the Complaint, and the statutes then in effect to determine whether the
access rights were being properly taken. There was no argument in the appeal about police
powers, because the State was expressly aclcnowledging the taking of access rights. However,
although the words "police powers" do not appear in the case, it is clear that there were issues
about what the jury could consider and what was compensable, so there must have been an
argument about the compensability of loss of direct access as well as loss of accessibility.
Fonburg has been cited in a number of other Idaho cases and remains good law.
The language of the statute the Court considered in Fonburg is virtually identical to the
current LC. § 40-3 11(1) relating to the Idaho Transportation Board. The applicable provisions
of LC. 6 7-71 1 remain the same as well.
While in Fonburg the property owner was questioning the right to condemn access, it also
appears clear the State Department of Highways was questioning having to pay damages as a
result, though the argument was not framed as a police powers argument in the Court's decision
However, the case is instructive in that it tells us how the Idaho Supreme Court addressed the
issue and what they considered relevant to the inquiry. They followed the same basic approach
that the Kansas Supreme Court did a year later in a case that is squarely on point; see below.
3. Case Law Squarely on Point & Cited Approvingly by Idaho Cases

a. Smith v. State Highway Commission, 185 Kan. 445,346 P.2d 259 (1959)
Perhaps the most instructive case is one squarely and directly on point from Kansas, the
reasoning of which was adopted and cited approvingly by the Idaho Supreme Court on three
separate occasions, in Johnson v. Boise City, 87 Idaho 44, 52,390 P.2d 291,295 (1 964), State v.
Bastian, 97 Idaho 444,447,546 P.2d 399,402 (1976), and Coeur d 'Alene Garbage Service v.
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City ofCoeur d'Alene, 114 Idaho 588,592,759 P.2d 879,883 (1988). The Kansas case is both
factually and legally analogous to the present case, and remains good law.
In Smith v. State Highway Commission, 185 Kan. 445,346 P.2d 259 (1959), the Kansas
State Highway Commission argued that as part of an improvement project on U.S. Highway 36,
the highway was going to have controlled access, and that the State need not pay any damages for
access rights acquired because it was entitled to regulate access through the its police powers
without being liable for compensation. The facts of the case were that the State was acquiring an
easement and access rights to a portion of the Defendant's frontage on the highway. The
property owner had the same number of entrances to their property after the condemnation as
they did before the condemnation, but they were losing access rights along 1,410 feet of frontage
except for a 40 foot wide existing entrance to their property, and three additional entrances on a
portion of their property for which access rights were not being acquired due to construction of a
frontage road. A drawing depicting the taking and the access rights being acquired appears in the
opinion, see Smith v. State Highway Commission, 185 Kan. at 448, 346 P.2d at 264.
The Kansas Supreme Court summarized the State's position in the case as follows:
The State Highway Commission took the position throughout the trial of the case
in the district court that it was not acquiring the landowners' rights of access by eminent
domain, but that it had the right and authority in the interest of public safety to regulate
access from the appellees' property to the highway by limiting access to the entrances then
in existence under its 'Regulations Governing Entrances to Highway from Private
Property.' Simply stated, the State Highway Commission contends it iscontrolling or
limiting the access of the landowners by the exercise of the state'spolicepower.
Apparently the Commission contends the right to regulate the entrances to an existing
highway under the police power includes the right to whollyprohibit access without
having topay damages, and by reason thereof, the Commission has the right to condemn
and take all rights of access described in this proceeding without becoming liable to pay
any darnages as a result thereof. (Emphasis in original).
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Smith v. State Highway Commission, 185 Kan. at 450, 346 P.2d at 265-66. Both the jury and the

Kansas Supreme Court rejected this argument from the State.
The Kansas Court held that there are two distinct types of rights property owners have
when adjacent to a highway:
The owner of properly which abuts an existing street or highway has two distinct
kinds of rights in a highway, a public right which he enjoys in common with all other
citizens, and certain private rights which arise from his ownership of property contiguous
to the street or highway, and which are not common to the public generally. These
private rights include certain easements, or appurtenant easements, such as the rights of
access, of view, of light and air, and others. These rights areproperty of which he may
not be deprived without his consent, except on full compensation and by due process of
law.
It has consistently been held in this jurisdiction the right of access to and from an
existing public street or highway is one of the incidents of ownership of land abutting
thereon, sometimes called a common law right of access, which may not be taken from
the owner by the public without just compensation. (Citations omitted).
Smith v. State Highway Commission, 185 Kan. At 451,346 P.2d at 266. The Kansas Court

recognized that an owner is not entitled to access his lands at all points and that the use of streets
and highways could be regulated pursuant to police powers. Id. at 453; 267. The Court pointed
out that the problem is the determination of how far the government may go under its police
power before a taking, warranting just compensation, results:
The basic problem in every case involving impairment of the right of access is to
reconcile the conflicting interests--i. e., private v. public rights. The police power is the
power of govement to act in furtherance of the public good, either through legislation or
by the exercise of any other legitimate means, in the promotion of the public health,
safety, morals and general welfare, without incurring liability for the resulting injury to
private individuals. (Citations omitted). Eminent domain, on the other hand, is the power
of the sovereign to take or damage private property for a public purpose on payment of
just compensation. (Citations omitted). (Emphasis in original).
Smith v. State Highway Commission, 185 Kan. at 453-54, 346 P.2d at 267-68. Where access

rights are concerned, there is no question that these rights may be condemned. The Court set
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forth the following framework for discussion regarding compensation of access rights:
Since there is no doubt that the right of access, like any other property can be
taken for public purpose under eminent domain upon payment of just compensation, the
interesting question is how far the public can proceed under the police power.
Determination of whether damages are compensable under eminent domain or
noncompensable under the police power depends on the relative importance of the
interests affected. The court must weigh the relative interests of the public and that of the
individual, so as to arrive at a just balance in order that government will not be unduly
restricted in the proper exercise of its functions for the public good, while at the same
time giving due effect to the policy in the eminent domain clause of insuring the
individual against an unreasonable loss occasioned by the exercise of governmental
power.
Smith v. State Highway Commission, 185 Kan. at 454, 346 P.2d at 268.
This exact language (beginning at "Determination ...) was quoted and adopted by the
Idaho Supreme Court in Coeur d 'Alene Garbage Service v. City of Coeur d 'Alene, 114 Idaho

The Kansas Court, after setting forth the framework for analyzing the issue, proceeded to
decide the case and found that the State had in fact taken the access rights of the Defendant and
was obligated to pay just compensation for those access rights. The Court considered the statutes
relating to the State's authority and noted that the legislature had given the State the power to
acquire access rights and establish controlled access highways. Id. at 456-57; 269-70. The Court
found that this indicated a legislative intent that the access rights acquired were compensable:
We think it clear that the legislature by enacting the controlled access facilities
statute has spoken on the subject of controlled access highways. By the provisions of 681903, supra, it has prescribed the exclusive methods by which private or public property,
including rights of access, may be acquired for the establishment of controlled access
facilities--that is, 'by gift, devise, purchase or condemnation, in the same manner as now
or hereafter authorized by lawfor acquiringproperty or property rights.' (Emphasis
added.) The legislature intended by 68-1903, supra, that a landowner deprived of
abutters' rights of access would be compensated for them. [All emphasis in original].
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Smith v. State Highway Commission, 185 Kan. at 457,346 P.2d at 270. The Kansas Court held
that the State had filed an action to acquire the defendant's access rights, and on the date of
taking, therefore had acquired those rights and was obligated to pay for them:
The petition filed by the State Highway Commission in the eminent domain
proceeding, presently before the court in the action pending, complied strictly with the
legislative mandates of the controlled access facilities statute, and particularly 68-1903,
supra, for the acquisition of abutters' rights of access on an existing highway. On the date
of the taking the Commissionfully acquired the abutters' rights of access described in the
petition and was thereafter empowered to regulate, restrict or prohibit access to the
highway as a controlled access facility pursuant to 68-1902, supra. By the same token,
the Commission obligated itself to pay for the rights of access taken. (Emphasis in
original).
Smith v. State Ifighway Commission, 185 Kan. at 463,346 P.2d at 273. The Court also set forth
the proper measure of damages for the taking of access:
The amount which the state will have to pay in an eminent domain proceeding for
the acquisition of rights of access is determined by considering the market value of the
property before the access right is taken and after it is taken. The difference in value is
the damage for the loss of access rights.
Smith v. State Highway Commission, 185 Kan. at 460,346 P.2d at 272

In addition, the Court noted that in the absence of an acquisition of access rights, a
property owner adjacent to a controlled access highway desiring an additional entrance would
need to apply for a permit from the State. If the permit were denied, the property owner could
litigate to determine whether his right of access to the highway which is reasonably necessary for
enjoyment of the land has been unreasonably curtailed or restricted. Id. at 459; 271. The State's
argument that it need not pay for access rights being acquired because it can regulate them
through its police power was then completely rejected by the Kansas Court on the following
grounds:
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The Commission argues under the police power it may limit access from the
abutting property on the highway to the entrances then in existence. While the entrances
in existence and used by an abutting property owner may be sufficient for thepresent and
be all that are reasonable necessary for the enjoyment of the land, the Commission's
argument fails to take into considerationfuture needs. With the advance in time land
uses change, as well as other circumstances, which might affect the need for additional
entrances to the land. And if in the future additional entrances are unreasonably denied
by the Commission, the courts are still open to determine the question.
But, if the Commission acquires the rights of access of an abutting property
owner on an existing highway, pursuant to 68-1903, supra, the Commission has absolute
control and may prohibit, at will, any further entrances to the portion of the land along
which access rights have been acquired.
Smith v. State Highway Commission, 185 ICan. at 459, 346 P.2d at 271
The Court then expressly found that future access needs, not only present needs, must be
considered as a material factor affecting the value of the land and directly effected by the taking
of access rights:
The need of an abutting property owner on an existing highway for additional
entrances in the future is vitally material, since the question is interwoven with the
present value of the land abutting the highway based upon a consideration of all of the
capabilities of the property for its best and most advantageous uses as it is actually
situated at the time of the taking. It is therefore obvious the taking of an abutting property
owner's rights of access on an existing highway will affect the value of the land from
which access rights are taken. The extent to which the value is affected will vary wit11 the
facts and circumstances of each case.
Smith v. State Highway Commission, 185 ICan. at 460, 346 P.2d at 271-272.

In Smith, the Kansas Supreme Court set forth the framework for analyzing the police
powers vs. compensable taking argument in the context of condemnation cases, and then
proceeded to analyze the facts and apply the law, resulting in a holding that the State had taken
access rights and had to pay for them. The Idaho Supreme Court adopted the framework in Smith
but has not yet had occasion to decide a case on identical facts as Smith. However, there is no
reason to believe they would not reach the same result the Kansas Court did, on the same facts,
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especially given their approach in Fonburg. Idaho has statutes which acknowledge access rights
are to be acquired for controlled access roadways, ITD has filed a Amended Complaint seeking
to acquire access rights from Canyon Vista, and the taking of access rights materially alters the
value of the remaining property because the property loses rights of access necessary for its
highest and best use.
In Johnston v. Boise City, 87 Idaho 44,51-52, 390 P.2d 291,294-295 (1964) the Idaho
Supreme Court was presented with a situation where the City passed an ordinance closing some
curb cuts to a property; there was no complete loss of access and no taking was alleged by either
party. However, the property owner challenged the City's right to pass an ordinance closing his
curb cuts. The Court looked to the reasoning in Smith, ultimately finding a proper exercise of
police power. This shows our Court approaches these types of cases the same way the Kansas
Court did in Smith.
This case presents the problem of reconciling the conflicting interests of the
public with that of the abutting owner. Under its exercise of the police power and
authority over the streets and in furtherance of the public good, the common council for
sufficient reason, can eliminate these curb cuts and the driveways without incurring
liability to the abutting owner for the resulting injury. On the other hand, if the order of
the comnon council be characterized as a taking of property for a public purpose, the
authority to make the order arises from the power of eminent domain, under which the
payment of just compensation is necessary. Smith v. State Highway Commission, 185
Kan. 445,346 P.2d 259,267 (1959).
b. State ex rel. Morrison v. Thelberg, 87 Arizona 318,350 P.2d 988 (1960)
The Idaho Supreme Court in Lobdell v State ex rel. Board of Highway Directors, 89
Idaho 559,564,407 P.2d 135, 137 (1965) has also cited approvingly to the Arizona case of State
ex rel. Morrison v. Thelberg, 87 Arizona 318, 350 P.2d 988, (1960). In Thelberg, an existing
conventional highway was converted to a limited access highway, which required a widening of
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the road. The State argued that the property owner enjoyed the same access before and after the
taking due to the construction of frontage roads, and that control of access to a controlled-access
highway does not constitute a taking of property which would entitle the owners to
compensation.
The Arizona Supreme Court considered the issue of whether the State must pay for access
rights when a conventional highway is converted into an access controlled highway to be of such
importance that they granted a rehearing of the case and reviewed numerous amicus curiae briefs
on point. After a review of the issues and authorities, the Arizona Court wholly rejected the
State's arguments and found that conversions of existing roads to access controlled highways
require compensation:
When the controlled-access highway is constructed upon the right of way ofthe
conventional highway and the owner's ingress and egress to abutting property has
been destroyed or substantially impaired, he may recover damages therefor. The
damages may be merely nominal or they may be severe. Other means of access
such as frontage roads as in the instant case may be taken into consideration in
determining the amount which would be just under the circumstances. [citations
omitted].
State ex rel. Morrison v. Thelberg, 87 Arizona 318, 325,350 P.2d 988,992 (1960)

The Court then went on to discuss the measure of damages in such cases. The Idaho
Supreme cited Thelberg in support of the measure of damages rule set forth therein. (Compare
the value of the property before taking to the value of the property after taking).
4. I.C. 40-311(1) Contemplates that Rights of Access Must be Acquired
Idaho has statutory language relating to the taking of access by the Idaho Transportation
Department similar to the Kansas statutes cited in Smith. Idaho's Title 40,Highways and
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Bridges, Chapter 3, Idaho Transportation Board, Section 40-3 11, Powers and Duties - Property
provides:
The board shall:
(1) Purchase, exchange, condemn or otherwise acauire, any real property, either in fee or
in any lesser estate or interest, rights-of-way, easements and other rights and rights of
direct access from the propertv abutting highwavs with controlled access, deemed
necessary bv the board for present or future state highway purposes. The order of the
board that the land sought is necessary for such use shall be prima facie evidence of that
fact. [Emphasis added].
This plain and unambiguous language of the statute is evidence that the legislature intended that
ITD acquire access rights, through condemnation or another means of acquisition, not through
non-compensable regulation via police powers.
The latter part of the statute refers to the Order of Condemnation entered by the Board
and declares that this is prima facia evidence that the rights sought to be acquired are necessary
for public use. The Order of Condemnation entered in this case provides in paragraph 4:
That all rights of access to, from, and between the right of way of the public way and all
of the contiguous remaining real property of the record owner(s) shall be extinguished
and prohibited except for access, if any, as provided and shown on the said project plans
referred to in Paragraph 2 above. (See Exhibit A, Attached hereto).
The Amended Complaint filed by ITD is consistent with the Order of Condemnation and
expressly provides in Paragraph VIII, setting forth the rights acquired, "That access is to be
limited to that shown on Exhibit 'B'." Exhibit B to the Amended Coinplaint depicts only one
temoorary access to and &om Canyon Vista's property and Pole Line Road; the access will be
removed if the use of the property changes.

In ACHD v. Shavp, 135 Idaho 888,26 P.3d 1225 (2001), there was a conflict between the
Order of Condemnation and the Complaint. The Complaint made no reference to access rights,
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while the Order did. (In this case, the two are consistent). The Idaho Supreme Court held that
the property to be acquired is to be set forth in the Complaint:
Idaho Code (i 7-707, appearing in chapter 7 entitled "Eminent Domain," pertains
to the condemnation complaint and sets forth what it "must contain," including "a
description of each piece of land sought to be taken, and whether the same includes the
whole, or only a part, of an entire parcel or tract." Idaho Code 5 40-1310(3), appearing in
a chapter entitled "Highway Districts," provides that the director of a highway district:
"shall have the right, subject to the order of the highway district commissioners, to begin
action in the name of the highway district in the district court of the county in which the
district is situated, to condemn the land necessary for the right-of-way for the highway,
under the provisions of chapter 7, title 7, Idaho Code," whenever the director cannot agree
with any person for the purchase of land. This section further provides: "An order of the
highway district commissioners entered upon its minutes that the land sought to be
condemned is necessary for a public highway and public use shall be prima facie
evidence of the fact." Neither of these code sections purport to state whether it is the
order of condemnation or the complaint initiating the eminent domain action that is
detenninative in defining what land or what rights are sought to be condemned. It is this
Court's opinion, however, that LC. (i 7-707 is more specific and, perforce, controlling.
Idaho Code (i 7-707 requires that the land sought to be condemned be specifically
described in the complaint, whereas I.C. (i 40-1310(3) only states that an order of
condemnation entered upon the commissioners' minutes will be prima facie evidence of
public use. While I.C. (i 40-1310(3) requires that such an order refer to the land sought to
be condemned, it does not require a specific description of the land, as does LC. (i 7-707.
Furthermore, I.C. 5 40-13 lO(3) only requires that this order be reproduced in the minutes
of the commissioners, not published to the public generally or to the landowner
specifically. Idaho Code (i 7-707, on the other hand, specifically anticipates that the
complaint will be filed with a district court and thus published to and served upon the
landowner.
ACHD v. Sharp, 135 Idaho 888,889,26 P.3d 1225, 1226 (2001).
The Complaint in this case, unlike in Sharp, expressly acquires access via condemnation,
reserving only one temporary point of entry from Pole Line Road to Canyon Vista property to the
owner. There is no requirement regarding the degree of specificity which must be pled in the
Complaint; it is sufficient for ITD to plead (as it did) that access will be limited to that shown on

TRIAL BRIEF- PART I1 (TAKING OF ACCESS) - 21
0 2006. May be freely used by Couils All othen must obtain pennission from the author for use or copying ofany poltion of this siatcrial.

the exhibit attached to the Complaint and to provide legal descriptions for the property taken in
fee and the easements taken.
The project plans attached to the Amended Complaint clearly and unambiguously limit
Canyon Vista's access to only one temporary 28' access which will serve only the existing land
use. In the event of re-development of the property, it is undisputed rn access to Pole Line road
will be allowed.
In 2006, the Idaho Legislature passed an amendment to Idaho Code $7-707 requiring in
paragraph 6 of that code section that Complaints in condemnation include: "An order of
condemnation, or resolution, or other official and binding document entered by the plaintiff
which sets forth and clearly identifies all property rights to be acquired including rights to and
from the public way, and permanent and temporary easements." This reflects the Legislature's
intent that the Order of Condemnation and Complaint be consistent, as they are in this case (Even
though the Order is not attached).

5. Cases Holding That Access Rights for Controlled Access Roads Are
Cornpensable Takings, Not Exercises of Police Power
A number of other States have highway departments which have made the argument the
Kansas Highway Department inade in Smith. In these instances, the State was widening a
roadway and converting it to a limited access highway as in the present case. In each instance,
the State made the argument it should not have to pay for the access rights acquired because
those rights could be regulated away without liability under the State's police powers. The
Courts uniformly rejected that argument, in each case finding there was a coinpensable taking
and not an exercise of police powers. These cases are all directly on point with analogous facts.
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Perhaps the most concise statement of the law comes from the Nebraska Supreme Court:
When the controlled-access highway is constructed upon the right of way of the
conventional highway and the owner's ingress and egress to abutting property has been
destroyed or substantially impaired, he may recover damages therefor. The damages may
be merely nominal or they may be severe. Other means of access such as frontage roads
as in the instant case may be taken into consideration in determining the amount which
would be just under the circumstances. [citation omitted].
Balog v. State, Dept. ofRoads, 177 Neb. 826, 837, 131 N.W.2d 402,410 (Neb.1964). In Balog,
the State argued that abutter's access rights were taken pursuant to police powers. The Court
found this non-persuasive, and pointed out that in a way, all actions are police power actions; that
does not make them non-compensable when there is a transfer of property rights. Further, the
Court held that because there was a condemnation action filed, the State subjected itself to
liability for the taking of access rights and could not rely on the police powers argument.
The defendant argues that the plaintiffs cannot recover damages because their
right of access to Cornhusker Highway was taken by an exercise of the police power. J&
fact that the improvement of a bighwav is an exercise of the police wower does not
determine whether the landowner or lessee is entitled to recover damages. This
distinction was recognized in Philli~sPetroleum Co. v. City o f Omaha, 171 Neb. 457,
106 N.W.2d 727, 8 5 ' ; 2 . ~ . ~ . 2570,~where
d
this court said: 'kp""e1lant substantially argues
that the court in giving instructions Nos. 4, 5, and 7 failed to recognize the right of a
municipality to exercise the police power delegated to it in reference to its streets. Section
14-301, R.R.S.1943. The essence of the contention in this respect is that damages
resulting from the exercise of the police power by appellant are not compensable. The
fact that appellant had under the policepower the right to improve its streets and thereby
control the traffic thereon does not mean that it had immunity from liability to respond in
damages which resulted to private property abutting the improvement where a part of the
propertv of appellee was taken bv condemnation. The exercise of police power may or
may not involve the taking of private property and it may or may not involve mere
noncompensable inconvenience to the owner thereof. The distinction is not whether it is a
valid exercise of police power but whether or not the property itself is taken or damaged.
In 18 Am.Jur., Eminent Domain, 5 11, p. 639, the author says: 'The rcal distinction,
however (between eminent domain and the police power). lies in the fact that in eminent
domain propertv or a right in property is taken from the owner and transferred to a public
gency to be enioyed by it as its own. whereas under the police power, although it mav,
and often does. take wropertv in the constitutional sense so that it must be paid for, this is
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not accomplished by a transfer of ownershiv, but by destroving the property or impairing
its value.' [emphasis added].
'This is a condemnation proceeding originated bv a petition of appellant which
characterizes it as such. The petition asked the appointment of appraisers to determine the
compensation appellant was required to pay in the manner and to the extent required by
law, and of course there was not and could not have properly been any claim in the
petition that the appellant was exempt from obligation to pay damages by reason that the
municipality was exercising the police power. Thereby avoellant subiected itself to
liability for all damages sustained by the taking which this court has repeatedlv held
includes all elements and inconveniences which affect the market value such as "The
creation of noise and dust, the invasion of privacy, the devrivation of light and means of
access
* * * and like matters * * *." Crawford v. Central Nebraska Public Power & I m
,
Dist., 154 Neb. 832,49 N.W.2d 682,686. [Emphasis added].
Balog v. State, Dept. of Roads, 177 Neb. 826,832-834, 131 N.W.2d 402,407-08 (Neb.1964).
The Indiana Supreme Court in State v. Marion Circuit Court, 238 Ind. 637, 153 N.E.2d
327 (1 958) also rejected the notion that a controlled access roadway could destroy access rights
without compensation, given that abutter's rights of access are property rights and are subject to
condemnation:
It is evident from the Limited Access Statute, [footnote omitted] supra, that it was
contemplated the State Highway Commission could thereunder acquire property and
property rights for the state, including rights of access [emphasis in original] by
condemnation, gift, devise, and purchase, and that the rights of property owners who may
claim damages may be enforced under present laws. And, if r i ~ h t sof access are propertv
or proverty rights which the state may acauire bv condemnation as specified in the
Limited Access Statute. it is difficult to see how the acauisition of such rights of access
could not constitute a taking of property but only a nebulous or intangible conseauential
iniurv giving rise to no claim for damages, as contended bv petitioner. In fact, this court
in the recent case of Huffv. Indiana State Highway Commission, Ind. 1958, 149 N.E.2d
299, 303, reiterated the established rule that the owners' right of ingress and egress to a
public highway is a property right which may not be taken from hiin without
compensation, citing Ross v. Thompson, 1881, 78 Ind. 90, and Burton v. Sparh, 1941,
109 1nd.App. 531,36 N.E.2d 962. [Underlined emphasis added].
State v.Marion Circuit Court, 238 Ind. 637,642-643, 153 N.E.2d 327, 329 (Ind.1958)
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The

Supreme Court clearly articulated the rule that limited access highways

require a destruction of access rights, not merely a regulation of them, and therefore
condemnation is applicable, not the police powers doctrine:
There can now be little doubt that when an established land service road is
converted into a limited access facility the abutting property owners are entitled to
compensation for the destruction of their previously existing right of access. A limited
access facility may be described generally as a broad super-highway with traffic lanes
separated by a central median strip, and with ingress and egress to and from the highway
only at designated interchanges or crossovers, oftentimes substantial distances apart.
Under limited access facilities statutes almost identical to ours. the courts have uniformly
held that an abutting property owner is entitled to compensation for the destruction of a
pre-existing right of access to a land service road upon which the limited access hig11way
is constructed. [Citations omitted].
The rule requiring compensation under such circumstances applies regardless of
the specific requirements of a statute. [Citations omitted].
We are not here confronted by the exercise of the police power to regulate the
flow of traffic or to control the operation of traffic or to prescribe reasonable limitations
on the number of driveways or access facilities that might be allowed an abutting owner
adjoining a land service highway. Admittedly, such regulations as prohibiting U tugs or
left turns, or establishing oneway traffic or specifying the location of driveways in and out
of abutting property are all the subject of police regulations which require no
compensation to abutting owners. [Citations omitted].
As we pointed out in our prior decision, the right of access was destroyed not
merelv remlated. We do not here deal with the relative convenience of one abutting
property owner as compared to others similarly conditioned. If injury or inconvenience is
the same in kind as that suffered by others similarly situated, but different only in degree,
compensation is not recoverable. [Citations omitted]. Moreover, the Legislature has
specifically required compensation for the destroyed right of access. Sec. 338.04, Florida
Statutes, F.S.A.
Anhoco Corp. v. Dude County, 144 So.2d 793,797 -798 (Fla. 1962).

In the Court of Appeals of Marvland, the State Roads Commissioll argued that the closing
of a driveway and the denial of access due a fee taking and the designation of the road as a
controlled access arterial highway was a non-compensable exercise of police powers. The Court
noted that this was entirely inconsistent with the fact that the State had actually filed an eminent
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domain action, defining the issue as a taking and not an exercise of police power. The parties
agreed to a stipulation withdrawing a portion of the eminent domain action in order to give the
Court an opportunity to rule on the police powers question. The Court then described the State's
position thus:
The Coinmissioil contended, both in its brief and in its oral argument, that the
closing- of the driveway and the denial of access constitute a proper exercise of the police
* [are] not * * * compensable item$] i f damage.' It was unable,
power and 'therefore
however, to reconcile this contention with the fact that the suit was brought pursuant to
its powers of eminent domain and that it actually had paid damages into court. The
amount, it is true, was nominal but it was the sum of money deemed by the Commission
'to be the fair value of the land and improvements taken and damages done to the
aforesaid property.' Several members of the Court commented, during argument, on the
inconsistency of the Commission's position and in the ensuing colloquy there were
indications that the propriety of the use of the police power in this and similar situations
could not be resolved in this litigation. Recognizing the probability of an adverse holding,
counsel for the Commission agreed to a suggestion by the Court that the case be reargued
on the basis of an appropriate stipulation. The stipulation, to which counsel for appellees
also agreed, is as follows:
'1. That the petition for condemnation for the denial of access and the $1 .OO
deposited therefor, shall be considered withdrawn from this case, prior to the
hearing by the court below.
'2. That this Honorable Court decide the issue of this case as if the same were filed
as a Petition for a Declaratory Judgment, i. e., whether access under the facts of
this case, can be denied under the Police Power, or must be acquired by
condemnation under the principles of eminent domain.'
The Commission says that to make conventional highways safer for the
transportation of the public it is necessary to use the police power to limit or deny access
to the abutting landowner and that this is a proper exercise of the police power. It goes a
long step further and contends that it is 'obvious' that such a use of the police power 'is an
inherent segment
of the highway
laws.' The Commission concedes that heretofore it has
accomplished denial of access along existing highways only by paying compensation to
the abutting
- landowner, the amount thereof having been resolved either by agreement or
by condemnation. It further concedes that this case reflects a proposed change in policy,
which, if successful, will result in substantial economies in the area of right of way
acquisition.
State Roads Commission v. Jones, 241 Md. 246,248-249, 216 A.2d 563, 64 (1966).
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The Maryland Court then went on to consider whether the access rights for the limited
access arterial highway could be regulated under police powers or required compensation. The
Court carefully considered applicable statutes, finding that police power emanates exclusively
from the Legislature, and noting the importance of not allowing police powers to go too far,
quoting the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. V. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393

It should be observed, as a prelude to the determination of the validity of the
Commission's claim, that the police power inheres exclusively in the Legislature, and can
be exercised by its creatures, such as the Commission, only to the extent it has bee12
delegated. [Citations omitted]. We shall concern ourselves, therefore, with the single
question whether there has been such a delegation. Any one undertaking this task would
do well, by way of proper orientation, to keep in mind an observation made by Mr.
Justice Holmes, in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415-416,43 S.Ct.
158, 160, 67 L.Ed. 322 (1 922):
'The protection of private property in the Fifth Amendment presupposes that it is
wanted for public use, but provides that it shall not be taken for such use without
compensation. A similar assuinption is made in the decisions upon the Fourteenth
Amendment. Hairston v. Danville & Western Ry. Co., 208 U.S. 598, 605, 28
Sup.Ct. 331,52 L.Ed. 637. When this seemingly absolute protection is found to be
qualified by the police power, the natural tendency of human nature is to extend
the qualification more and more until at last private property disappears.'
'We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the public
condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the
constitutional way of paying for the change.'
State Roads Commission v. Jones, 241 Md. 246, 249-250,216 A.2d 563, 565 (MD.1966).
After considering the Maryland co~ltrolledaccess highway statutes, the Court concluded
that the Legislature intended access right be paid for, and thus held there was no exercise of the
police power, but rather a compensable taking.
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The following cases have all addressed improving existing roadways to controlled access
highways and found that access rights are compensable takings in such instances, not proper
exercises of police power:
Alabama: Blount Co. v. McPherson, 268 Ala. 133,105 So.2d 117 (1958). The Court held
"Certain it is that appellee was entitled to have compensation for his loss of access rights to this
limited access highway when those rights were sought to be condemrled along with his land for
the right of way of the highway." Id. 268 Ala. At 135, 105 So.2d at 119. In Arlcansas State
Highway Comm'n v.Arkansas Power & Light Co., 231 Ark. 307,330 S.W.2d 77 (1960), the
Court held that police powers should not be exercised indisc~irninatelyor unnecessarily, and that
statutes gave the state the power to purchase or condemn access rights, so there was an
alternative to the use of police power which must be utilized: condemnation.
Arizona: State ex rel. Morrison v. Thelberg, 87 Arizona 318,350 P.2d 988, (1960).
Conversion of an existing highway to a limited access highway requires compensation for loss of
access rights. Discussed, supra.
Arkansas: Arkansas State Highway Comm h v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank, 231 Ark. 907,
333 S.W.2d 904 (1960). The Court held that it did not need to reach the question of whether
access rights could be taken via the police power without compensation, because controlled
access highway statutes conternplated a taking of right of way in fee, and the court was
"...convinced that in the case at bar the State is actually exerting its power of eminent domain. It
thus becomes unnecessary for us to decide whether the same result might constitutionally be
attained through the exercise of the police power alone, without payment to the landowner." Id.
at 23 1 Ark. at 914,333 S.W.2d at 908-09.
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u:
Dept. of Public Works v. WOK414 Ill. 386, 111 N.E.2d 322 (1953). The Court
held that access rights of abutting owners could not be obtained through the State declaring a
roadway controlled access (freeway), but rather, access rights are property rights which must be
taken via condemnation, and paid for, in order to be extinguished.
Massachussetts: Nichols v. Commonwealth, 331 Mass. 581, 121 N.E.2d 56 (1954). The
State argued that because a property owner still had a legal right of access after construction of a
limited access road, the owner should not be entitled to present evidence of damages. The State
argued that the travel time or convenience of the route was immaterial as long as some legal
access remained. The Court held that under the Massachusetts law relating to controlled access
facilities it was clear compensation for toss of access rights was to be paid. In Wenton v.
Commonwealth, 335 Mass. 78, 138 N.E.2d 609 (1956), the State tried the argument that since the
property owner had no approved access permits, the owner essentially had no access to be taken
via a controlled access highway. The Court rejected this argument on the grounds that there is a
right of direct access to and from the public road belonging to adjacent property owners, whether
or not they have obtained permits. Thus, the taking of access was compensable despite the lack
of access permits pre-condemnation.
Mississippi: Mississippi State Highway Conzm iz v. Ray, 215 So.2d 569 (1968). The loss
of direct access due to converting an existing highway into a limited access highway was
compensable and the trial court properly received evidence from three real estate appraisers who
testified that there were severance damages caused by the loss of direct access and that the
highest and best use of the property had changed due to the loss of access. See also Mississippi
State Highway Comm'n v. Finch, 237 Miss. 314, 114 So.2d 673 (1959). The State claimed it
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wasn't taking access rights and wasn't creating a controlled access highway because it's petition
for condemnation did not refer to access rights as being taken and they had not declared the
reconstructed roadway to be access controlled. The Court found that the plans for the project
clearly showed it to be an access controlled highway after reconstruction, and that abutter's
access rights had to be coinpensated because the statutes so contemplated.

Ohio:Rothwell v. Linzell, 163 Ohio St. 517,526-527, 127 N.E.2d 524, 529 (1955). The
statutes provided that the State could acquire access rights to a limited access highway by
purchase, gift, agreement or condemnation. When the State files an action to condemn for a
limited access highway, it exercises the power of eminent domain to acquire access rights. In
most instances this will result in substantially reducing the value of the adjacent land, for which
damages must be paid as part of just compensation.
Orepon: Douglas Co. v. Briggs, 286 Or. 151,593 P.2d 1115 (1979). The Court found

that the statutes authorizing the County to establish access controlled throughways contemplated
that compensation would be paid to acquire abutter's access rights. See also State v. Burk, 200
Or. 21 1,265 P.2d 783 (1954). Converting a conventional highway to an access controlled
highway requires compensation for access rights lost.
Rhode Island: Aust v. Marcello, 112 R.I. 381, 385,310 A.2d 758, 760 (1973). The Court
held that the general police powers rule does not apply in cases where abutter's access easements
were talcen for limited access freeways because the statute allowed for purchase or condemnation
of such access rights.
Washington: McMoran v. State, 55 Wash.2d 37, 345 P.2d 598 (1959). The State
constructed a concrete curb along a roadway to convert it to a limited access road. The State
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claimed the property owner still had access to the right of way along a frontage road and
therefore was not entitled to compensation. The Court found that the property owner had an
appurtenant right of free and convenient access to the roadway where traffic was flowing, not just
the right of way, and found a compensable taking.
West Virginia: Ashworth v. State Road Comm'n, 147 W.Va. 430,436, 128 S.E.2d 471,
475-76 (1 962). A property owners claim for loss of abutter's access rights when a roadway was
designated as a limited access highway was upheld.
6. Access Rights of Abutting Owners Are Cornpensable Property Interests

Idaho has long recognized that access to a public right-of-way is one of the fundamental
components and vested rights of ownership of land which an owner cannot be deprived of
with.outjust compensation. The principle was first elucidated in Village of Sandpoint v. Doyle,
14 Idaho 749,757,95 P. 945,947 (1908) by the Idaho Supreme Court:
While the public generally may have no special or particular interest in the right of
ingress to any particular lot owner's property, the lot owner has a very material
and special interest in having the public reach his property and place of business,
and in his right to go and come and carry on business and invite the public to his
place of business. It has been held by the courts that to cut off this right of ingress
and egress would be to take the lot owner's property without due process of law.
InFarris v. City of Twin Falls, 81 Idaho 583, 586, 347 P.2d 996, 998 (1959), the Idaho
Supreme Court stated:
Access to a public way is one of the incidents of ownership of land bounding
thereon. Such right is appurtenant to the land and is a vested right of which the lot
owner cannot be deprived without just compensation. (Citation omitted).
The rule was similarly stated in Hadjeld v. State ex rel. Burns, 86 Idaho 561, 566, 388 P.2d

TRIAL BRIEF- PART I1 (TAKING OF ACCESS) - 3 1
0 2006. May bc freely used by Courts. All others must obtain penmission from the author for use or copying of any portion of this inatefiai.

This court has long recognized that access to a public way is one of the incidents
of ownership of land bounding thereon; that such right of access constitutes an interest in,
and is appurtenant to, the land. It is a vested right of which the property owner cannot be
deprived without just compensation.
See also Continental Oil Co. v City of Twin Falls, 49 Idaho 89, 107,286 P. 353, 359 (1930);
Lower Payette Ditch Co. v Smith, 73 Idaho 514,519,254 P.2d 417,420 (1953); Killinger v Twin
Falls Highway Dist., 135 Idaho 322, 17 P.3d 266 (2000).
The Idaho Supreme Court unequivocally held in Hughes v. State, 80 Idaho 286,295,328
P.2d 397,402 (1958) that access rights must be compensated when taken, as they are a valuable
property right.
Our review of Idaho's Constitution, statutes and decisions, clearly shows that the
power of eminent domain extends to every kind of property taken for public use,
including the right of access to public streets, such being an estate or interest in and
appurtenant to real property; and since such right of access constitutes an interest in, by
virtue of being an easement appurtenant to, a larger parcel, the court, jury or referee must
ascertain and assess the damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be
condemned by reason of the severance of the portion--the right of access--sought to be
condemned, and the construction of the improvement. LC. sec. 7-71 1.
Idaho law has carefully guarded and protected access rights as property interests. The
Idaho Supreme Court summarized the state of the law as follows in Mabe v. State ex rel. Rich, 83
Idaho 222,227,360 P.2d 799,801-802 (1961).
Idaho is firmly committed to the rule that access to property from an existing
highway is a prooertv right. Village of Sandpoint v. Doyle, 14 Idaho 749,95 P. 945, 17
L.R.A.,N.S., 497; Continental Oil Co. v. City of Twin Falls, 49 Idaho 89,286 P. 353;
Independent School Dist. No. I of Twin Falls County v. Continental Oil Co., 49 Idaho
109,286 P. 360. That the curtailment of. or interference with access to real property is to
be considered as an element of damages in an action for condemnation has been
recorinized by this court in the following cases: State ex rel. Rich v. Fonburg, 80 Idaho
269, 328 P.2d 60; State ex rel. Rich v. Dunclick, lnc., 77 Idaho 45, 286 P.2d 1112. This
court has further held interference with access to be. in itself. a t a k i n ~of a ~ropertyright,
com~ensablein damages awarded by way of 'inverse condemnation'. and not merely as an
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item of severance damaizes in a condemnation suit. Farris v. City of Twin Falls, 81 Idaho
583,347 P.2d 996; Hughes v. State, 80 Idaho 286, 328 P.2d 397,402. [emphasis added].
Per the Supreme Court, access rights of ahutting owners must be taken only with payment of just
compensation:
We have recognized that an ahutting property owner's right of reasonable access
to a public highway is a property right, which may not be taken by the state without just
compensation. Hadjeld v. State, 86 Idaho 561,388 P.2d 1018 (1963); Mabe v. State, 83
Idaho 222,360 P.2d 799 (1961); Farris v. City of Twin Falls, 81 Idaho 583, 347 P.2d 996
(1959); Hughes v. State, 80 Idaho 286,328 P.2d 397 (1958). When such property is taken
without compensation the owner may recover, in an action in inverse condemnation, the
damages to his property caused by the taking. Johnston v. Boise City, 87 Idaho 44, 390
P.2d 291 (1964); Farris v. City of Twin Falls, supra.
Bare v. Department ofHighways, 88 Idaho 467, 471,401 P.2d 552, 554 (I 965).
There is a recognized distinction between the rights of direct access to and from the
roadway and an abutting property and rights to flow of traffic; there is no recognized right to
traffic flows. There is a recognized right of access. E.g. Brown v City of Twin Falls, 124 Idaho

Therefore, any argument from the State that Canyon Vista had no access rights to Pole
Line Road before the taking because they did not have any approved, permitted access points is
fundamentally flawed. ITD would be ignoring that every abutting property owner has an
easement appurtenant for direct access to and from the public roadways. The argument also
ignores the property owner's historic use of their access rights to Pole Line Road. The cases
have not held that absent a permit there is no right of access; rather they have recognized
abutter's inherent rights of access.

TRIAL BRIEF- PART I1 (TAKING OF ACCESS) - 33
O 2006. May be freely used by Courts. All others must obtain permission from the author for use or copying of any portion of this inaterial.

7. Rights Vest at the Date of Taking; ITD Has Acquired Canyon Vista's Access

Right
LC. 5 7-712 provides that the property owner's right to just compensation vests as of the
date of taking, which in this case is December 28,2004. The State toolc all access rights to Pole
Line Road as of that date in its Amended Complaint, except for the temporary access which was
reserved to the property owner for the current use. The State is bound by its Amended Complaint
and must pay just compensation for the access rights it has acquired.
The Nebraska Supreme Court held in Danish Vennerfovningand Old Peoples Home v.
State ofNebraska, Dept. OfRoads, 191 Neb. 774,775,217 N.W.2d 819,822 (1974):
A condemnor must take the rights he appropriates unconditionally by his petition
of taking and he must pay full compensation to the condemnee for what he takes or is
entitled to take by his petition of taking. [citation omitted].
Also, the Amended Complaint states no access will be allowed other than as shown in the
plans. Facts admitted in pleadings are deemed admitted and need not be proved.
Facts admitted by the pleadings need not be proved. Pendlebuvy v. Westevn
Casualty and Surety Company, 89 Idaho 456,406 P.2d 129 (1965); Cloughley v. Orange
Transportation Co., 80 Idaho 226,327 P.2d 369 (1958); Burleson v. Tucker; 78 Idaho
262,300 P.2d 816 (1956).
Whitt v. Jarnagin, 91 Idaho 181, 186,418 P.2d 278,282 (Idaho 1966). Thus, Canyon Vista
should not have to prove access rights are being taken. The rule was also well stated in the early
case ofICnowles v. New Sweden Irr. Dist., 16 Idaho 217, 101 P. 81, 82 (1909).
Admissions made in pleadings on which the trial is had are solemn admissions in the case
in which made, and are not required to be supported by evidence on the part of the
adverse party. Such admissions are taken as true against the party making them, without
further proof or controversy.
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B. There is an Important Distinction Between Physical Access and Legal Access
We anticipate that ITD will argue that: a) Canyon Vista did not have access points to and
from Pole Line Road which they were utilizing, b) did not have any access permits to Pole Line
Road, and c) did not request any. This reasoning is completely flawed, not only because
abutter's access rights are recognized without permits, as discussed above, but for additional
reasons as well.
The fact that Canyon Vista did not have constructed physical access to and from Pole
Line Road for their existing use of the property other than four historical accesses does not mean
that they had no access rights to and from Pole Line Road. The current physical access that a
property enjoys, the physical access being utilized, is not necessarily identical with the legal
rights of access to and from a property.
The reason this is important is that ITD is acquiring all the legal rights of access to Pole
Line Road, but may ask the Court to focus on thephysicalaccess removed, i.e. only constructed,
pre-existing physical entrances to and from Pole Line Road. Entrances are not the issue; rights
are.
The distinction between physical and legal access is perhaps best illustrated by title
insurance cases that have addressed legal rights of access and contrasted rights of access with
actual physical access. Title insurance policies insure "a legal right of access," assuming the risk
of loss from the lack of a legally enforceable right of access to and from the insured property
appearing from the public records. The specific language in policies typically insures against
"Lack of a right of access to and from the land." In insurance cases, legal access is distinguished

TRIAL BRIEF- PART ll (TAKING OF ACCESS) - 35
0 2006. May be freely used by Couris. All others must obtain permission fmm the author for use ox copying ofany poliion of this material.

from physical access, and title insurers have been held liable for lack of legal access but not lack
of physical access, providing examples of the distinction which may be instructive here.
In Title & Trust Co. v. Barrows, 381 So.2d 1088 (1979) the insured purchased a lot
surrounded on three sides by land owned by others, all of which were a part of a beach
subdivision. The fourth side of the lot bordered on a platted street, the right of way for which
had been dedicated and accepted by the county. The insured later discovered that the right of
way abutting their property was covered by high tide water during the spring and fall of each
year,
At the time the property was purchased Borrows purchased title insurance. The title
policy covered any lack of a right of access to and from the land. The insured sued the title
insurance company on the theory that there was no access because the road was impassable. The
trial court held that there was a lack of access to the insureds' property, but the Florida Court of
Appeals reversed, stating:
Appellant and Florida Land Title Association, appearing as amicus curiae, argue that
appellant cannot be held liable on grounds of "lack of right of access to and from the
land" since there is no defect shown by the public record as to their right of access; that
the public record shows a dedicated and accepted public right-of-way abutting the lot.
They contend that title insurance does not insure against defects in the physical condition
of the land or against infirmities in legal right of access not shown by the public record.
See Pierson v. Bill, 138 Fla. 104, 189 So. 679 (1939). They arguethat defects in the
physical condition of land such as are involved here are not covered by title insurance.
We agree. Title insurance only insures against title defects. Title 6; Trust Co. v.
Barrows, 381 So.2d at 1090.
In Gates v. Chicago Title Insurance Company, 813 S.W.2d 10 (Miss. 1991), the insured
purchased a 480 tract of land that ended up having as its access a goat path. The access was one
negotiable only by foot or horseback and if attempted in a four wheel drive, it should not be after
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rain or snow. The insured brought suit pursuant to his title insurance policy which provided for
loss against darnages sustained or incurred by the insured as of the date of the policy by reason of
a lack of right of access to and from the land. The court found the title insurance company was
not responsible for investigating the physical condition of the access road, and therefore the
insured was unable to recover under the terms of the policy.
In Krause v. Title & Trust Co., 390 So.2d 805 (F1a.Dist.Ct.A~~.
1980), the court held that
where plaintiffs had legal access to their property but it was not physically passable by ordinary
vehicles without a substantial amount of fill, they were not allowed to recover under their title
insurance policy. The court reasoned that the insurer is responsible for ascertaining the quality of
title and legal access as shown by the public record, and could not be held responsible for
insuring that physical access was possible.
In Hocking v. Title Insurance & Trust Co., 37 Cal.2d 644,234 P.2d 625 (1951), plaintiff
sued because the roads in the subdivision in which her lot was located had not been properly
graded and paved prior to the filing and acceptance of the subdivision plat by the City, claiming
that the condition of the roads impaired the value of her property and that she lacked access. The
Court held that the insurer was not responsible, noting:
It is defendants' position that plaintiff confuses title with physical condition of the
property she purchased and of the adjacent streets, and that "One can hold perfect title to
land which is valueless; one can have marketable title to land while the land itself is
unmarketable. The truth of this proposition would appear to be elementary. It appears to
be the condition of her land in respect to improvements related thereto (graded and paved
streets), rather than the condition of her title to the land, which is different from what she
expected to get. Hocking, 234 P.2d at 629.
In MacRean v. St. Paul Title Insurance, 405 A.2d 405 (N.J. 1979), plaintiffs purchased a
lot which was bounded on one side by an allegedly public street, Delaware Street, and on another
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side by Warren Avenue, a public street. Plaintiffs accessed their home via Delaware Street.
After a time, they were notified that Delaware Street was actually a privately owned lot, and a
home was shortly thereafter constructed on that lot facing Warren Avenue, so that plaintiffs front
door faced the side of the new neighbor's home. Although plaintiffs had access from Warren
Avenue, they sued their title insurer, claiming that free access to the front of their home had been
cut off by the fact that Delaware Street was not a dedicated public street. At issue in MacBean,
according to the Court, was the reasonable expectation of a lay purchaser of title insurance. The
court, after an examination of the policy and its exceptions, concluded that it was anlbiguous and
left the issue of liability open for the trier of fact.
The law relating to access claims is summarized by Joyce D. Palomar in Title Insurance

Law'.5 5.07, Lack of a Right of Access:
Title insurers also assume, in both owner's and loan policies, the risk of loss from lack of
a legally enforceable right of access to and from the insured land. It is important to
understand that the title insurance policy insures only a legal "right of access," and not
any particular physical route.
These cases clearly demonstrate that the right of access is a distinct property right which
may be separate and apart from actual physical access. Title insurers check the public records to
determine if properties abut dedicated public roads. If they do, they are presumed to have legal
rights of access unless there is something of record (perhaps a Condemnation Judgment taking
access rights) which would indicate there are no legal rights of access.
If Courts have found title insurance companies not liable for lack of access when the right
of access exists, even is access is physically impossible, it makes logical sense that Courts have

' Copies attached for the Court's convenience as Exhibit,"B"
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also held that when condemnors take or destroy rights of access, the fact that there may not have
been physical entrances to the property is irrelevant. These rules are consistent. It would be
inconsistent to treat legal access rights one way for title insurance purposes and differently for
condemnation purposes, not requiring compensation by insurers when legal rights of access exist,
but also not requiring compensation from condemnees when legal rights of access are lost.
C. The Defendant's Claim for Severance Damages Due to Loss of Access Rights is Proper

The remaining property owned by Canyon Vista has been damaged as a result of the
taking. That damage is measured by comparing the value of the property as of December 28,
2004 without the taking or the project, and the value of the property as of December 28,2004,
considering the taking and the project. This is entirely appropriate and reflects the proper
measure of damages in such cases.
Generally, just compensation in a direct condemnation action is measured by the
difference between the fair market value of the highest and best use of the property before the
take and the fair market value of the highest and best use of the property after the take. The
phrase "highest and best" use means the highest and most profitable use for which the property is
adaptable or needed in the reasonably near future. Highest and best use does not necessarily
depend upon the uses to which the property is devoted; rather, all uses for which the property is
suitable should be considered. State ex rel, Symms v. Ciry of Mountain Home, 94 Idaho 528,493
P.2d 387 (1972). The type and number of accesses provided to the affected property, both in the
before and after condition, directly relates to the highest and best use for which the property may
be suitable.
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The Fonburg case, supra, allows for evidence of highest and best use to be considered in
determining fair market value as an element of severance damages.
When access rights are taken, the measure of damages is the value of the property before
the taking less the value of the property after the taking, as was held in Lobdell v. State, 89 Idaho

The authorities are almost universally in agreement that the measure of damages
for the destruction or impairment of a right of access to a highway upon which the
property of an owner abuts is the difference between the fair market value of the
taking, and fair market value of the same property immediately after the
destruction or impairment of the access. The basis of the damages awarded is not
the value of the right of access to the highwav. but rather the difference in the
value of the proverty before and after the destruction or impairment of the access,
and this in turn is based upon the highest and best use to which the land involved
is suitable before and after the talc in^. Mabe v. State, 83 Idaho 222,360 P.2d 799;
State ex rel. Morrison v. Thelberg, 87 Arizona 318, 350 P.2d 988 (1960), 29
ACJS Eminent Domain (i 141 p.597; 18 American Juris Prudence 919, Eminent
Domain paragraph 280,4 Nichols on Eminent Domain, 588, (i 142431;
Condemnation and Appraisal Practice, p.201. (Emphasis added).
Lobdell cited approvingly to State v. Thelbeug, 87 Arizona 318,325,350 P.2d 988,992
(1960), in which the Arizona Supreme Court stated the rule as follows:
The measure of damages for the destruction or impairment of access to the
highway upon which the property of an owner abuts is the difference between the
market value of the abutting property immediately before and immediately after
the destruction or impairment thereof. The damages awarded the abutting
landowner for destruction or impairment of access therefor is based, not upon the
value of the right of access to the highway, but rather upon the difference in the
value of the remaining property before and after the access thereto has been
destroyed or impaired. This in turn is based upon the highest and best use to
which the land involved is best suited before and after the right of access is
molested. State. By and Through State Highway Commission v. Burke, supra;
Boxberger v. State Highway Commission, 126 Colo. 526,251 P .2d 920.
Let us apply the above rules of law to the facts in the instance case
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bearing in mind that a portion of Thelberg's property was taken by the State for
the purpose of constructing a frontage road along the north side of the controlledaccess road on the old right of way." (Emphasis added.)
See also Smith v. State Highway Commission, 185 Kan. At 460, 346 P.2d at 272
The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that loss of access is a material consideration in
assessing severance damages.
Where a part of the owner's contiguous land is taken in a condemnation
proceeding, all inconveniences resulting to the owner's remaining land, including an
easement or access to a road or right of way formerly enjoyed, which decrease the value
of the land retained by the owner, are elements of severance damage for which
compensation should be paid. 29 C.J.S. Eminent Domain 5 105, p. 910; 29 C.J.S.
Eminent Domain § 163, p. 1033; State ex reL Rich v. Dunclick, Inc., 77 Idaho 45,286
P.2d 1112; State v. Sgner, 58 Idaho 233, 72 P.2d 699, and in Creasy v. Stevens (Marshell
v. Stevens), D.C., 160 F.Supp. 404,405, the Court held:
'The right of access to a public highway is a property right which cannot be taken
or materially interfered with without just compensation.'
State ex rel. Rich v. Fonburg, 80 Idaho 269,278, 328 P.2d 60,64-65 (1958). Therefore, the
Defendants claim for severance damages is appropriate and the proper measure is being used.
D. A Simple Framework for Making Sense of Aceess/TakingslPolice Powers Cases
One can easily get overwhelmed by the confusing nature of the myriad of access cases.
Because the cases tend to be both direct and inverse condemnation cases, and involve a variety of
property rights and fact patterns, it is easy to find apparently contradicting cases. This has been a
problem in jurisprudence for a long time; access is one of the thorniest issues one can research.
As one Court stated:
There is, of course, a veritable gallimaufiy of judicial opinion in respect of the
right of access of abutting owners to highways. As long ago as 1907 the Supreme Court
felt compelled to say:
'The right of an owner of land abutting on public highways has been a fruitful
source of litigation in the courts of all the states, and the decisions have been
conflicting, and often in the same state irreconcilable in principle. The courts have
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modified or overruled their own decisions, and each state has in the end fixed and
limited, by legislation or judicial decision, the rights of abutting owners in
accordance with its own view of the law and public policy.' Sauer v. City of New
York, 206 U.S. 536,548,27 S.Ct. 686,689,690,51 L.Ed. 1176, 1182 (1907).
We content ourselves by observing that the situation has not improved and we
draw not a little comfort from the fact that it will not be necessary, in this case, to
undertake either a discussion or a reconciliation of these seemingly myriad decisions, to
say nothing of the output of the text writers and the legal periodicals.
State Roads Commission v. Jones, 241 Md. 246,250-251,216 A.2d 563,565 (1966). The Court
in that case was able to avoid the morass of cases because they found a direct taking of a
compensable right, avoiding the balancing issues.
How does one determine whether changes to access are a compensable taking or are
merely the result of the exercise of police powers, which is generally non-compensable? The
following is the analysis courts have used to answer this question.
1.

m,consider "Is the power of condemnation being exercised to take access?"
a.

2.

If no, consider: "Is there a property right at issue?"
a.

3.

b,
there is not a compensable taking, end of inqui~y.

w,consider "Is the property right being eliminated or destroyed?"
a.

4.

m,there is a compensable taking; end of inquiry.

m,there is a compensable taking; end of inquiry.

rfno,there is a balancing test to determine whether the police power has been
utilized to such an extent that it has gone far enough to be a coinpensable taking.
Factors to consider include:
a. Interests of condemnor vs. interests the condemnee (present and future)
b. Degree of interference with private property rights
c. Reasonableness or unreasonableness of regulation
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Access cases do not always articulate this framework for analysis, but review of the cases
shows that it is primarily the approach courts have used, and as a result, access cases generally
fall easily within one of these four basic "levels" of inquiry.
There are many variations of fact patterns in access cases. Before delving further into the
cases, it is worthwhile to briefly develop the above four steps another layer, with the most
common fact patterns and a brief explanation.
First, courts consider "Is the Dower of condemnation being exercised to take access?"
Where the power of condemnation is being used to acquire access rights, courts have held that
the condemnor cannot escape liability by claiming it is exercising its police powers. In fact, it is
not, it is expressly using its power of condemnation, and cannot recast its actions as police
actions in order to avoid liability. Courts have considered constitutional and statutory authority
for the condemnation, the conde~nnor'sorders and pleadings regarding the necessity of the
taking, the rights being acquired, and the fact that rights vest at the time of taking and cannot be
later recast. In cases where an existing road is being widened and converted to a limited access
highway, as in this case, courts have held that acquisition of access rights is a compensable
taking and not an exercise of the police power. Thus, if there is a direct condemnation, there is a
compensable taking, though we must examine the rights being acquired. These are "Level One"
cases, because they can be resolved at the first level of analysis; compensation is due.
Where there is not a direct condemnation, there is often an inverse condemnation, with
the property owner claiming something done without a condemnation action rises to the level of
a taking. In these cases, the threshold question is "Is there a proverty r i ~ h at
t issue?" If not, there
is not a taking. Courts have held that there is no right to a particular flow of traffic, therefore
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regulations on traffic flows such as medians, U-turns, signals, etc. are non-compensable.
Property owners also have no rights regarding regulations on the public way, so certain types or
weights of vehicles may be prohibited, traffic can be limited in speed, parking inay be allowed or
not in the public way, etcetera. There is also no right of adjacent property owners to access a
newly constructed roadway, so when a road is built where none was before, denying adjacent
owners access is not a compensable taking, as there is no pre-existing property right being
affected. Where courts have found that no property right existed, they have obviously found no
compensable taking. These are "Level Two" cases, because they can be resolved at the second
level of analysis; compensation is not required.
On the other hand, when a taking is asserted and a property right is at issue, there is
clearly at least the possibility that property right is being so eroded that a taking results. Property
owners which abut existing roads have an easement appurtenant to direct access to and from the
road to access their property (though they do not necessarily have the right to access it at all
points). In these cases, dealing with direct access, courts first consider "Is the property right
being eliminated or destroved?" If yes, leaving the parcel landlocked with no vehicular access to
and from the public way, the property right has been entirely destroyed and there is a
compensable taking. These are "Level Three" cases, because they can be resolved at the third
level of analysis; compensation required.
In instances where there is a property right being impacted, but not entirely destroyed,
more analysis is required. The court must balance the interests and equities to determine whether
the police power has been utilized to such an extent that it has gone far enough to be a
compensable taking. Factors to consider include the interests of condemnor vs. interests the
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conde~nneeboth now and in the future, the degree of interference with private property rights,
and the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the regulation. If the property owner is merely
inconvenienced, or has merely a more circuitous route to travel, but one which is still reasonable,
there will be no taking found. However, if the restriction on access is so severe that the highest
and best use of the property is changed, the development potential of the property is diminished,
or the degree of impairment is unreasonable, compensation is warranted. These are "Level Four"
cases, because they require going through all four levels of analysis; compensation may or may
not be required, depending on the specific facts of each case.

1. Brief History of Idaho Access Cases
Idaho Appellate Courts have not considered the taking of access for limited access
highways except in the Fonburg case, supra. However, access cases in Idaho have taken many
forms, and will be discussed briefly, in chronological order, and categorized according to the
above system. These cases deal with different levels of analysis, and include inverse cases or
regulation of traffic flows rather than direct access rights.
1. Village of Sandpoint v. Doyle, 14 Idaho 749,95 P. 945 (1908)

Level 3. City sought to prevent landowner from obtaining access to an elevated bridge.
Court ruled he had a unique right to access as an abutting owner.
2. Crane v. City ofHarrison, 40 Idaho 229,232 P. 578 (1925).

Level 2. Change in grade of road didn't result in compensable taking because it
damaged, rather than took, property and at the time, damages were not recoverable.
Overruled by Hughes v. State, infra.
3. Continental Oil v. City o f Twin Falls, 49 Idaho 89,286 P. 353 (1930).

Level 3. City ordinance seeking to prevent abutting property owner from accessing
sidewalk and roadway for service station use of his property was held unconstitutional
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4. Powell v. McKelvey, 56 Idaho 291, 53 P.2d 626 (1935).
Level 2. Construction of a subway in the center of a street, leaving lanes on either side,
did not result in loss of access for abutting owners. Rather, the problem was diversion of
traffic, held to be non-cornpensable.
5. Fosters v. Boise City, 63 Idaho 201, 118 P.2d 721 (1941).
Level 2. Installation of parking meters by the City in the right of way was challenged, but
upheld as a non-cornpensable exercise of police power.
6. Lower Payette Ditch Co. v Smith, 73 Idaho 514, 254 P.2d 417 (1953).
Level 3. Not a compensation issue, but dealt with abutter's access rights to vacated road
and recognized abutter's rights as property interest.
7 . State ex vel. Rich v Dunclick, Inc., 77 Idaho 45,286 P.2d 1112 (1955).

Level 1. Convenience of lost access could be considered by the jury in a direct
condemnation.
8. State ex rel. Rich v Fonburg, 80 Idaho 269, 328 P.2d 60 (1958).
Level 1. Taking of access rights for a limited access highway was proper under the
statute, and cornpensable. (Discussed at length, supra).
9. Hughes v State, 80 Idaho 286,328 P.2d 397 (1958).
Level 4. Inverse case where one of two means of access to a corner colnmercial property
was taken. The Court found this rendered the property unsuitable for its highest and best
use and therefore there was a cornpensable taking.
10. Farris v City of Twin Falls, 81 Idaho 583, 347 P.2d 996 (1959)
Level 3. Access to a residence was impaired by installation of a curb and raising of the
road by 8". The Court found a cause of action existed for impairment of access rights.
11. Mabe v State ex vel. Rich, 83 Idaho 222, 360 P.2d 799 (1961).
Level 4. Held that if the owner could establish damage from loss of direct access it
would be compensable. However, in Mabe v. State, 86 Idaho 254, 385 P.2d 401 (1963) it
was found that the owner failed to establish anything other than circuity.
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12. Hadfield v State ex rel. Burns, 86 Idaho 561,388 P.2d 1018 (1963).
Level 4. Court found it was unreasonable to dismiss a complaint seeking compensation
for destruction of access during construction for three months to a Pocatello service
station. If the temporary taking was unreasonable, it would be compensable.
13. Johnston v Boise City, 87 Idaho 44,390 P.2d 291 (1964).
Level 4. City was closing curb cuts which were not being utilized, under its police
powers. The Court balanced the interests and found a non-compensable, reasonable use
of the police power, and r&inainingaccess to the property reasonable.
14. James v State By and Through Idaho Bd. of Highway Directors, 88 Idaho 172,397 P.2d 766
(1964).
Level 2. Lodge in Kootenai claimed it lost access to the highway, but the Court found
that there was still access, it was just more circuitous and there was no compei~sableright
to traffic flows.
15. Bare v Department ofHighways, 88 Idaho 467,401 P.2d 552 (1965).
Level 2. Property owner was using the right of way for his customers to obtain gas from
his pumps. State closed off this use but did not change his access. He had no right to use
public right of way for private purposes so be had no compensable claim.
16. Lobdell v State ex rel. Board ofHighway Directors, 89 Idaho 559,407 P.2d 135 (1965).
Level 1. Court found the State had stipulated their actions were a condemnation. State
closed off all but a 40' access and a shared access with 3' on the subject property to serve
a service station, restaurant, bar and taxi business. This reduction in access was a taking.
17. Snyder v State, 92 Idahol75,438 P.2d 920 (1968).
Level 2. Parking eliminated in right of way to allow for more through traffic. No
physical taking. The owner had no rights in the right of way and there was no taking of
access rights, thus a proper exercise of police power and no taking.
18. Weaver v Village ofBancroft, 92 Idaho 189,439 P.2d 697 (1968).
Level 3. Direct access to a residence was completely destroyed by construction of a wide
ditch between the residence and the roadway, therefore there was a compensable taking
requiring compensation.
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19. State ex rel. Moore v Bastian, 97 Idaho 444, 546 P.2d 399 (1976).
Level 1 & 2. Direct condemnation was being used to acquire property from a corner site
where an Albertson's was used. Owner tried to claim damages caused by median
installation and increased circuity rather than damage caused by taking. Noncompensable.
20. Merritt v State, 113 Idaho 142,742 P.2d 397 (1986).
Level 4. Partial indirect taking of access. Owner filed an inverse claim. Court
considered all facts and found remaining access to the property reasonable, thus no
compensable taking.
21. Brown v City ofTwin Falls, 124 Idaho 39,855 P.2d 876 (1993).
Level 2. Inverse claim arising from median installation. Court found only minor
inconvenience resulted; non-coinpensable.
22. Killinger v Twin Falls Highway Dist., 135 Idaho 322, 17 P.3d 266 (2000).
Level 3. Direct access to a public way was destroyed by the State's change in use of the
right of way, resulting in a compensable taking.

E. Even if Police Powers Were at issue, There is Still a Taking of Defendant's Access
Rights
It's difficult to imagine categorizing this case within the realm of police powers, given the
Amended Complaint, LC. 5 40-31 1(1), Fonburg, Smith, and the majority of cases regarding
limited access highway cases from other jurisdictions. However, even if we characterize the
State's actions in this case as falling within the police powers doctrine, there is still a
compensable taking under the balancing test because access to the remaining property is not
reasonable, limits the highest and best use of the property, and decreases the development
potential of the site.
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1. One Access to Fifteen Acres for Commercial Use Found Unreasonable

In a prior condemnation case with ITD, State v. Fuhvman, Judge D. Duff Mckee acted as
the trier of fact and issued a decision, after hearing evidence at trial, that where the State was
leaving the property owner with only one point of access the remaining access was unreasonable.
The property was vacant but had a highest and best use of commercial, for a big box retailer.
The site was roughly fifteen acres in size. The State was not expressly acquiring access rights as
it is in this case. However, because the State project imposed a free running right onto new
Highway 55, the remaining frontage on the road did not allow more than one full movement
access to the property per Ada County Highway District standards.
After considering all the evidence, Judge McKee found that one full movement access
point was not reasonable access to serve a big box commercial development, which was the
highest and best use of the property. A copy of his decision in the case is attached as Exhibit
"C".

If one full movement access was not held reasonable to serve 15 acres with a highest and
best use of commercial big box type retail, it is hard to see how no access could be considered
reasonable to serve almost 18 acres in the after condition, as in this case.
2. If the Remaining Access Changes the Highest & Best Use, It's Unreasonable

In evaluating what is reasonable access, one must consider "Reasonable for what
purpose?" Access which is reasonable for a single family residence may be completely
unreasonable for an office complex or a commercial development. Therefore, consideration of
the highest and best use of property is an integral issue in a determination of whether or not
reasonable access remains. If the remaining access changes the highest and best use of the
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property, a compensable taking is generally found.
In Douglas County v. Briggs, 578 P.2d 1261 (1978)), a f m e d by Oregon Supreme Court,
Douglas County v. Briggs, 593 P.2d 1115 (1079) reasonableness of the remaining access was
held to be a fact question which must be determined in light of the highest and best use of the
property. Briggs looked at the alternative access to see if it complied with the commercial use of
that property, which necessitated a comparison between its past and current use. While the
remaining access was suitable for residential and farming, it was not suitable for its highest use
because no commercial access to the affected property remained. A talcing occurred as a result
The New York case of Priestly v. State, 23 N.Y.2d 152,242 N.E.2d 827,295 N.Y.S.2d
659 (1968) contains a good explanation of why highest and best use must be considered to
determine unreasonableness or unsuitability:
Claimants' appeal from that determination revolves upon the rather murky
distinction between access which is merely 'circuitous' and, therefore, insufficient as a basis for
consequential damages and that which is 'unsuitable' and, therefore, compensable. It is beyond
dispute that mere circuity of access does not constitute a basis for an award of consequential
damages [citations omitted]. But, this legal proposition is controlling in aparticular case only if,
as a question of fact, the access involved is shown to be merely circuitous [citations omitted]. Lf
the facts established at the trial of a claim show that the access involved is more than merely
circuitous so that it can be characterized as 'unsuitable,' compensabilitv follows. The trial court in
this case, by necessary implication from its award of consequential damages and by its reference
to the damage caused by the loss of access to the bridge approach, found the access remaining to
be unsuitable, while the Appellate Division disagreed and found it to be merely circuitous and
not unsuitable and insufficient. In this posture, the issue then is whether the record as a whole
supports the determination of the trial court or that of the Appellate Division [citations omitted].
Before attempting to evaluate the evidence as to the nature and character of the
remaining access with a view toward the ultimate characterization of it either as merely
circuitous or as unsuitable. it is first necessary that those concepts be given content and
substance. Case law has indicated that mere inconvenience of access is insufficient to
constitute unsuitability [citations omitted] and that 'Suitable access now is any access by
which entrance may be had to a property without difficulty' [citations omitted] and,
further, that the question of suitability is a factual one directly related to the highest and
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best use of the property [citations omitted]. Such formulations, however, do not provide
any definite or certain guides to the decision of particular cases. In light of this, the vew
definition of the concewts involved can provide a basis upon which to approach such
determinations. 'Circuitous,' in its commonly accepted understanding. indicates that
which is roundabout and indirect but which nevertheless leads to the same destination.
'Suitable,' in its commonlv accepted understanding describes that which is adeauate to
the reauirements of or answers the needs of a particular object. The concepts are not
mutuallv exclusive and. therefore, a finding that a means of access is indeed circuitous
does not eliminate the possibility that that same means of access might also be unsuitable
in that it is inadeauate to the access needs inherent in the highest and best use of the
property involved. [Emphasis added].
Priestly v. State, 23 N.Y.2d 152, 155,242 N.E.2d 827, 829-830,295 N.Y.S.2d 659,662-63 (N.Y.
1968). See also Baan v.State ofNew York, 75 A.D.2d 919,920 (1980).
Changes in access can result in a change of highest and best use. In Cousin v. State oj
New Youk, 42 A.D2d 1016 (1973), the city appropriated one of two curb cuts for an irregularly
shaped property. The highest and best use before taking was as a gasoline service station. The
appropriation reduced its highest and best use to light manufacturing or industrial. Since the
taking changed the property's highest and best use, it did not matter if a more circuitous route
existed because the change in use was unsuitable. (More weight is given to change of highest
and best use than circuity).
In Columbus Holding Corporation v. State ofNew Yorl, 36 A.D.2d 674,675 (1971) the
State argued that highest and best use did not change as long as it was still "commercial." The
Court disagreed, finding:
This arwment is predicated upon the theorv that the highest and best use should have
been determined to be commercial rather than a specific commercial use, to wit, a
gasoline service station. This argument. however. ignores the fact that there are higher or
lesser commercial uses to which a parcel of land mav be put: that some land is more
suitable for one purpose than another: and that the suitabilitv of the land for a warticular
purpose has a direct relationship on its value. The State's appraiser recognized this since
he arrived at consequential damages of $27,500, obviously, since the land was no longer
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suitable for a gasoline service station and was suitable only for some lesser commercial
use. Under the circumstances, the court properly determined that the remaining access
was unsuitable as distinguished from merely circuitous and awarded consequential
damages. [Emphasis added].
3. Development Potential of the Property Has Been Diminished

When there is no change in highest and best use, (i.e. commercial development is
possible on the site both before and after the taking), it must be determined whether or not the
remaining access has reduced the development potential of the property. (For example, if big
box retail was possible before development, but only service-commercial after development, or if
much less development can be accommodated on site). If the remaining access fails to support
the degree of development potential that existed before the taking then damages may be
awarded.
In Split Roclc Partnership v. State ofNew York, 275 A.D.2d 450,451,713 N.Y.S.2d 64,
65 (2000) the Court stated the rule as follows:

In Priestly v State ofNew York (23 NY2d 152), the Court of Appeals held that if the
State's appropriation of highway-abutting land or the physical construction of the
improvement itself so impairs access to the remaining property that it can no longer
sustain its previous highest and best use, then the State must pay consequential damages
to the owner (see, La Briola v State of New York, 36 NY2d 328, 332). This Court has
interpreted Priestly to include cases in which the remaining access would not support the
degree of development potential that existed before the taking. Thus, consequential
damages have been properly awarded when the highest and best use of the property was
the same both before and after the taking, but the remaining access reduced the potential
development of the property (see, Matter of Coung of Rockland [Kohl Indus. Park Co.],
147 AD2d 478).
Split Rock focused on the volume of traffic accessing the property, as well as the size of
office buildings which could be constructed on the remainder.
Where a change in access diminishes the degree or intensity of development, even though
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the category of highest and best use remains the same, there are compensable damages, as held in
Rockland v. Kohl Industrial Park Co., 147 A.D.2d 478,479, 537 N.Y.S.2d 309 (1989):
Consequential damages have been properly awarded in many cases where the
remaining access has reduced the potential development of property (see, e.g., Chemung
Canal Trust Co. v State of New York, 90 AD2d 889 [drive-in bank facility]; Matter of
Saratoga County Sewer Dist. # I v Gordon, 101 AD2d 966 [less suitable for commercial
purposes]; Banos v State of New Yorl, 54 AD2d 1077 [from unlimited to limited
industrial development]; Laken Realty Corp. v State ofNew York, 29 AD2d 1027
[industrial development]; Tauzel v State ofNew Yorlc, 82 AD2d 933 [farmland]).
4. "Police Powers" Cannot Be Used as a Subterfuge for Taking Property Rights

The State cannot recast or re-characterize a compensable taking as a police power
regulation merely to attempt to avoid liability. In Coeur d'Alene Garbage Service v. City of
Coeur d'Alene, 114 Idaho 588,592,759 P.2d 879,883 (1988), the Court considered an inverse
condemnation claim for the taking of a property right when the City took a contract away from a
garbage company by annexing property into the City and only allowing one garbage service
provider to operate within City limits. The City claimed this was not a taking, and also attempted
to categorize the case as a tort, which would make them immune from liability, much as ITD
seeks to categorize its taking of access as a non-compensable exercise of police powers in this
case. The Court was clearly able to see through the City's actions, noting that it had the power of
eminent domain (as does ITD) but'was simply choosing to try and exercise that power without
admitting it.
Here, the City had the right of eminent domain under LC. 5 50- 1030(c) for the
purpose of preserving the public health as provided for in I.C. § 50-304. Although the
City did not exercise its right of condemnation in this case, it did take Garbage Service's
property by excluding Garbage Service from servicing its existing customers in the
annexed areas.
The decision of this Court in Renninger v. State, 70 Idaho 170, 2 13 P.2d 9 1 1
(1950), disposes of the City's contention that it is immune from liability to Garbage
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Service by virtue of I.C. § 6-904(4). The City characterizes this suit as one for tortious
conduct of the City. In Renninger this Court held that art. 1, 5 14 of the Idaho
Constitution waives the immunity of the state in an inverse condemnation case. Id, at 178,
213 P.2d at 916. This case is correctly.characterizedas one for inverse condemnation and
not as one for tortious interference with contract. The City cannot avoid liability by
attempting to recast what it has done.
The Idaho Supreme Court pointed out in Foster's that the police power cannot be used as
a method of imposing a tax. Likewise, it cannot be used to impose an uncompensated take.
Effective exercise of the police power necessarily involves expenditures in many
ways. The means and instrumentalities, by and through which the supervising
powers of the policing authority are brought to bear on the subject to be regulated,
involve costs and expenses. It is only reasonable and fair to require the business,
traffic, act, or thing that necessitates policing, to pay this expense. To do so has
uniformly been upheld by the courts. On the other hand, this power may not be
resorted to as a shield or subterfuge, under which to enact and enforce a
revenue-raising ordinance or statute. [citations omitted].
Foster's, Inc., vRoise City, 63 Idaho 201,218, 118 P.2d 721,728 (1941).
F. Access is Related to Value and Is a Fact Question and a Jury Issue
In the event the Court determines that: 1) there is not a direct taking of access rights in
this condemnation case, 2) that there is a property right at issue due to abutter's having a right of
direct access, and 3) that therefore a balancing of interests is required to determine whether or
not the Defendant's remaining access is reasonable, that question should he submitted to the jury
rather than decided in advance. Whether access is reasonable or not is intertwined with the
highest and best use of the property and value, and cannot be separated therefrom.
In Cady v. North Dalcota Dept. Of Transportation, 472 N.W.2d 467 (1991), a Level 4
inverse condemnation case requiring a balancing test to determine whether or not a taking had
occurred, the Court held that it was necessary for the fact finder to consider items non-

TRIAL BRIEF- PART I1 (TAKING OF ACCESS) - 54
t3 2006, May be freely used by Courts. All othen must obtain permission from the autllor for use or copying ofany ponion of this material

compensabie in themselves, such as circuity, in order to determine whether reasonable access
existed or did not exist.

In Filler, we said that loss of traffic, loss of business, and circuity of travel are not
themselves compensable. 281 N.W.2d at 243. However, we do recognize that loss of
traffic, loss of business, and circuity of travel are factors to be considered in determining
the reasonableness of the remaining access to and from an abutting roadway. Id.
Cady v. North Dakota Dept. of Transp,. 472 N.W.2d 467,470 (1991).
The same was held in Simln'ns v. City ofDavenport, 232 N.W.2d 561,566 (Iowa 1975):
'No hard and fast rule can be stated as to whether an abutting property owner has been
denied access that is reasonable or, as we have said, 'free and convenient.' In most
instances the question is one of fact, not of law, and its determination depends largely
upon the evidence in the particular case. * * * (citing authorities).' Iowa State Highway
Comm. v. Smith, 248 Iowa at 877, 82 N.W.2d at 760. See also Stom v. City ofcouncil
Bluffs, 189 N.W.2d at 526.
The rule was also stated in Douglas County v. Briggs, 34 0r.App. 409,414, 578 P.2d 1261,

When restrictions on access are imposed, whether or not adequate access remains
available is a question of fact which must be determined in light of the highest and best
use of the affected property. 2 Nichols, Eminent Domain, s 5.72(1) at 5-165 (1976).
Even in a direct condemnation case, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that circuity of
access may be considered by the jury as an attribute of the remaining property, and considered in
valuation of the property:
There is no direct proof of any specific amount of damages that would be suffered
because of curtailed access to the proposed highway. There is testimony that the new
highway when constructed could, in the vicinity of appellant's plant, only be entered at
certain points. Convenience of access to a highway, formerly enjoyed by appellant, and
impaired by reason of the new construction, could be considered by the jury with the
other testimony in fixing the amount of damage sustained. 29 C.J.S., Eminent Domain, 5
163, p. 1033.
State exrel. Rich v. Dunclick, Inc., 77 Idaho45, 53,286 P.2d 1112, 1116- 117 (1955).
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The jury cannot fairly detennine value without consideration of all attributes of the
property and its highest and best use before and afler taking. Access is a key component of that
question.
DATED this lothday of April, 2007.
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COX

Attorneys for ~efegdan)d/
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the lothday of April, 2007, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served upon the following by the method indicated below:
/'

Joseph Mallet
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
331 1 West State Street
P.O. Box 7129

L ~ . ~ . MAIL
Hand Delivery
Facsimile Transmission
Overnight Mail
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ORDE,R O F CONDEMNATION

PROJECT NO. :

F-2390 (104)

HIGEYWaY: U . S . H i g h w a y No. 9 3
LOCATION:

T w i n Falls

RECORDOWNER(S): CANYON V I S T A

E'ARCEL NO. : 41
EXY NO^ : 5137
PARCEL ID. NO: 00414831
FAMILY L I M I T E D PARTNERSEIIP,

an Idaho L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p

T w i n Falls, IDAHO
COUNTY: Twin Falls

The Board, having considered the report and recommenda~ionsof the
State Highway Administrator and having duly considered!thematter,
finds:
1.

That the above designated project is for the purpose of
constructing a,section of the State Highway System in the
location as noted above.

2.

That the right of way necessary for the proposed project
consists in part of certain real propekty located in the
county as noted above, and which property has been designated
and shown as the above parcel number on the plans of said
project now on file in the office of the Idaho Transportation
Department.

3.

That the parcel so designated and shown on said project plans
is necessary to the construction of said project, and the
construction of said project is impossible without the
acquisition of said parcel.

4.

That all rights of access to, from, and between the right of
way of the public way and all of the contiguous remaining
real property of the record owner(s) shall be extinguished and
prohibited except for access, if any, as provided and shown on
the said project plans referred to in Paragraph 2 above.

5.

That the record owner(s), according to a Preliminary Title
Report now on file in the office of the Idaho Transportation
Department, of the parcel so designated and shown on said
project plans are as listed above. Any encumbrances or liens
of record pertinent to the parcel so designated are as set
forth in said title report. Any other known claimants to the
property as determined by investigations of representatives of
this Department are as set forth above.

6.

That the Idaho Transportation Department has, by and through

ORDER OF C0NDEMNATl:ON

its representatives, sought in good faith to arrive at a
settlement with the above-mentioned record owner(s), as to the
value of land (including the improvements thereon) represented
by the aforementioned parcel, together with any easements
necessary for the construction and relocation of irrigation
and drainage facilities, approaches, access roads, rounding of
slopes, etc., in connection with the construction of the
project, and the damages which will result to the property not
taken and has been unable to make any reasonable bargain
therefore, or settlement of such damages.
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the acquisition of the lands
and property rights hereinabove described is necessary to the
construction and maintenance of the said highway project.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Idaho Transportation Department shall
acquire the hereinabove designated real property and property rights
through the power of eminent domain.
Dated this -

day of

RECOMMENDED t

~ G V ,
- 2004

IDAHO TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT

David S. Ekern, Director,
On Behalf of The
Idaho Transportation Board

APPROVED AS d & l R M :

TITLE INSURANCE LAW

title subject to certain encumbrances cannot rescind the conti-act 011 the
ground that a title insurei- \yill not iinsure lnai-ketable title because uf those
encumbrances or defects." Fuithei-more, since any title insurance policy
issued to that purchaser surely woiild except such encumbrances, the puilchaser would not have a claim against its title insurer for loss therefioin,
including loss caused by a subsequent purcliaser's rejecting the title as
uninai-I<etable,40

5.07 Lack of a Right of Access

Title insurers also assume, in both standard owner's and loan policies, the
risk of loss from lack of a legally enforceable light of access to and froin the
insured land.] It is important to understand that the standard titleinsurance
policy insures only a legal "rigllt of access," and not any particular physical
route.2 An exception to this rule is that the "Hoineowners Policy of Title
Insurance for a One-to-four Fanlily Residence," which the American Land
Title Association (ALTA) adopted in 1908, expressly insures that homeowners will have actual vehicular and pedestrian access to and froin the land.2.'
An insui-ed has no clailn against its title insurer because of a road's poor
pl~ysicalcondition or because tlie insured inust build a road over a right-ofway or irnprove an existing road.8 Indeed, wllel-e public records showed a
the only road was
legal right of access, insureds were denied a claim altl~ougl>
See Kirkwall COT. v. Scssa, 48 N.Y.2d 709,397 N.E.2d 1172, 422 N.Y.S.2d 368 (1979).
"Oar Pdliser v. Tide Ins. Co., 115 N.Y.S. 545 (Sup. 1908).
See ALTA owner's and loan policies, at Appendices B, C, D and E infro.
%SeeGates v. Ciiicago Title Ins. Co.. 813 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. App. I9SI); Kraure v. Title &
T m t CO..3911 SO.2d 805 (Flil. App. 1980): Title & Trust Co, v. Barrows, 381 So. Zd 1088 (Fla.
App. 1979). See generally Phwer v; Lawyers Title Ins. COT., 508 So. 2d 731 (Fla. App. 1987);
Annot., "Defkd in, or Condition of, Adjacent Land or Way as Within Covelage of Title
Iilsurance Policy," 8 A.L.R. 4th 1246,1250-54; Annot., "Absence oI'EffecIva1Subdivision, or of
Sheet or Easements, as Witliin Title Insuimce Coverage." 40 A.L.R. 2d 1247; Werner, "The
Basics of Title Insurance,'' in A.B.A. Red Prop. Frob. & Tr. L. Sec., Title h,sumnce: The
Lmoyer's Etponding Role 36,50 (1985).
2."his policy is rliscussed in !ill at $5.13[2] i f ~ f r aand ii copy is reproduced at Appendix H
30

substantial i.epnii): Title & Trust Co. v . Barrows, 381 Sb, 2d 1088, 1090 (Fla. App. 1980) (Bct
that road wm frequently under water due to elevation of insured property was not bi-mch of
policy, since insuredsweie only guaranteed legal riglit of access); MixBean v. St Paul Title Ins.
Corp., 169 N.J. Supn. 502,405 A.2d 405 (1979) (insured is only paranteed a legally enforcealbe most convenient or easily used
ble light to get lo and fro111 property, nut that access d
route.): Hocldng v . Title Ins. & Trust Co., 234 P.2d 625 (=d 1951).

RISKS TRANSFERRED TO INSURER

impassnhle due to high tide water duling the spring and fall of each year.*
The reasoning is that it is the insured's, not the title iilsurer's, responsibility
to inspect the property or hire a survey to evaluate the efficacy of the access."
This rule is consisterit with the line of cases discussed in $$ 5.05 and 5.06

PI-opertyor access it by boat or plane over a lake. Yet, a magistrate judge
actually upheld such a defense by one title insurer.8 On appeal, the First
Cil-cuit "recoiled" at that idea and relllanded the case for a deterlnination of
whether lake access was adequate in that case as a matter of fact. Unfortunately, the First Circuit let pass the better niling-that "a right oiaccess" in
a title insurance policy means "access over land by vehicle" as a matter of
law, unless the title insurer expressly indicates that its access coverage is
See Title & T n s t CO.v. Bariowr, 381 So. 2d 1088 (Iila. App. 1980).
See Kiause v. Title & Trust Co.. 390 So. Zd 805 @la. App. 1980):

[tllir:quality of a pariicular access . . .would Inve been discoverableod? upon n pllysical
examination of tile proper?, oi- a detailed survey. The policy here specifically excepted
any facts revealed by ax accurate smvey . . .As the title coinpony insured the quality of
tlie title as shown by the record and there was access of record, it war not required to aid
in the suit. . . to establish a giant of necessity
Accord Gates v. Cliicngo Title Ins. Co., 813 S.W.2d 10 (Mo.App. 1991).
See genewily United Bank v. Cliiciigo Title Ins. Co., 168 F.3d 37 (1st Cii. 1999): Mamot
Pin. Sews. Inc. v. Capitol Funds, 988 N.C. 122, 217 S.E.2d 551 (1975) (thougli title insurer
ul6rnately prevailed because polivy excluded ordinance that prevented auionmtive access, tlie

See United BanL v. Chicago Title Ins. Co.. 168 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 1998).

Cl>icagoTitletells us tliat there is access by seaplanelandingontlie I& and that visitors
to a recreational piopcrly often travel in this manner. Possibly there are situations in
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Since tlus insuring clause does not guarantee a pal-ticular access, an
insured sliould have the descitptinn of any accessway iinpol-tmt to a project
included within the policy's description of the land to which title is insured.
Tile insured alternatively ]nay ask the title insurer for an Access Endorse1nent.l' Where a title policy describes a public street as a boundary of
insured land, the insured is entitled to e v e c t that the insurer determined
that the street was legally dedicated for public use."
Where tbe policy does not describe a particular accessway or bounding
street, the title insurer may still be required to enforce an insured's light to
use streets bounding the insured n:al property. This result foilows from the
presuinption in the law of conveyancing that property ownerslup extends to
the center of any bounding street."z The reasoning is that if fee owners are
entitled to presume rights to the center of the streets adjoining their land,
then insurance of their title includes coverage of their rights to tile center of
the bounding streets.'s That rule has been applied despite policy conditions
restijcti~lgthe pdlicy's coverage to the specific lot described in the policy and
disclaiming responsibility for defects in the title to adjoining streets.14 Nevwhich a right of access in fiiis rnlnneiis d l that is required. But tlieie is no case law cited
to us shou,ing that this is always so for all property. and common sense recoils from sucll
a suggestion.Tlius,.weconclude that-ifthere is no "right" oflnnd access, . . the recod
creates an issue oftiact >ISto w1,ether a "rigl>t.'by any otber means. . .is ndeguatein this

See $ 9 . 1 7 i n 1 .
"See MacBean v. St. Paul Title Ins. Coip.. 169 N.J.Super. 502,405 A.2d 405, 409 (1979)
("a ieasuna1,ie purelxuer of insurance would understand tl~ata survey . . . indicating a sheet
abuttingone oftlie boundary lines.. .had been certified to him by thoinsurer as showing that
sheet to be a dedicated public sweet'?. Tlie issue in MacBean was the b,ciusion of a survey
within tile policy's coverage, not the clause insuingaccess: lioweuer, thestateinent of lawwould
appear applim>bleto an access case.
IZ See Joyce P ~ O I WPatton
S ~ , oa Titles 5 143 (2d ed. & 1999 Pocket Part, west Group);
'O

Trust Co., 250 Cd. App. 2d 248,253,58 Cad. Rptr. 273,276 (1967):

In a conveyanL.e of p r o p a v by reference to a iiiap that slrows a bounding stTeet, n
grantee c.m correctly claim a presinnption of ownership to the center of tlie street. In
view of the shength of this presuniption and its long-standing aoucpviinct: in the law of
red property, we think a titieinsurincepolicy on properly bounded by a sheet necessa-

Cornpare Sli~vel-v.
Title Guar. &Trust Co., 43 S.W.2d 212 (Tenn. 1931)(insurer not lixble for
iiiisdescription ofboundsty street that the~.caitciwould be closed).
' % M ~ ~ v.
I ~Title Ins. &Trust Co., 250 Cd. App. Ed 248,252.58 Cd. Rptr. 273,276 (1967):

TITLE INSURANCE LAW

Since tlus insuring clause does not guailultee a particular access, an
insured should have tile description of any accessway impo~tantto a PI-oject
included within the policy's description of tbe land to whicll title is insured.
The insured alternatively ]nay ask the title insurer for an Access Endol-sement.1" Where a title policy describes a public street as a bonndaq~of
insured land, the insured is entitled to expect tlxlt the i~lsiircrdeter~nined
that the street was legally dedicated for public use."
Wlrere the policy does not desciibe a particular accessway or bounding
street, the title insurer may still be required to enforce an insured's light to
use streets bounding the insul-ed real PI-operty.Tliis result follows froin the
presuinption in the law of conveyancing tliat property ownership extends to
the center of any bounding street.'% The reasoning is that if fee omers are
entitled to presume rights to tlie center of the streets adjoining their land,
then insurance of their title includes coverage of their rights to the center of
the bounding streets.13 That rule has been applied despite policy co>lditions
restiictingthe policy's coverage to the specific lot desc~ibedin the policy aud
disclaimi~lgresponsibility for defects in the title to adjoining streets.14 Nevw1lic.h a iight ofaccessin this ilianner is nU tl~atis required. But thereisno case law cited
to us showing that this is tdwnys so for nU pioperty, and common sense recoils iiorii sucl,
a suggestion. n~us,
b e conclude hat--if there is no "rigllt" of land nccers . . . tlie rrc.ol-d
creates an issue of fbct ar to wlietlier a "right" by any other means . . .is adequate in this
me.
lo See

$9.17infiu.

" See MacBean v. St. Paul Title Ins. Coip., 169 N.J. Super. 502, 405 A.2d 405,409 (1979)

Pa reasonable purchaser of insurnnce wodd understand that a survey . . . indicating a street
abuning one ofthe boundary h e s . . . had been ceitiIied to !rim by the insurer as showing tliat
sl~eetto be a dedicated public sheet"). Tlie issue in MucBron war the i~>clusionof o survey
*thin the policy's covnage,nM ibe ciauseinsuring access; howwer, h e statement of isw would
appear applicable to an access case.
See Joyce R~lomw,Putton on Til1e.v $ 143 (2d ed. & 1999 Pocket Part, west Group):

In n conveyirnco of property by refeisnce to a map tlist sliows a bounding sheet, a
grantee can correctly ddin s presumplioil of ownenllip to tlie center of the sheet. In
view of the strength of this presmription and its lorig-standing acceptance in the lsw of
red piopefly, we tbink a title insunince policy on property bounded by a sheet nnecessa-

Compere Shiwer v. Tille Guar. &Trust Co., 43 SW.2d 212 (Tenn. 1931) (insuler not liable for
~nisdescri~tion
of boundary sheet tliat therci~fterwould be closed).
l4 Murray". Title Ins. &TrustCo., 250 C I ~
App.
. 2d 248,252,58 C.4. Rptr. 273,276 (1967):
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ertheless, if ai.1 insured had notice p~iorto purchasing that the adjoining
public street wtis abandoned, then title insurance of a specific lot would not
insure by i~nplicationtitle to the adjoining stlip of land where the street was
abandoned. Under these circuinstances a grantee would have no right to
expect that owr~ershipof a lot would presumpiively inolude ownership in the
abandoned street.'"
In a case wl1e1-etile policy did no expressly cover loss from lack or a right
of access, a title insul-er still was held liable for damages when it was found
that the iiisured bad no access from the insured land to a public street.15.l
The court ruled that a title insurance policy covers loss oftitle from any cause
e in value of the
not expressly excepted, and held the insurer liable for t l ~ loss
insured 1and.15" Additionally, even if the policy does not eqressly cover lac]<
or a right of access, if it insures against nnmarlcetability of the title, the title
insurer will be hable if no legd access to the land exists. The majority rule is
that lack of access makes title nilinarketable.'6s
Often, in wol-king out debt, a defaulting ~nortgagorwill deed over to the
mortgagee enougl~of the mortgaged propelty lo satisfy part or all of the
deht. Additionally, o ~ njulisdictions
e
pennit the siieriff at forecloure to sell
only so much of the debtor's properiy as is necessary to satisfy the debt. In
both situations, the party talang title to the land should ascertain that a right
of access exists otbkr than through propelty the debtor has retained. Otherwise, if the debtor refuses access througl~its retained property, the
mortgagee or purcl~asermay find it owns landlocked property of little value.
In that situatior~access can solnetiines be acquired via judicial action enforcing an easemeilt by necessity. However, the insured mortgagee who
[T]be title colnpany initially relies on certain policy exclusions purporting to restrict its
coverage to the specific lot described in the policy md to disclaim responsibility for
defects in the title to adjoining sheets, and the Wie. We are not impressed with this
defense, and w r liwe no hesitancy in finding the title oo~np&~'s
blanket exblusions from
tire coverage of its policy wholly inconsistent with the protection w1iic.h the face of the
policy puiports to oiier.
l5 id. Cornpare Hawstad v. Fidelity Natl Title Ins. Co., 68 Cd. Rptr. 2d 481 (Cd. Ct. App.
1997) (policy should not be interpreted to indude private road whereit is clearly neither a part
oinoi ;Ippurten;m*to either of t l ~ elots specifically referred to in the policy's Schedule "A"
descliption,ptlriicu1,uiy given policy deiinitioo oi"1and" whicll cleorly and explicitly insures fee
title and not any property beyond tlle lines oftbe siea described or refirred to in Schedule A,
nor any right. title, interest estate or easement in abuttingstieets).
s5.1See Clements v. Steiwart Title Guar. Co., 537 S.W. 2d 126 (Tex. App. 1976).
15.2 1~1.

'6.sStewilit Title Guar. Co. v. West, 110 Md. App. 114, 138, 676 A.2d 853,964 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1996); Regm v. L.imr, 40 NY.M 415, 387 N.Y.S.2d 79, 354 N.E.2d 818 (1976);
Joyce Puloiiiar, Potton 071 Titlrs 5 46 (2d ad. & 1QQDPodret Part, West Group).
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acquired title to landlocked propel-17throug11 foreclosure or a deed in lieu
~ costs of such a
would have no claiin under its original loan policy f o the
judicial action, unless the mortgagee Iiad the policy updated, or purchased a
new owner's policy, to cover title problems through t l ~ edate of the forecloSure Or W O T ~ O U ~ . "
As inentioned in the preceding paragraph, when no legal access exjsts to
insured real property, the title insnrer inay have to bear the cost of a judicial
action to declare an easeir~entofway by necessity.17 However, as always, the
insurer's liability under this insuiing clause is lnodified by t11e policy's
exclusions, exceptions, and conditions. The foliowing lnay be particularly

relating to the use or enjoyment of tbe land and the cliaracter or
location of iinprovernents on the land,
(2) The standard exclusii>nsfor loss caused by exercises of govemmental police power aid eminent domain,'8 and
The
standard Schedule B exception for titleproblelns wllic11 would
(3)

Insureds' claims also are liinited by any special exceptions written into the
policy, even tl~oughthe result is no velucular access to the insured property.20 Additionally, terms of the policy permit iildelnnification only if the
insured has sustained a 10~s.~'
As discussed inore fully in $$6.06[1] and 10.04[1] [aJ[ii], standard owners' title insurance policies seem to say, and courts have construed them to
Is Regarding tile need to update the title policy to date alier the worlcout or foreclosure
s;lie,see $4.04[2] suprn and Ch. 14 injn.
l7 See Myerberg, S a y e r & Rue, P.A. v. Agee, 51 bid. App. 711,446 A.2d 69(1%2).

's'Wl,ere access is lust due to condeliinntion of a stmet abutting the insured parcel, poli~y
rncludons for eminent dom.Cn actions prevent tile insrirer froin being liable, u>Jessthe condemnation proceedings were of record at the time tile policy was issued. L. Srniilock Real9
Cori). v. Titic Guix Co., 52 N.Y.2d 179,418 N.E.2d 650, (W7 N.YS.2d 57 (1081). sr~hseqrmnt
appeal, 97App. Div. Zd 205,469 N.Y.S.2d 415 (1983),n1oil$ed 63 N.Y.Zd955,473N.E.2d 234,.
483 N.Y.S.2d 984 (1984).
'Q~ee Cbs. 6 and 7 i,fr<c.
20 Tile poky's spuiijc sception o l deed rertl-ictionsproliibiting die insured's using pnrt of
tlie property ibi an access easement to tile common boundsiy o f t l ~hsurcd
e
land imd the street,
limited the insured's clvili?.Lincoln Sav. &Loan Ass'n v. Title Ins, tiTmst Co., 46 Cd. App. 3d
493,120 Cal Xptr. 219 (1875).
21 See Nawldnsv. OddandTitie ins. & Guiir. Co., 165 Cal.App. 2d IlG, 331 P,Zd742(1958)
(insureds hiled to show that lack oi'direct access to theii remice station reduced the market
wriue of the insured luml). S w also § 5.02 saipm.
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say, that the loss payable when tl)e insured land lacks a nght of access will
generally be the cliffel-ence hehueen tlie [air market value of the land with a
light of access and its value without any light of access.Z2 However, the
author is aware of several recent unpublished cases'in wllich tit.le insurers
told insured owners wile 11ad learned that the only access to their insured
property was via revocable license rather than pennanent legal right of
access that they had no loss under the policy until the access actually is
revoked. Essentially, they are contenrling that, so long as the insureds have
not yet been stopped fro~nusing the road or had to pay ~noneyout-of-pocket
to use the roadway or buy another, they have no indelnnifiahle loss. If title
insurers want "actual loss" to mean tl~atan insured owner must have had to
pay a third party or sell the land to a third party at a loss, they need to revise
the policy to expressly say so. Until such policy revision, if the insurer does
not acquire a right of access, an insured owner's loss shouldhe the amount
that the lack of a rigl~tof access reduces the fair market value of the land.

Lender's title insurimce typically covers all the risks discussed in pS5.04
to 5.07 above, plus certain ad&.tional risks which c o d r o ~ Ienders
~t
who talie

In 1970 ALTA loan policies, this insuring clause also contains language
excepting from its coverage any clailn of invalidity or unenforceahility of the
insured mortgage based upon (a) usury, or (b) any consumer credit protecSee, e.g, llnited Bankv. CM~igoTitleIns. Co., 168F.3d37 (1st Cir. ISSO).S E E ~ ~cases
SO
cited in $$ 6.0GllJ and lU.O4[1][a][iiJ inJn, construing the meaning of ''actual loss" in a title
insurance policy.
See ALTA Loan Policy 1970, ALTA Loan Policy (Apr. 6, 1990) and Compuison of 1970
ALTA Loan Policy With 1987 Lorin Policy, tit Appendices C, E and F infra.
22

'
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 'DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
NU.

STATE OF IDAHO ex rel. IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,

4.u.

)
)
)

I I ..I5

FILED
P.M.

NOV 0 1 1996

Plaintiff,
Case No. 98518

)

VS .

)

JAMES A. FUHRMAN and IIIANE E.
FUHRMAN husband and wife,

)
)

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Defendants.

This matter was tried to the court without a jury on September

3 and 4, 1996.
for the state.

George Parham, deputy attorney general, appeared
E. Don Copple appeared for the defendants.

Whereupon, the court proceeded to hear and consider the testimony
and exhibits of the parties and witnesses, and the arguments of
counsel.

Now, being duly advised, the court makes and enters the

following findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Pindings of Pact
1.

This is a condemnation action in which the sole issue

litigated was the amount of just compensation to be paid by the
plaintiff to the defendant.
2.

The state has procedurally complied with all requirements

for the condemnation of a portion of defendant's property as part

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

---

Page 1

5
2.

.>I'

:. .J

be permitted from the property onto new Highway 55.
9.

The limitations on access will have a significant impact

on the market value of the remainder of the property. The single
access to State Street which will be allowed after the take and
construction of

the state's highway project

would not be

a

reasonable access to allow full commercial development on the full
fifteen acres.
10.

Based upon all of the evidence, I find that the value of

the property before the take was $650,000. I find the value of the
property after the take to be $425,000. I find the value of the
take and easements to be $35,000.

The temporary easement is of

insignificant value, and is included within the values stated for
the.propertytaken.

11.

I therefore find the just compensation total

The calculation required by statute is as follows:
Value before t:he take :
Value of property taken
Subtotal
Value of remainder
Severance damage

$ 650,000

35,000
$ 615,000

425.000
$ 190,000

Recapitulation:
Value of property taken
Severance damage
Just compensat.ion

35,000
190.000
$ 225,000
$

C!onclusions of Law
12.

1

conclude that the limitation of access onto State

Street, restricting the potential access points from three to one,
does not leave the entire parcel with reasonable access for full

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

---

Page 3

commercial development and constitutes a taking which significantly
impacts the value of the remainder.

The decrease in value must,

therefore, be included in the determination of just compensation.
13.

I conclude that the just compensation due from the state

to the defendants to be the sum of $225,000 as set forth in the
findings of fact above.
14.

A judgment of appropriation and condemnation in the form

provided by law may be made and entered accordingly.
Dated this T
2
d
a
y

of November, 1996
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,

Defandants.

1

Comes now the Plaintiff, Sate of Idaho, by and thou&. i t s cowsel of record, Joseph D.
Mallet, Deputy Attorney General for the State of Idaho, and hesby moves t b i s Court for an order
bifurcating the trial in this ,matter so hat the scope of the takiug issues can be tried and xesolved
.-

by the Court priox to the presentation of the issue of jmt compensation to the jury.
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This motion is based upon Idaho Rules of Evidence 42@), and other authorities, as

further set fonh in the Brief in Suppo*t of Plaintiff's Motion to Bifurcate, filed concurrently
herewith, as well as the other pleadings and papers on file in this case.
DATET) this

aa-

day of May, 2007.
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Comes now the Plaintiff, State of Idaho, by and through its counsel of record, Joseph D.
Mallet, Deputy ~ t t o r n General
e~
for the SZate of Idaho, and hereby submits &is Memorandum in

support of its motion to bifurcate the txial in this matter so that the scope of the taking issues can
be tried and resolved by the Court prior t o t h e presentatjon of the issue o f just compensation to
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the jury.

J.
XIYTRODUCTXON

This is' acl eminent domain case. The Plaid% State of Idaho (hereinafter, "ITD")has
essentially taken a "sttip take" kom Defendants, Canyon Vis.ta Family Limi.tedPartnership and

Lazy J. ~ m c (hereinafter,
h
"Defendants") in conjunction with phase one of the US 93 Twin
Fails Alternate Route Project (hereinaftex, "Project"). This Project will ultimately route US 93
,

west on polk &he Road, bypassing the core of the city of Twin Falls,
~ o u the
@ discovery process and the recent exchange of pretrial motions, it has become
clear that there is a dispute between the parties regarding the "latger parcel" issue in this case. In
other words, the parties disagree as to what consolidated body of land constitutes the remainder
parcel or the full parcel in tbe before condition. A specific description of the remrrjnder parcel is
essential for &e jury to analyze the issue of severance damages. For this reason, Plaintiff bas
moved to bihcate the tcial so that the Court can resolve the larger parcel dispute prior to
submitting !tw issue ofjust compensation to the jury.
11,
LEGAL STANDARD

~ o t i o to,
b bifurcate are c o m o in
~ eminent domain cases because, in Idaho, the Court.

and the jury are boq required to decide separate factual issues. In eminent domain cases, 'Yhe
only issue for.submission to a jury is the question of the value of the property sought to be taken
or the amoudt of compensation for the taking." State ex rel. Flandro v. Seddon,94 Idaho 940,
943, 500 ~ . 2 d841, 844 (July 28, 1972), AU issues other than just compensation are for

resolution by tl~etrial court. Rueth v. .Sfare, 100 Idaho 203,223, 596 P.2d 75, 95 (1978) rehr'g
denied (1979) (hereinafter "Kueth l"). This includes my question as to the scope of the take,

-
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which are legal; questions to be decided by the court. Ada County Highway District v. Sharp, 135
.Idaho 888,892;,26 P13d1225,1229 (Ct. App 2001)).
Because of the interrelated fact finding roles of the judge and jury, the Idaho Supreme
Court has recogdized that ttial courts may find it preferable to bifurcate the issues with the court
first determining the taking issues, then providing the jury with "an accurate description of the
property or rigkt therein which has been taken." Rueth I at 223, 95. The policy behind
bifurcation is @at 'Such a procedure would save the litigants the unnecessary expense of expert
witness fees &d trial time were all issues submitted in one trial and the taking issue then
resolved adversely .to the property owner." Id.
However, the deoisian to bifurcate eminent domain proceedings is left to the sound
discretion of the tsid court. Rueth v, State, 103 Idaho 74, '80, 644 P.2d 1333, 1339 (1982)
(hereinafter '5ueth IT). This is consistent with R C P 42@) which allows for a

GO&,

in its

discretion, to &der separate trials for any separate issues in a case "in furtherance of conveaience
or to avoid pkjudice, or when separate kids will be conductive to expedition and economy."'

IRCP 42@).

nr.

ARGUMENT

In this case, bifurcation is approprjate because the parties have a matexid dispute as to
what constitutes the "larger parcel." ITD asks the c o d to b i i c a t e the trial and resolve the
twger parcel dispute prior to submitting the issue of just compensation to the jwy.

A.

The Lamer Parcel Rile.
The larger parcel issue arises &om the language of Section 7-71 1, Idaho Code, which sets

forth the rules fox assessing damages in entinent domain cases. .710is statute provides in part that
"If the property sought to be condemned consfitUtes only a p M of a larger parcel.. ." then the

jury must assess 'tbe damages, if any, "which will accrue to the portion not sought to be

condemned, by reason of its severance Born the portion sought to be condemned, and the
construction 05: the improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff:?

I.C. $ 7-711(2)

(emphasis added). Incidentally, if severance damages are found, tbey must be offset by the
extent the larger parcel is "specially and directly benefited" by the taking. I.C. $ 7-71 1(3).
"Parcel," as used in this section, means a consolidated body of land. State ex rel. Symms v. City
ofMountain Home, 94 Idaho 528,531,493 P.2d 387,390 (1972)(citing Big Lost River I&ga6don
Co. v. ~ u v i d s o n2i
, Idaho 160, 171-17s 121. P. 88 (1912)).

The larger parcel issae is also ~ t a t e dto the valuation of the part taken. In the City of
CaldweIE v. Roark, 92 Idaho 99, 437 P.2d 615 (1968), the Court held that the value of the part

taken should be detennined "with the whole parcel being sold in its then condition in one sale.)'

Id. at 101, 617 (emphasis added). In that case, the court invalidated a valuation methdd that
valued the t&e by comparing it to tlie market pfice of a small portion of the remainder parcel,
..

not the whole .property itself. Similarly, it is error to not consider the correct lwger parcel when
deciding the appEcable highest and best we of the property. State ex rel. Symms v. City of
.

-

Mountain ~ o h e94
, Idaho 528,531,493 P.2d 387,390.
Accordiigly, for the jury to analyze just compe11sation, the j q must be supplied with a
specific description of the larger parcel. Only after the jury knows .the bounds of the correct
larger pweI,can t$e jury decide the highest and best use, value of property Men, and whether
any damages .accrue to the larger parcel in excess of special benefits conferred. It is the court's
.

.-

responsibility to decide the lnrger parcel. In State ex rel. Fiandro v. Seddon, 94 Idaho 940, 500
P.2d 841, (Jply 28, 1972), the court held that the jm can only decide questions of just
compensation. All other factual issues are to be resolved by the court. ld. at 943, 844. Flandro,
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i issue. The court held that whether or not an

item was a f i m e had .to be decided by the trial court. Only if and when the trial court decided
the item in

was

a fixture would the jury be allowed to determine the value of the fixture.

SimitwIy, in %e c w at bar, it should be the Court that determines the larger parcel. Once the

larger parcel is settled, the issue can then be given to the jury to determine just compensation. In
both cases, the court describes the property and the jury values it.

ITD is obligated to disclose and discuss ~ontrarydicta horn State ex rel. Symms v. City of
Moanfain Home, 94 Idaho 528, 493 P.2d 387 (Feb 2, 1972). In that case, while reviewing the
correctness of a larger parcel determination, the c o w mentioned that ordinarily the larger parcel
.

.,.

,

question was-a practical questio~lfor the jury. Id. 532, 391. Since that time, the court has
specifically addressed'tke boundaries of what a jury may properly decide in an eminent domain
case. Tt was the Fland~ocase, decided later in 1972, that fast made it clear Pbat "in emineht
domain proc6ediigs the ody issue for submission to a jury is the question of tke value of the
property sought @ be taken or the amount of compensaljon for the W g . " Flandro, 94 Idaho at
943,500 P.2d at 844, Rlteth Jalso clarified that the role of the court was to provide the jury with
both the "description of the propety or the right thexein which has been taken." Rueth 1; 100
Idaho at 223, 596 P. 2d at 95. Since the larger parcel, determination anives at an accurate
description of the property, under Flandro and Rueth I, it is a question for the court to resolve.
B.

T h e Larger Parcel Dlspuk

In the,case at bar, there is a dispute as to the larger parcel that needs to be resolved. The

expert witnesses hired by each side disagree as to the larger parcel determination. For a correct
resolution ofthis issue, the parties need to have a fair opporttmity to argue the applicable law as
we31 as +he facts. The larger parcel answers vary froln expert to expert, and those answers will
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vary dependkg on how the Court interprets the applicable law. Examples of the larger parcel
dispute follow:
..

.Roger Dunlap (Defense valuation witness). Mr. Dunlap analyzed the larger

I.

parcel and concludes that the larger parcel matched the legal description in the
..'c,omplaint. (See Deposition Transcript of Roger L. Dunlap, Exhibit "A" to
,Affidavitof Joseph D. Mallet in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Bifurcate,,at p.
,,

110, LL. 8-1 1) (hepafter "Dualap Tr.").

However, for purposes of valuing the

taking, he assumed the property was taken from a 1-acrepad site. @ualap Tr. at

:p. 165,LL. 5-14).
,

,

This allowed him to use co&mable sales that indicated pad

site values, not the value of the parcel described in the legal descriptiou.
Mark Rickey (Defense valuation witness).

2.

h.
Richey analyzed the larger parcel

and concluded that the larger parcel was only the property described in the
.

. complaint. (See Deposition Transcript of Mark Richey, Exhibit "B" .to Affidavit

. of Joseph D. Mallet in Support of Plainties Motion to Bifmoate, at p. 89, L. 24 to
: p. 90, L. 3) (hereafter 'Richey Tr.")).

3.

_John Dillman (Plaintiff valuation witness). Mr. Dillman concluded the larger
parcel included not only the subject property, but also at least the adjacent parcel
to the east. (See Deposition Transcript of John Ditman, Exhibit "C' to Affidavit
"

ofJoseph D.

all& in Support of Plaintiff's

Motion to Bifurcate, at p. 13, L. 21 to

p. 14, 1;. 12) @?mafter "Dillman Tr."). Mr. Dillman discussed that the larger
parcel could be the four adjacent parcels. (Dillman TI. at p. 31, LL. 9-11).

4. . Paul Hyde (Plaintiff valuation witness). While Mr. Hyae assessed damages to the
subject property, calling that the larger parcel, he also discussed the fact that he
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the sub.iecf property assuming that the highest and best use was to develop
.valued
..
with all four adjacent parcels 'developing together, which is essentially a larger

to
parcel detwmination, (See Deposition Transcript of Paul Hyde, E&ibit
- . .
Affidayit of Joseph D. Mallet in Suppo~tof Plaintiffs Motion to Bifurcate, at p. 7,

,LL. 13-24) (hereafter "Hyde Tr."). Mr. Hyde analyzed the value of the subject
p r o p w assuming

.&at

neighboring parcels. w

In addit&

it would at least develop in conjunc~onwith the
e Tr. at p. 103, L. 23 top. 104, L. 7).

to the factual issues related to the hearget parcel issue, the Court also needs to

clarify the applicable law. The parties dispute whether legaUy s a c i e n t d t y of ownership
exists for the,iarger parcel to include .Ute neighboring parcels. In State ex ref. Symrns v. Nelson

S a d a n d Gravel, Inc., 93 Idaho 574,468 P.2d 306 (1970), the Idaho Supreme Court held that a
larger parcel determination does not require a fee interest in each tract. Diering ownerships,
such as a fee ownership inone parcel and a leasehold interest in another, are sufficient %r larger
parcel purposes, Nelson Sand and CiPave1,93 Idaho at 581,468 P.2d at 313,
The difense witnesses mistakeny believe that a larger parcel determination requires a
paty to own the land in question in fee. Dunlap, for example, says his larger parcel
determination would have been larger if suEcient unity of omersbip (a fee interest) existed.
..

(Dunlap Tr. at p. 112, L. 23 to p. 115, L. 3). Richey also says the absence of common fee
ownership caused him to fmd a smaller larger parcel. (Richey Tr. at p. 96, L. 10 to p. 97, .,I 14).
Wbile finding no. Mty of o&sbiP,

Richey admi& that the subject property is leased by the

neighboring parcel, (Richey Tr, at p. 102, LL. 3-5). Correctly applying the Nelson Sand and
Gruvel rule, both Dunlap and Richey would have different larger parcels. T h i s law needs to be

before the jury can determine just compensation.
clarified and .applied by the COW%

-
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Confusion on this issue aZs0 exists to the reality of the ownership of &e related pacels.
J.C. and Margwet .~illims,
at oae h e , owned a "parent parceY that has been split into four
parts. (~ee:~%osition
Transcript of C i a Wills, Exhibit "E'to Affidavit of Joseph D. Matlet in
Support of ~ l ~ n 6 fMotion
fs
to Bifkcate, at p. 49, LL. 5-14)(hereafter "Wgls Tr."). b e of
theses parts

6 the

subject parcel wblch is owned by the Cayon '(rista Family Limited

PartnersMp. The children of J,C. and Margaret Williams, Linda Wis, Christie Wiiiiams, and
ffary WiIi&ns, are all equal partners in that entity and recei~eequal disbursements of

partnership.incpme. (Wills Tr, atg. 67, L. 1 to p. 69, L.6). The ownership of the KLS&M parcel

to the west is the same. (WiUs Tr. at p. 59, L. 23 top. 60, L.8). Similarly, the puce1 to the east,
the Lazy J p-arcel, is ,,ownedby a corporation and the shareholders of that corporation are the
same people who o , y ,t&eadjacent parcels as partners. (Wills Tr. at p. 23, L. 6 to p. 24, L. 11).
I n a sitnation like this, where the same four people own four adjacent pieces of property
..

.-.

,

under different business entities, the hequestionof unity of title for purposes of a larger parcel
analysis is..a.fhtualdetermination that needs to be resolved before the jury can value damages.
The parties dispute whether unity of title exists where the same people o m adjacent propexties
through different entities. TrT, argues Nelson Sand and Gravel only Tequtres that the same
person bas an ownemhip interest in each of the two tracts. The Defendants, through their
experts, argue that the different entity fee owners preclude a larger parcel determination
including the.adjacent properties. This facbal and legd dispute must be resolved by the Court
prior to allowing the jury. to detenni~~e
just compensation. Under these circumstances,
bifurcation is appropriate to resolve the issue prior to presenting the issue o f just compensation to
the jury.

For the above-stated reasons, IT73 ~pespectfdlyrequests that the Court bifwcate the trial in
this matter to resolve the larger parcel issues prior to the jury's assessment of just compensation,
"rr\
DATED this =by
of May, 2007.

~ e ~ u Attorney
j$
General
Idaho Depatment of Transportation
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P.O. Box 1583
Boise, Idaho 83701

0 U . S . Mail
n~and
De!.jvevered
a w e m i g h t Mail
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MONTE C. McCLURE, GARY BLICK,
NEIL MILLER and JOHN X. COMBO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
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-vs-

CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J RANCH,
INC.
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1
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Joseph D. Mallet, being first duly sworn, states the followiiig:

1.

I am the counsel of record for the Plaintiff, State of Idaho, in the above captioned
'I C r

FOURTH AFFIDAVIT OF JOSEPH D. MALLET - 1

v.

J .L

case and make this Affidavit based on my personal lcnowledge, unless stated otherwise.
2.

On Wednesday, April 11,2007, J took a deposition in this case of the Defendants'

valuation witness, Roger Dunlap. Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by
reference, is a true and accurate copy of relevant portions of the Deposition Transcript of Mr.
Dunlap from the April 11,2007 deposition.

3.

On Monday, April 16, 2007, I took a deposition in this case of the Defendants'

valuation witness, Mark Richey. Attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and incorporated herein by
reference, is a true and accurate copy of relevant portions of the Deposition Transcript of Mr.
Richey from the April 16,2007 deposition.
4.

On Monday, April 2,2007, opposing counsel took a deposition in this case of the

Plaintiffs valuation witness, John Dillman. Attached hereto as Exhibit "C" and incorporated
herein by reference, is a true and accurate copy of relevant portions of the Deposition Transcript
of Mr. Dillman from the April 2,2007 deposition.
5.

On Friday, April 6, 2007, opposing counsel took a deposition in this case of the

Plaintiffs valuatioll witness, Paul Hyde. Attached hereto as Exhibit " D and incorporated herein
by reference, is a true and accurate copy of relevant portiolls of the Deposition Transcript of Mr.
Hyde from the April 6,2007 deposition.
6.

On Tuesday, April 24,2007,I took a deposition in this case of one of the partners

of the Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership, Linda Wills. Attached hereto as Exhibit "E"
and incorporated herein by reference, is a true and accurate copy of relevant portions of the
Deposition Transcript of Ms. Wills fio~nthe April 24, 2007 deposition.
7.

Fu~-theryour affiant sayeth not.
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DATED this x $ a y

of May, 2007.

~ e ~ uAttorney
tf
General
Idaho Department of Transportation
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this &y

ofMay, 2007.

NOTARY PUBL/IC for Idaho
E0;re
,Idaho
Residing at
My Con~missionexpires r7/02,/&

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

rrd
a
day of May, 2007, I caused a true and correct

copy of the above to be served to:
E Doll Copple
Heather Cunningham
Davison Copple Copple & Cox
P.O. Box 1583
Boise, Idaho 83701

0 U . S . Mail
n ~ a n Delivered
d
movernight Mail
M ~ e l e c (Fax)
o ~ ~386-9428
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1 was.
I identifies the parcels that it is touching.
2
Do you believe that that is the same
2
So the first thing I do is I look at
3 highest and best use for adjacent parcels on both
3 title to other adjacent properties. And then 1
4 look at whether these properties have a similar 4 sides?
5
A. It's very similar. I can't recall
5 highest and best use. So if you have a smaller
6
exactly
what it was on Lazy J or KLS&M right now.
6 property with a different zoning, and a different
7 highest and best use, but it happens to be under 7 But I think it was really similar.
Q. It is your opinion, then, if not
8 the same ownership, I may call the smaller parce 8
9 identical, they are substantially the same?
9 the larger parcel.
10
A. Yes.
And then the other thing I do is look
10
11
Q. So in the highest and best use factor
11 at unity of title. Who owns the property is the
12 we actual])/got a check mark. I mean, that is
? 2 potential larger parcel. And then possibly
13 present on that one factor in your analysis;
13 narrow it down from there.
Q. So you look at the governmental --you 14 correct?
14
A. Yes.
15 look at the parcel the government identifies to 15
16
Q. You don't see any barriers related to
16 start with; correct?
17 the highest and best use -- nothing about the
17
A. Right.
18 highest and best use of the neighboring parcels
Q. And you look to see if that tmly is
18
would cause you to make a larger parcel
19 what the market would consider
20 determination than what you have done?
20 purposes of development?
21
A. Right.
A. No. You're correct.
Q. And the second factor was -- or it may
Q.
Did
I
state
that
accurately?
22
have
been the first factor you gave me. The next
A. Right. Plus, the ownership.
23
factor is whether or not the parcels are
Q. Right. And that is relevant to you
24
25-co.n.ti.gaaus--lslhatc~~reL-

1
A. Well, you need to know what you are
I
2 appraising. Once you come up with your larger 2
3 parcel, that is your subject property. And that 3
4
4 is what you appraise.
5
Q. Did you perform that analysis in this
5
6
6 case?
7
7
A. Yes.
8
Q. And what was your determination?
8
9
A.
The
determination
is
the
legal
9
10
10 description in the complaint is the larger
11
11 parcel.
Q. And what was it that made you decide tcV2
12
13
13 use that as your larger parcel in this case?
14
14
A. Well, the highest and best use is a
15 mixed used center as illustrated on this diagram3 5
16 And there are no other contiguous parcels that 16
17 are owned by the same folks. I guess that's the 17
18
18 end of the analysis.
19
Q. Okay. So you gave me three factors.
19
20 And you applied those three factors. And the 20
21
21 result was the parcel that we've identified is
22
22 lhe larger parcel?
23
23
A. Yes.
24
Q. Now, highest and best use of the
24
25 subject property You have just stated what thaP5
M & M COURT REPORTING
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A. Right.
Q. You called it contiguity?
A. Right.
Q. Whether that's a word or not, I think I
know what you are mean. They are touching each
other. They are next to each other. Right?
A. That is a word.
Q. Okay. So you look at the Lazy J parcel
on the east. And what we call the KLS&M parcel
on the west. In fact, the BCM&W parcel -- let's
go one more further on the west.
The BCM&W is not contiguous; is it?
A. To the subject; no.
Q. But the two adjacent parcels that I
have just identified, they are contiguous, and
share the same highest and best use?
A. Yes.
Q. So far so good. It loolcs like we have
a larger parcel as of these two factors; correct?
A. Correct.
Q. We move down to the unity of title.
A. Right.
Q. And that is the sole reason that you
have determined the lar er parcel to be only the
subject panel?
SERVICE, INC. - (208) 345-961 1
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1
A. Yes.
Q. And what was it that made you decide
2
3 there wasn't sufficient unity oftitle?
A. There are different companies that own
4
5 three different parcels.
Q. And the companies would be? On the
6
7 subject we have Canyon Vista -8
A. LLC.
Q. It's a limited family partl~ership,I
9
1 0 think.
A. I think it's limited liability company.
11
1 2 But I could be wrong.
Q. Whichever the entity is. We've got
13
74 that entity. Aiid Lazy J is owned by the Lazy J
15 Ranch Corporation?
A. Something like that.
16
Q. Because those two are different
17
18 entities, that is the basis of your determination
1 9 that unity of title didn't exist?
20
A. Yes.
Q. And because unity of title didn't
21
2 2 exist, for that sole reason you have taken the
2 3 larger parcel only as the subject property?
A. I should say I started with the premise
24

Page 115

1
Q. Now, you said it's possible. Is it
2 likely that would have occurred?
3
A. Yes.
4
Q. What effect, if any, would that have
5 had on your valuation in this case, in your
6 opinion?
7
A. I don't know. I can't do that
8 appraisal on the fly.
Q. Too big for you to say as you sit here
9
1 0 today?
11
A. Yeah.
Q. Is it possible it would have had a
12
13 difference? Is it possible it would have made a
14 difference?
15
A. Yes.
Q. It seems like your severance damage
16
1 7 determination that the subject parcel is
18 landlocked, your determination that there is
1 9 damages because it is legally landlocked, that
2 0 aspect would go away if the larger parcel
21 included all three parcels; would it not?
22
A. It would be different. Now, if it had
2 3 access somehow through adjacent parcels -- for
24 instance, if there was one here (indicating), and

2 ~ . - t h a t - . t h 6 l 6 g a ; l - d ~ ~ ~ i ~ ~ i . O R - i ~ 2Lone-be-1e(i.~d-icat-in~)~-w~~1d-'E-hat--bead@~~
~O~fe~~R-t$g~~~

1 complaint. You know, if you legally described 1 drain the whole property? And would all three of
2 this, and this property was also owned by Canyon 2 these properties be worth less? Maybe Lazy J and
3 Vista, LLC, I would say, "Wait a millute. How 3 KLS&M have value now that would be lower if they
4 had to share access with this middle parcel. I
4 come there is two different lawsuits or two
5 don't know. That's a biggy. That would be
5 different complaints?" But I saw no reason to
6
another assignment.
6 include other propefiies, because they are not
Q. Ican appreciate the fact that that is
7
7 owned by the same entity.
8
a
complex
question.
8
Q. Now, ifthey were, hypothetically,
If you can tell me, would you assume
9 owned by the same entity, would your highest and 9
10 best -- would your larger parcel determination 10 that a larger parcel of all three, including all
11 three properties we just discussed, would you
1 1 have been different?
12 assume that that deter~ni~latioii
would give you
12
A. Very possible.
1
3
less
severance
damages
overall?
Or can you even
Q. It seeins like unity of title was the
13
74 one aspect that bumped it down to the size that 14 say?
A. I can't say.
1 5 you have determined. If that made any sense to 15
16
MR. MALLET: Off the record.
16 you. Go ahead and answer.
(A discussion was held off the record.)
17
It seemed like unity of title was the
17
(Noon recess taken.)
18 sole factor for you determining the iarger parcel 18
Q. (BY MR. MALLET) Before our lunch break
19 that you did. And I gave you a hypothetical. If 19
20 we would have had unity of ownership, or, as you20 we were speaking about the large parcel issue.
21 And your large parcel determination in this case.
21 call it, unity of title on the two adjacent
22 I want to switch gears a iittle bit and talk
22 properties, is it possible that your larger
2 3 parcel would have been all three of the parcels? 23 about a co~iceptcalled assemblage.
24
Are you familiar with that co~icept?
24 Being Lazy J, Canyon Vista, and ICLS&M?
125
A.
Yes.
25
A. Yes.
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7

8
9
10
11
12
13
14

15
16

17
18
19
20

21
22
23

liege lr51

whole parcel. If I were to buy this whole larger 1
2
parcel at $5.50 a square foot in the before;
3
correct?
4
A. Yes.
5
Q. Your $9.50 a square foot, isn't that
6
essentially what a purchaser would pay for -- I
7
want to say a pad site on the front. Is that
8
fair to say? If I were to buy a pad site on the
9
front, or if I were to sever off something in
that band on the front, sever off a pad site, 1 10
I1
would pay $9.50 for that as a purchaser?
12
A. Yeah. And let me just clarify that.
$9.50 coiltemplates selling off an acre of land 13
14
with frontage on Pole Line. There is some
confusion in the market and in our terminology 15
when we talk about real estate. Sometimes pad4 6
mean that you sell this area off to a potential 17
user. And the parking lot has been installed. 18
19
And all of the utilities been stubbed to this
20
building. And the oilly thing that is there is a
little piece of dirt where they can drop in the 21
building and everything is ready to go. That is 22
not what I'm thinking of when I say pad sites. 23
Q. I'm with you. What are you describing 24

site for the sake of our discussion right now to
avoid confusion?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Under that definition of a pad
site, if I were to come up with this piece of
property in the before, and want one of those pad
sites, and I were to buy it, you are saying $9.50
a square foot; right?
A. I'tn saying that is the price for the
dirt.
Q. Right.
A. The one acre of dirt undeveloped.
Q. The one acre of dirt undeveloped. So
that $9.50 a square foot equates to what you
would sell a piece of -- sever off and sell a
piece of the front dirt to a purchaser?
A. Yes.
Q. You would call that the economy scale?
What do you call that when the individual pait in
the front has a higher price than what a
purchaser would be induced to pay for the whole
parcel? What do you attribute that to?
A. Proximity, access, and size.
Q. Those are all characteristics unique to

24
~ ~ - i . n . . ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ a ~ ~ ~a g~e ~1 6.6 2~..-Mr~at.-we..a~a~.].i.~gaaapad.si.teL
~ w . ~ ~ t ~ y ~ ~ . . h ~ ~ ~P a~g eu 1~6 8 t ~ ~ ~
1
A. Right.
A. I'm thinking of a pad site with a
1
2
Q. Now, you could have taken the approach
2 one-acre -- approximately one-acre site that is
3
to
where
you assessed the value by determining
3 suitable for a user to develop a building, as
4 what would be -- what price would be paid by one
4 well as a parking lot.
5 buyer for the whole parcel; correct? You could
Q. I appreciate you clarifying that. I
5
6 was having trouble formulating my question. Antt6 have done that?
7
A. Yes.
7 that, 1think, was the part I was having trouble
8
Q. But you chose not to?
8 with.
9
A. Right.
So if you've got a shopping center that
9
Q. Now, at the date of the take there was
10 is almost 90 percent built out. There may be a 10
11 no platted pad site on this property; was tl~ere?
11 little square of dirt up there with a parking
12
A. No.
12 lot. Services stubbed out. Everything of that
Q. It is still your opiiiion that a market
13 nature. And somebody is going to come by and 13
14
existed
for one of those at the date of the take?
14 stick a coffee shop, or a Jack in the Box, or
15
A. Yes.
15 something on that square of dirt.
16
Q. So you basically decide what a
That
is
what
some
people
refer
to
as
a
16
17 purchaser would pay in the future for land in one
17 pad site; correct?
18 of those smaller pad sites and that is what you
18
A. Yes.
19 assign to the take?
Q. My question was -- and I think it was
19
A. I11 the future?
20 in line of what you are thinking. What do you 20
Q. At the date of the take. Excuse me.
21 call it when you have your band of value up here,21
22 Would you like me to rephrase that?
22 and you're conte~nplatingthe whole site that
23
A. Yes, please.
23 would be encoinpassed for that use? In other
24
Q. You basically decide what a purchaser
24 words, not only that little square of dirt, but
25 the parking lot and -- can we call that a pad
I25 would pay at the date of the take for land in one
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1 analysis; why didn't you just go in and take
control on those roads have to reflect the
2 ITD's parcel they've identified and use that as
inoveinent of traffic through urban areas. So
access has changed and I expect it to continually 3 your large parcel; why does it matter to you as
4 an appraiser?
change to ease the flow of traffic through most
5
A. Well, s o ~ n e t i ~the
~ ~ properties
es
that you
5 all the towns in Idaho.
Q. So is it fair to say that as cities or
6 are appraising that's identified in a project
6
7 co~nrnunitiesgrow their access policies become 7 reflect a larger parcel and sometinles they don't.
8
Q. Why do you even care what the larger
8 more restrictive kind of as a general
9 parcel is, is what I'm asking; why does it matter
9 proposition?
?O to you?
10
A. Yes.
11
Q. Have you observed this in Twin Falls?
A. Because it determines the highest and
11
1 2 best use.
A. I observed it, yes.
12
13
Q. Certainly Twin Falls is a classic
Q. Other than the fact that it relates to
13
14 the highest and best use, is it useful to you at
1 4 example of a lural coinmunity that is being
1 5 all?
1 5 affected by a lot of growth; is it not?
A. It defines the larger parcel that I'm
16
16
A. Yes.
Q.
When
you
appraised
this
property,
my
17
appraising.
17
Q. I understand that is what it does. I'm
18 understanding of your work and what you've don :I 8
1 9 asking you why that matters. You seem to say it
19 is that your larger parcel determination
20 coincides with the way ITD has identified this 20 inatters for highest and best use. Does it matter
21 for any other reason?
21 parcel; is that correct?
A. It matters for highest and best use
2
2
A.
Well,
that
would
be
partly
due
to
it
22
23 because you measure the effects of the project
2 3 and also it's the ownership of record.
Q. Without respect yet to the reasons why, 2 4 against the highest and best use. Should this
24
2 ~ - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ e ~ ~ . ~ . ~ ~ ~ n d e r s t ge
a ~ 90
~ i . n ~ ~ . t h a t - ~ ~ 5 - - - j u s t - ~ e a ~ . ~ aage
. ~ -92l - p a ~ ~ e
1
2
3
4

1 the project affects the use of that property
1 parcel is exactly the same as the parcel
2
stand alone, that is the parcel.
2 identified in ITD's complaint?
3
Q. What about severance damages, does it
A. I believe it is.
3
Q. When you undertake your larger parcel 4 have any relationship to severance damages or
4
5 determination, do you consider it persuasive the 5 your assessment of severance damages in the case?
A. The larger parcel; is that your
6
6 way ITD has addressed the properties?
7
question?
7
A. No.
Q. That is my question.
8
Q. In other words, you really don't care
8
A. Yes.
9
9 what ITD says the larger parcel is, you make yo=10
Q. How is that related?
1 0 own; is that right?
A. Severance damages can be reflected by
11
A.
I
malte
my
own;
that
is
correct.
11
12 change in highest and best use.
Q. It just happens in this case that your
12
Q. We've talked about your general
13 larger parcel coincides with ITD's parcel in this 1 3
1
4
approach
to determining the highest and best use
1 4 case?
1 5 and why you do it. Did you do that analysis in
A. It coincides.
15
16 this case?
Q.
How
is
the
larger
parcel
determination
16
17
A. Did I do the highest and best use
1 7 relevant to your valuation?
18
analysis?
A.
It
generally
determines
the
contiguity
18
19
Q. Yes. Actually, I'm asking about the
19 of use, contiguity of ownership, continuity of
20 larger parcel ailalysis. I'm sorry.
20 use and ownership. It's part and parcel to the
21
Did you undertake that in this case?
21 valuation of the property.
22
A. Yes.
Q. When you say it's part and parcel to
22
Q. You gave me three factors, you said
23 the deterillination of the value of the property, 23
24 use, I believe, you looked at, ownership, and
24 how does that affect the outcome, a sillaller
25 whether the properties a
25 versus a larger; why do you even do this
M & M COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC. - (208) 345.961 1
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1
1
A. Yes.
2
Q. While that is generally the analysis
2
3 you apply to your larger parcel determinations, 3
4
4 is that the analysis you applied in this case?
5
5
A. Yes.
6
Q. The result of that analysis was that
6
7 the property we've described in the complaint is 7
8
8 the larger parcel?
9
9
A. Yes.
tc11O
Q.
When
you
look
at
neighboring
parcels
10
11 the subject property, say, the Lazy J parcel, for 11

KLS&M. I think there is just some survey
discrepancy where they fall over. So highest and
best uses are similar, but the existing uses
would be different.
Q. So we are talking about your larger
parcel determination in this case. When you are
looking at that use factor, just as to that
factor, it looks like you've got some uses that
are common between the adjoining properties on
both sides; is that correct?
A. Well, that happens with ahnost any
1 2 example, are there similar uses on the property 12 property you would ever appraise has some common
1 3 uses.
1 3 right now or at the date of the take?
Q. We are just talking about the use leg.
14
14
A. Yes.
15
I
understand
you gave me three legs of analysis.
Q. Are the highest and best uses similar,
15
16 But just as to the use leg, it seems like what
16 in your opinion?
17
you are telling me is you've got this prong
I
haven't
done
one
on
the
Lazy
3,
so
I
A.
17
1
8
satisfied as to the neighboring parcels, at least
18 can't answer that.
Q. A s you sit here today, do you have an 19 this prong; is that your opinion?
19
A. On the highest and best use they have
20 opinion on whether the highest and best use is 20
21 similar highest and best uses.
2 1 likely the same?
Q. But that is not the end of your
22
A . I don't know. 1 don't really know how 22
23 the Lazy J fits with all the adjacent properties 23 analysis; is it? If it was, you'd have a larger
24 parcel of possibly three or four other parcels;
24 and what the access scenarios are. I can't
2!i-wouldyounoL25,5answcr-th&,
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A. Right. They don't have common
Q. You've done the KLS&M property. Let's 1
1
2 ownership.
2 look to that side. Is the highest and best use
Q. One of the other factors was contiguity
3 similar between these two properties, KLS&M and 3
4 1think you said, whether they are contiguous or
4 the subject?
5 whether they are next to each other. Certainly
5
A. In what condition?
6 the parcels we are talking about, the IUS&M and
6
Q. In the before condition.
7 Lazy J, are contiguous to the subject property;
7
A. Similar.
8 are they not?
8
Q. So it looks like on your use leg of
9
A. They are contiguous.
9 your analysis you've got the use at the time of
Q. We've bumped through two of the factors
10
1 0 the take is similar to at least one of the
11 and so far it looks like we've got those
11 adjacent properties; correct?
12 satisfied. I take it you get hung up on the
A. Similar highest and best use, that's
12
13 third one, that is ownership?
1 3 correct.
14
A. Yes.
Q. Well, not only the highest and best
14
Q. If there were common ownership between .
1 5 use, but you've got the mobile home park use that 1 5
1 6 spills over on to the KLS&M property, occupies 16 all three ofthe parcels, would you have made a
17 the Canyon Vista property and the Lazy J as well; 17 larger parcel determination that was greater than
1 8 the one you made in this case?
1 8 right?
A. There is common ownerships between the
19
A. Well, I believe the manufactured units
19
20 two parcels or I should say common interests
20 that slop over from the Lazy J park that is
21 located on Canyon View, some of those units, just21 between the two parcels. It's my understanding
22 the ownership of the subject property is sole and
22 due to the line of the legal description, flop
23 over o11to KLS&M property. I don't think there is 23 separate from the ownership of the KLS&M property
24 even though they are related entities. The owner
24 a technically improved mobiie home park, an
25 economic entity mobile home park constructed on 25 of the subject property doesn't have 100 percent
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1
Q. Now, when you are looking at the
I interest in the subject property because those
2 current use of the property, do you believe or is
2 shares or whatever are being transferred out
3 it your understanding that the Lazy J Ranch
3 through estate planning through a family
4 partnership.
4 Corporation that OWITSthe Lazy J property, that
I believe the KL,S&M parcel, the owner
5 they have some sort of a lease or right of use
5
6 there doesn't own 100 percent interest, but has a 6 over the Canyon Vista property?
7
A. They have a lease over at least a
7 majority interest lilce the subject property,
8 portion of the property.
8 awaiting additional shares to be gifled through
9
Q. "This property" being the subject
9 estate plaiming and via a family partnership.
10 But it's also my understanding that those parcels 10 property?
11 were all created -- they were created prior to
11
A. Over the subject property, that's
12 the project and the project caused the change of 12 correct.
13 access to each of those parcels that were
Q. I lulow my question may have been a
13
14 little confusing, so I want to clarify.
1 4 created.
15
You believe that the Lazy J parcel
Q. You have read Christy Williams'
15
16 owners have a lease on the subject property?
16 deposition; is that correct?
17
A. Well, let me review the lease to be
17
A. Yes.
Q.
Is
that
where
you
base
your
opinion
of
18
accurate
on that. There is a lease in there and
18
19 the ownership or information you received from 19 I have a copy of the lease in my file and I would
20 like to review that before I answer that
20 her, is that the basis for your opinion that the
21 question.
21 larger parcel determination as far as the
Q. That would b e fine.
22 neighboring parcels fails on the ownership prong't22
I
think
you
asked
two
or
three
23
A.
Can we take a break?
A.
23
MR. MALLET: Actually, that's a good
24 questions in there. Could you repeat that for
24
~
5
.
i
d
e
a 7 - ~ @ t ~ a---~---.~I . ~ a - b ~P aeg ea I1 0~0
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1
(Recess taken.)
Q. I'd be happy to reask it.
1
Q. (BY MR. MALLET) We are back on the
It loolcs like you've considered the
2
2
3 record after a short break.
3 ownership prong in your larger parcel
Before we left we were talking about
4
4 determination and you think that the adjoining
5 your opinion that there was some sort of a lease
5 properties fail that common ownership
6 by the owners of the Lazy J parcel over the
6 requirement; is that correct?
7 subject property and you qualified that by
7
A. Yes.
8 saying: I've got a document I need to look at to
Q. You get that information from where
8
9 give you the real answer. Have you had that
9 that leads you to that determination?
10 document in front of you?
A. Well, it's contained in that
10
A. Yes.
11 deposition, but also at a meeting years ago they I 1
Q. What, if anything, does that tell you
1
2
12 described the ownership in those three parcels
13 about the possibility or the certainty that the
13 when we had the meeting at the ciubi~ouse.
Lazy J owners have a lease over the subject
Q.
Now,
tile
Lazy
J
Ranch
Mobile
I-Iome
Par134
14
15 or manufactured home park has a use that Lazy J 1 5 property?
A. It just sl~owsthe parties to the lease
16 parcel and Canyon Vista parcel share; does it
16
17
and
when it was made. So what I wanted to
17 not?
7 8 confinn is that the Lazy J did have the lease on
18
A. Is a use that they share, that's
19 it. When you asked me the question, I knew there
19 correct.
20 was a related entity that had the lease, the
20
Q. In other words, this operating mobile
21 mobile home park, but I didn't know, at the time
21 home park, which is apparently named Lazy J
22 1 wasn't prepared to answer I k ~ e w
what entity
22 Ranch, it is cited on both of these, the Lazy J
23 that was. But it does look like the Lazy J
23 and the Canyon Vista parcels?
24 Mobile Home Ranch does have a lease on the
A. It covers both of tliose parcels, that's
24
25 subject property for the mobile home portion of
25 correct.
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1 determination, would it matter if separate
1 the property.
Q. I apologize, we took a break and I
2 parcels were created but not through the legal
2
3 can't remember what I have or haven't asked yo1,3 subdivision process?
A. I don't really know what you are asking
4 so I may reask a couple questions. But just to 4
5
me.
You can create whatever parcel you want in
5 make sure we are on the same page, it's your
6 understanding that the Lazy J Mobile Ranch, Inc . 6 the state of Idaho. S o I don't know what you are
7 asking me regarding to subdivision.
7 is the owner of the Lazy J parcel?
Q. I'll give you a hypothetical. The day
8
8
A. No, that's not my understanding. I
9 don't know who owns the Lazy J parcel. All I'm 9 before the date of the take if the owners of the
10 commenting on is the lease between the Lazy J 10 subject property were to have created 20 leases
11 Mobile Home Ranch and the part of the subject 11 and sold this parcel in 20 different
1 2 property it affects. I believe a previous family 12 approximately 1-acre parcels to other people,
13 would you consider each of those parcels as the
1 3 partnership created this lease prior to the -.. .
14
larger parcel or how would that affect, if it
1 4 prior to the creation of the current ownership.
1 5 would, your larger parcel determination? I may
1 5 I think the current owners are successors in
16 need to reask that, let me know if I do.
1 6 title to this property.
A. You said they created 20. It's a
Q. Where you see a use that occupies the 1 7
17
1 8 hypothetical question, but you said they created
1.8.Lazy J parcel and the subject parcel, do you
1 9 assume that there are leases in favor of cross- 1 9 20 leases?
Q.Twenty lots.
2 0 leases or leases in favor of one property owner 20
A. Twenty lots?
21- over the other; how do you account for that in 21
Q. Yes.
22
2 2 your opinion when you are appraising this
In other words, if the owner of the
23 property; what do you think the facts are; what 23
24
property
gets deeds and divides their parcel into
24 did you assume for purposes of your opinion?
.
2~~~~-hat-t.h~~eis-a-l.ea.sef~rthe-mab~~~2~-2Qappr0xi~matdy-eq~a1si
1 home occupation on the subject property for that 1 them away to other people; would that affect your
2 larger parcel determination on the next day, the
2 use.
3 date of the take?
Q. Whatever the lease may be, there is
3
4
A. It may.
4 some sort of lease; is that your opinion?
5
Q. Now, if they didn't go through a
5 . A. Yes.
6 subdivision process, in other words, those splits
Q. Now, we've been talking about the
6
7 were not created through a subdivision or they
7 larger parcel determination before our break. I
8 didn't avail themselves of the subdivision
8 would like to continue on, at least for a time,
9 requirements to maice those smaller divisions of
9 on that issue.
10 their properiy, would that matter to you?
When you are looking at the way these
10 . .
A. It may not in the hypothetical you are
11
11 parcels were created and the timing and how it
12 was done, do you have any opinions as to whether 12 describing because I believe you can survey and
1 3 t h e KLS&M property and the subject property w e d 3 divide any parcel pretty much any way you want to
14 in the state of Idaho. If you break, if you
14 legally subdivided from each other?
15 create what they call maybe an illegal
A. Do I have an opinion if they were
15
16 subdivision parcel, it depends on what the county
16 legally subdivided from each other?
17 records are, the ones that are illegal you
17'
Q: Yes.
18 couldn't build a house on them. And since you
18
A. No.
19 are not putting houses on that parcel, it
Q. Did you make any assumptions of that
19
20
probably wouldn't have a big effect on it because
20 nature when you formulated your opinion in this
21
you are going to go through the entitlement
21 case?
22 process to put the property to its highest and
A. They are each legal parcels of record
22
2
3 best use anyway and cure those issues.
23 and as far as the legality of a subdivision, I
Q. So in other words, if that were screwed
24
24 don't have an opinion to that.
25 up, if the creating of the lots was done outside
Q. As far as your larger parcel
25
M & M COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC. - (208) 345-961 1
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A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Is this updating a specific page
of the report?
4
A. I'd have to look at the report, but
5
there was a math error on --here's the sulnmary of
6 it. It had to do with the summary of the
7 remainder value, and explained the error. It was
8 a thousand-dollar error, so the compensation would
9 have been 326 instead of 327.
Q. Okay. And when did you discover that?
10
11
A. Saturday.
12
Q. This past Saturday?
13
A. Yes.
14
Q. So you have refreshed yourself on your
15 2003 report?
16
A. Yes.
17
Q. Do you believe that report was an
1 8 accurate assessment of fair compensation as of
1 9 July 30th, 2003?
20
A. With the correction to the 326, yes.
Q . Okay. Why did you in your 2003 report
21
22 appraise the Canyon Vista as a stand-alone
23
property, and in your update combine it with
24 parcel 191
25
A. The more I was involved in the project,
Page 1 4

A. You look at the property you are
appraising. You look at the ownership, you look
at the use.
4
Q. Do you look at the current use or the
5 highest and best use?
6
A. You have to look at both. Current use
7 could be the highest and best use.
8
Q. I,etis deal with the ownership issue
9
first. How did you analyze that and determine the
1 0 larger parcel in doing your Canyon Vista
11 appraisal?
12
A. The original tract owned by the
1 3 Wiliianis family was about 82 acres. Originally,
1 4 it was subdivided -- not subdivided. It was split
1 5 into two properties: Lazy J, and J and M
1 6 Investments. And in November of 2001, J and M
1 7 Investments split their area into three.tracts of
1 8 land which are now known as parcels 41, 16, and
1 9 40; for the project, not the joint legal
2 0 descriptions.
21
Q. When was the property originally split
22 Into Lazy J and J and M?
23
A. I don't have a date on the Lazy J,
2 4 which occurred heforeNovember of 2001. But the
25 other split occurred on November 2nd, I believe,
Page 1 6

1
2
3

and particularly the four parcels owned by the
Williams extended family unit, it was clear to me
that the larger parcel was not an individual
3
property, that the mobile home park, the Lazy J
4
5
Mobile Home Ranch, was operated as a single entity
6
across three properties. And 95 percent of them
7
were on parcels 19 and 41, and I concluded that
8 was a larger parcel. And I concluded that parcels
9 16 and 40 were a separate larger parcel. And at
1 0 the advice of counsel, I use those two different
11 units as larger parcels, but the compensation was
1 2 allocated out to each different parcel separately.
13
Q. As an appraiser how do you properly
1 4 determine the larger parcel?
A. It has to do with ownership, use, and
15
1 6 particularly the proximity to each other.
17
Q. Is there a definition of larger parcel
1 8 that you use?
19
A. Basically, the three components that 1
20 just gave you define a larger parcel. But it has
2 1 to be somewhat flexible; il might not have ali
22
three -- ownership, unity of use, and contiguity
23 -- ail, in eveiy case.
24
Q. And how do you use the three factors to
25 determine what the iarger parcel consists of!
1

2

1
2
3

1
2
3

4
5
6

7
8

9

10
11

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

2001.
Q . How do you know Lazy J was split off
before 20017
A. There was a reference in my 2002
appraisals where -- no, that's not quite right.
Tlie original set of plans showed parcel 19 as
Lazy J and the other three as parcel 16. So based
on that, I assumed that Lazy J had been separated
before the other three properties. They conid
have all occurred at once in November of 2001.
But there is no record that I have, there is
nothing in the title report that shows that.
. Q. That shows what?
A. I'm sorry?
Q. There's nothing in the title report
that shows what?
A. That it was split off earlier than
that.
Q. And is that why, throughout your 2007
appraisal report, you reference all four as being
split at the same time?
A. Yes.
Q. When you read that report, you were
under the impression that all four were split at
the same time.
4 ( P a g e s 1 3 to 1 6 )
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hasn't changed.
Q. What did you conciude about the highest
and best use before the taking of the Lazy J piece
3
4
standing aione?
5
A. Same conclusion.
Q. What did you conciude about the KLSMN,
6
7
or parcel 16 piece, standing alone?
A. Same conciusion.
8
9
Q . How about BCM&W on the corner -10
A. Same conclusion.
11
Q. You need to let me finish my question
1 2 for the record.
What was your conclusion of the highesl
13
1 4 and best use BCM&W standing alone?
15
A. Same conclusion.
16
Q . So all four pieces in your view have
1 7 the same highest and best use; correct?
18
MR. MALLET: Object to the question. The
1 9 form of the question is not ciear whether you are
20 asking him in the before or the after.
21
MS. CUNNINGHAM: In the before.
22
THE WITNESS: In the before, the highest and
2 3 best use is to deveiop ail four of them in one
24 master plan, one C-l PUD.
2 5 Ill
Page 30
1

2

1

2
3
4
5
6
7

8
9

10
11

12
13

14
15
16
17
18

19
20

21
22
23

24
25

BY MS. CUNNINGHAM:
Q. So for highest and best use purposes,
why wouldn't that poinl to the larger parcels
being all four pieces then?
A. Well, like 1 said, reanalyzing the
property over the years that I have spent on this
project, 1 reconsidered my original conclusions in
that the property would have to be developed
together to maximize the benefits to the
ownership. And it was clear that the ownership
stretched across three, at least three of the
properties that were operated as the Lazy J.
So I changed my opinion about the
larger parcei. The highest and best use never
changed. The broad highest and best use for
redeveiopment sometime in the future is commeicial
and residential.
Q. You said that the three prongs of
determining the larger parcel were ownership, use,
and contiguity, ~neaningwhether or not the
propenies are contiguous to one another; correcl?
A. Yes, correct.
Q So if we look at ail Four pieces, under
your analysis they wouid have common ownership
because they are all somehow tied into the family,

Page 3 1

and that is aii that's required; correct? In your
view?
A. In my opinion, yes.
Q. And all four of them have the same
highest and hest use; correct? In the before?
A. Yes.
Q. And ail four are contiguous; correct?
8
A. Correct.
9
Q. So why isn't the larger parcel all
1 0 four?
11
A. The larger parcel could be ali four.
12
Q. Yes, it could. Why isn't it?
13
A. Well, 1 think it had to do with the
1 4 fact that the parcei numbers were developed by the
1 5 Highway Department, that the ownership required
1 6 compensation to each of the four iildividuals and
1 7 not as one lump sum, and that the value
1 8 conclusions were the same for each iarger parcel.
1 9 So in effect, it was appraised as one larger
20 parcel. The beforevalue of each parcel is the
2 1 same as the -- same as the after value.
22
But you're right. In retrospect, it
23 couid have been appraised as one parcel.
24
Q. Are you saying, in effect it was -- one
25 larger parcei as all four because your values were
Page 32
1

2
3
4
5
6
7

1
2
3

4

5
6
7

8
9
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12
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14
15
16
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20
21
22

23
24
25

the same in the before, or similar; and your
values were the same in the after in each separate
appraisal?
MR. MALLET: Object to the form.
THE WITNESS: Well, I'll retract that.
There's two larger parcels: One is improved, with
95 percent of the mobile home park. The other
larger parcel is mostly cropland.
BY MS. CUNNINGHAM:
Q. Would you agree that the current use is
not as important as the highest and best use when
you are appraising property for condemnation?
A. Yes.
Q. Would you agree that when you're
determining the larger parcel, the highest and
best use is what you need to look at as far as
unity of use?
A. Yes.
Q. And that is more imponant than the
current use in that context; correct?
A. If it's in the changing market, yes.
Q. And this is a changing market; correct?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. And it was in 2004?
A. 11 was ii12004, yes.
8 (Pages 29 to 32)
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A. Six or seven.
Q. How recently?
A. I just finished one last week.
Q. What would be the first condemnation
report that you did, what point in your career?
A. Probably three or four years ago.
Q. So you've only been doing condemnation
work for the last three or four years?
A. Yes.
Q. Have you ever done any condemnation
work for property owners?
A. Yes.
Q. What percentage ofyour condemnation
work's been for owners?
A. I guess probably one out of six, so
that would be, what, whatever pcrcentage that
works out to, a little less than 20 percent.
Q. Out of the five that you've done for
condemnors, would those all be for ITD?
A. Yes.
Q. And how did you come to start
appraising for ITD in condemnation?
A. I received a phone call, oh, it's been
a couple, a number of years ago from a Scott
Campbell. They were interested particularly at

-

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

9
10

I1
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

23
24
25

Q. Okay. I would agree. Why don't you
tell me what you'd like to change in that regard.
A. Just that I considered the larger
parcel issue in this case, the main concern is the
unity of ownership as to whether or not that
exists and view that as a legal matter. And so I
really collsidered the legal from the position
just the one parcel, the Canyon Vista parcel, this
parcel 41 is probably, as I mentioned later, is my
larger parcel. However, as you gathered through
the report, I still considered all four parcels in
highest and best use considerations.
Q. Okay. If I understand you correctly,
you're saying that the larger parcel that you've
appraised and valued is specifically only parcel
4 1; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. However, in your view, the property
would he developed together all four for highest
and best use purposes?
A. Yes.
Q. All right. And that's true in your
view both before and after the taking; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. When you say unity of ownership is a

--

Page 6

Page 8

that time for business valuations.
Q. What projects have you worked for ITD
doing condemnation work?
A. Let's see. As best 1 recall there was
a mobile home park in Idaho Falls. There's
been it was the Fearless Farris property there
in Nampa. And there's been, let's see, three on
this Twin Falls project. It seemed like there was
another one someruhere, too, hut Lhose are the one
I can remember offthe top of my head.
Q. What other properties did you appraise
in Twin Falls?
A. Two of the parcels that were next to
this one, the Lazy J. aiid then the KLS&M.
Q. Did you ever do any work on the comer
parcel BCM&W?
A . NO.
Q. Before we begin today, are there any
changes that you'd like to make to your March 7,
2007 report in this matter?
A. I just wanted to clarify perhaps the
discussion in the cover letter dealing with the
larger parcel. As 1 read through it last night, I
realized that 1 didn't clarify what is mentioned
later on in the report.

legal issue, what do you mean by that from an
appraisal standpoii~t?
A. Well, in my investigation of the four
named entities, there's clearly some common
ownerships. And looking at the appraisal text, it
talks about there are some cases that say that
common ownership is sufficient and some that would
argue that point. I'm not an attorney, so I'm not
going to specify how that would work out.
Q. Okay. Did you ask for any
clarification on that issue from ITD's legal
department?
A. Yes.
Q. What did you learn?
A. They really wanted me to just conclude
on a value for this specific parcel. So it wasn't
as big an issue.
Q. So your value of $3 a foot before and
after assumes that this propeity is sold as a
stand-alone piece in the market?
A. Yes.
Q. Arc you fmiliar with the process that
ITD has for having a list of approved appraisers?
A. Yes.
Q. And have you made application to be on

--
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initial other than larger parcel because of the
legal connotation. I wasn't meaning that, just
3 meaning because of the bigger piece. And I
realize I should have come up with different
4
5
verbiage.
6
MR. MALLET: Bigger parcel.
THE WITNESS: Bigger parcel, would that
7
work? The bigger combined parcel. I should have
8
said like the combined fours parcels or soinething
9
l a like that would have been more clear.
Q. BY MS. CUNNINGHAM: Right, to refer to
11
1 2 your highest and best use concept.
A. Exactly.
13
Q. Rut when wc get to our valuation
14
1 5 concept, we're just dealing with this as a stand16
alone?
17
A. Yes. That's what I should have said.
1 8 I wasn't thinking the Iwger parcel word as a
19
legal connotation.
20
Q. Let's take a little break.
21
(Recess.)
Q . BY MS. CUNNINGHAM: Ail right. Page 64
7.2
23
is where we're going next.
24
A. Okay.
z.5
Q. Okay. 'The second paragraph down you've
Page 1 0 2

assessment. I'm wondering if you know whether or
not the tax assessed vaiue of the properiy is
3
going up or down?
4
A. 1 don't h o w . But generally it goes
5
up, but I don't know for sure.
6
Q , If it were going dowil, would that
7
impact your view at ail?
8
A. No. If it were an income-producing
9
propetly, it would, but in this case it wouldn't.
10
Q. On page 67 and a couple other places in
11 the report under physical possible use you
1 2 reference the relatively large size of the
1 3 property, and given your other statements I was
1 4 confused as to whether that meant the 20-acre or
1 5 the 82-acre size.
16
A. This is particularly now we're talking
1 7 just about this wouid he the 20-acre piece.
18
Q. So you consider that to he a relatively
1 9 large size?
20
A. Yeah. But as I've mentioned, you know,
21 you'd make more money if you'd develop it as an
2 2 80-acre site.
23
Q. Along similar lines on page 68 when
2 4 we're talking about the conclusion of highest and
25
best use if lefi vacant, again are we talking
Page 1 0 4

s

1
2

1
mentioned that you've talked to both Mr. Mallet
2
and JoAnn Butler about this issue of the trailer
. 3
3 parks -- I mean the mobile home evictions or I
4
don't know if you want to call them evictions hut 4
5
5 redevelopment of the site.
6
6
A. Yes. It sounds better; huh?
7
Q. Yes. I f I understand you correctly,
7
8 you had a concern about whether or not you could 8
9
redevelop the site given its current use; is that
9
1
0
1 0 fair to say?
11
11
A. Well, not whether you could but at
1 2 least considering timing and costs and would that 1 2
13
13 impact the property and how much.
14
Q. And do you think that a six-month
14
1
5
15 timeframe to transition the use would have any
1
6
1 6 impact on value?
17
17
A, I consider that in the value basically.
18
1 8 In other words, I think I concluded I roba ably
19 would have concluded at a litlie bit higher value 1 9
20 had it not been for the mobile home park hut not a 2 0
2s
21 significant amount. Now i n other states where
22
2 2 there's other issues, then it would have made a
2
3
2 3 major difference. But Idaho, this is -- as far as
2
4
2 4 w e could determine this is it.
2
5
Q. Okay. 011 page 65 you deal with the tax
25

1
2

about a subject development as a mixed use 20-acre
or as an 82-acre?
A. It's really both. Talking speciFically
at this point I'm valuing this specific piece, so
it's the 20-acre piece. But I'm looking at that
highest and best use for the entire parcel so the
larger -- not larger parcel, the bigger piece.
Q. Did you do an economic feasibility
study?
A. No.
Q. Did you do a developmental approach as
a check on highest and best use?
A. No.
Q. Okay. Now on page 74,1 need some help
understanding what you're saying here about the
before and aRer comps.
A. Okay.
Q. You seem to be saying that it's okay to
use comps for both the before and the after, tile
same comps, and I'm curious how that relates to
disregarding project influence in condemnation.
A. Well, in this case as I mentioned you
ordinarily try and do others, but because of the
long history of this project, I thought that that
was basically so well known that it was basically
26
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Page 23

1 corporate shareholder for the Lazy J Corporation
A. 19 spaces were added at a later date.
Q. Do you know roughly where those were, 2 and as an employee ofthe corporation. First of
3 all, you are a currently a shareholder in the
3 or where those are?
4 Lazy J Corporation; are you not?
4
A. Yes.
5
A. Yes.
5
Q. Where is that?
6
Q. When I say Lazy J Ranch, the full name
A.
That
would
be
-well,
take
157
spaces
6
7 is Lazy J Ranch, Inc.?
7 and subtract 19, and they're between those two
8
A.Yes.
8 numbers.
9
Q. And you are a shareholder in that
Q.
I
just
mean,
where
are
they
located?
9
10 entity?
1 0 Are those the ones on the property line in
11
A. Yes, I am.
11 between?
1
2
Q.
And you were at the time of the taking
A.
No.
No.
They
would
be
on
the
norlh
12
1 3 side of Canyon Vista. They would runalong Polo13 in this case, which was December 28th, 2004?
14
A. Yes.
1 4 Line Road.
15
Q. What are your responsibilities in the
15
Q. It's my understanding that in between
16 Canyon Vista and the KLS & M parcel, there are 16 corporation as a corporate shareholder, if any?
1 7 I think you were listed as secreta~y?
1 7 row of trailers that are split by the property
18
A. I'm secretaryltreasurer now. My
1 8 i n Is that your understanding?
1 9 parents were always the officers, and the three
19
A. Yes.
Q. And there may even be a couple that are 20 ofus were directors up until -- oh, I don't
20
21 know -- four, or five, six years ago. I can't
21 over the property line; is that correct?
22 remember exactly what year. We thought it best
22
A. That's correct.
Q. And those were in existence or in place 2 3 that somebody be an officer.
23
Q. Now, just for the record, you have a
24
24 before the property line was created?
-25-br-e&em-lliw?
Page 24
25
,2. Tkather~+st.
Page 22
1
2

1
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. I was led to believe that you
1
Q. And a sister, Christie Wills?
2 are the manager of the mobile home park; is that 2
3
A. Williams.
3 fair to say?
Q. Excuse me, my apologies.
4
A. That's what they call me.
4
5
A. Yes.
Q. Can you explain what your duties are.
5
Q. They are both shareholders in this
6 Why don't you explain'to me what your position 6
. ..
7 is, or what your duties are generally, basically. 7 corporation?
8
A. Yes.
8
A. Basically, I am the manager. I oversee
9
Q. And currently, your inother is the
9 the employees we've got; the outside person,
1 0 people who do our lawn mowing; my office help,lO fourth shareholder in the Lazy J Corporation?
A. She is the president.
11 which right now is my granddaughter. I collect 11
Q. So it looks like you said, until four
12
1 2 rent. I pay the bills. I pay the employees and
1 3 or five years ago, it was you and your parents
13 do the withholdings.
14 that were the directors; is that correct?
14
Q. Now, is this your primary occupation?
A. No. My mother and my father were the
15
15
A. Yes.
16 officers. And my brother and sister and I were
Q. Do you receive a wage?
16
17 directors.
17
A. Yes.
18
Q. Would you consider yourself an employe~l8 Q. Directors; okay. What type of
19 decisions as the secretary and treasurer can you
19 of Lazy J Ranch Corporation?
20 make for the corporation, or do you make?
20
A. Yes.
A. Boy, what kind of decisions?
Q. Is that who your W-2 would show as your21
21
22
Q. I have to ask. Can you give employees
22 employer?
23 raises? You are the employee.
23
A. Absolutely.
24
A. I would like to.
Q. And one thing I'm curious about is the
24
MR. COPPLE: R
25
2 5 split between your responsibilities as a
C?
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"% ,y

EXM,181& NQ.
5,

LINDA WILLS - 04/24/2007
Page 51

were split, and the ownership interest of all
these different entities. So I'm going to try to
wade through that.
A. Okay.
Q. We've gone through the easy stuff, and
it took a long time. I'm hoping that's not a
hard venture of things to come. But let's go
8 ahead and start by talking about how these
9 properties were split-up originally.
Originally, your mom and dad owned a
10
I 1 vely large piece of property that now consists of
12 what we call the BCM & W, the K
13 Vista, and the Lazy J parcel?
14
A. Yes.
Q. So at one point, your mom
15
16 that piece of property?
17
A. Yes.
Q. And the first split, it looks to me was
18
19 in 1970, where they split off what we call the
20 L,azy J parcel -21
A. That's correct.
Q. -- which is the coulee andeast;
22
23 correct?
24
A. Correct.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

25.-Q-bya-havc-anyid~&@

A. It's the corporation, and it's owned by
1
2 my brother, my sister, and I, and my parents.
Q. Now, it seemed like in 1970, there was
3
4 a name change. It looked like it was Lazy J
5 Mobile Home Park?
6
A. That's correct.
Q. But that's the same corporation?
7
8
A. Absolutely.
Q. Except the name change, the Lazy J
9
10 Ranch, Inc, today is the same corporation?
11
A. Yes.
. In 1970, as far as I can see, the
3 corporate records show that there were three
14 shareholders in the corporation. And I showed it
Pike was one share, your mother was one, and
d was one. Are you familiar with that at
A. Kind of. I vaguely remember that when
18
19 it was first set up as the corporation, he was
0 their attorney, and he had to have a share or
ing. I don't remember any inore than that.
So the lawyer drafted the documents and
d himself in the deal, it looks like?
MR. COPPLE: That was not uncustomary,

~ ~ ~ - @ = - i = W f = @ p a

1 That was the days before one-man companies.
1 canals coulees in Twin Falls?
2
MR. MALLET: I didn't know that. I was
A.
No,
I
don't.
Because
supposedly,
it's
2
3
wondering
why it was that way.
3 an incorrect name for them.
4
Q. (BY MR. MALLET) But basically, as far
Q. Is that a French word or -4
5 as you know, it was your mom and dad that ran the
5
A. It beats me.
MR. MALLET: Do you mind if we take a 6 corporation. And your lawyer was only nominally
6
7 included?
7 recess, since I spilled water?
8
A. Yes.
8
MR. COPPLE: No.
Q. So in 1970, we have a corporation with
9
9
(A recess was had.)
Q. (BY MR. MALLET) Now, this original 10 your mom and dad owning what we call the Lazy J
10
11 parcel. It's been split off from the 60-acre
1 I division was in 1970, as far as you know?
12 parcel. At the time it was split off, it was
12
A. Yes.
13 . Q. And it left what we now call the Lazy J 13 owned by whom, if you know?'
A. J C and Margaret Williams.
14 parcel. And then its adjacent eastern parcel had 14
15
Q. Was that the J&M, Limited Partnership
15 about 60 acres in it?
16
A. That was my mom and dad's parcel that 16 that owned that, by chance?
17
A. No.
17 was left.
Q. That came to be actually later; didn't
18
18
MR. COPPLE: But. that's not what he
19 it?
19 asked you. Was there about 60 acres in ihe
20
A. Yes.
20 parcel that was left?
Q. So your mom and dad owned the 60
21
21
TI-IE WITNESS: Yes.
22 individually, and then they owned the smaller
22
MR. MALLET: Thanks.
Q. (BY MR. MALLET) At the time it was 23 parcel through the corporate entity in '70.
23
A. The land is actually in the
24
24 split, who owned the Lazy J property, if you
25 corporation.
25 know?
M & M COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC. - (208) 345-961 1
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Q. (BY MR. MALLET) So the property was 1
THE WITNESS: I don't know why you had
1
2 me bring anytl~ing.You've got everything.
2 transferred out of the J & M Family Investments,
3
Q. (BY MR. MALLET) Actually, I don't have
3 Limited Partnership -- it was transferred out,
4
everything
that you've brought. I have quite a
4 that would be the transfer in November of 2001,
5 few items from your sister. .She claimed not to
5 which split the 60-acre parcel?
6 have access to Lazy J. She punted to you, I
6
A. The 60 acres was transferred out.
7
guess, so.. .
7
Q. That's correct. So we've gone from
A. That's probably true, though.
8 1970, where the 60 acres was held by your lnoln anc 8
9
Q. I figured it was. Since you were not
9 dad?
10
only
the manager, but the secretary of the
A. Right.
10
Q. .And then we move to 1983, where it was
11 corporation as well. So here we are.
11
These partnerships, the limited
12 transferred from your lnoln and dad to the J & M 12
1
3
partnerships
that received titie in 2001, your
1 3 Family Limited Partnership?
14 entity was the KLS & M partnership, the limited
14
A. That's right.
Q. And now I'm moving ahead to 2001,
1 5 partnership?
15
A. Yes.
16 specifically, November, and now it looks Like the 16
Q. And the general partner at that time
17
17 limited partnership transferred title of that 60
1 8 was or is the KLS & M, LLC?
18 acres to -A. Right. That's correct, to the three
A. Yes.
19
19
20
Q. And that has one member, which is you;
20 other entities.
Q.
Right.
Okay.
1
have
a
copy
of
a
21
correct?
21
22
A. Correct.
22 quitclaim deed froin the limited partnership to
Q. At the time it.received title, who were
23 the Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership, and 2 3
24 the limited partners, if you know, of that
24 that appears to have been dated November 2nd,
25-2..oo7~KbS&-~-pa&~e~ship?----Page 60
Page 5 8
A. In other words, the date of the change?
1
A. I imagine that's when it was gifted
1
2
Q. Correct, 2001?
2 over to her entities.
3
A.
Myself, my sister, and my brother.
Q. Okay. And you would have a similar
3
Q. How about your mother?
4
4 quitclaim deed -5
A. You know, they did have a little
5
A. Right.
6
percentage,
and they -- I believe, that was
Q. -- to your entity, which would be the
6
7 signed over right at the time of the change of
7 ICLS & M?
8 the entity.
A. Yes. Right. I know I'm talking over
8
Q. The reason I ask is, because it looks
9
9 him. I'm sorry.
1 0 to nie like on tlie Canyon Vista, instead of having
Q. Again, tliat's productive to do that in
10
11 everyday conversation. It's just going to muddle 1 I an LLC, you have a colyoration, which is the
1 2 general partner, wliich is your sister, Christie?
1 2 our record up a little.
13
A. Mnl-luiiiii.
13
A. okay.
Q. But tlie limited partners are -- as far
1
4
Q.
So
my
question
was:
You
received
a
14
1 5 siiililar quitclaiin deed that deeded the ICLS & M 1 5 as the documents I've seen, were originally your
1 6 mom and dad, and the11 you, your sister, your
1 6 property into your entity?
1 7 brother. And that seemed like it was probably
17
A. Yes.
1 8 the case on the ICLS & M as well; is that correct?
Q. And as far as you know, the 60 acres
18
19
A. I guess I lost you when you were
1 9 has stayed titled the same way, since this
20 talking about her corporation. What does that
20 transfer in 2001; as far as you know, have all
21 three of the parcels stayed in the same ovvllership21 have to do wit11 it? Okay. Start again.
Q. Yes. If you don't understand, ail you
22
22 since that time?
2 3 have to do is ask me to repeat the question.
23
A. Yes.
24
A. Okay. Repeat it.
MR. MALLET: She's going to wait.
24
Q. Instead of having an LLC as the general
25
2 5 She's giving me a hard time, Don.
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Q. I had a bunch of questions related to
Q. And your mom and dad, possibly?
I
1
2
some
documents that your sister gave me. I have
A.
They
had
.3
something
in
the
beginning,
2
3
tabbed
what she calls "Tax Report 2003." Have
3 and then they gifted it out immediately.
4 you ever seen that document?
4
Q. Now, how was it that your
A. Yes, this is something she's made up.
5
5 grandchildren -6 It's on her -6
A. Mm-hmm.
Q. -- and your daughter, how do they come
7
Q. That was my first question: If you've
7
8 seen it, where did it come from? And it looks
8 to supplant your sister and your brother and your
9 mom and dad as owners of the KLS & M, the li~nitec9 like you didn't generate that as your manager or
1 0 secretarial duties?
10 partners?
A. No, I didn't.
11
A. Okay. You are going to have to repeat
1I
Q. Now, this is the Canyon Vista Family,
12 that. I don't understand that.
12
1 3 Limited Partnership record, at least it was
13
Q. You said originally, your brother,
14 represented to me, to be a record of that limited
14 sister and your mom and dad, and possibly you
15 partnership?
15 were limited partners in the KLS & M, Limited
A. That's exactly what that is.
16
16 Partnership?
Q. Are you currently a limited partner of
17
17
A. That's correct.
Q. It looks like that's changed; hasn't
1 8 that limited partnership?
18
19
A. Yes, I am.
19 it?
Q. It shows that you received a
20
20
A. Yes.
21 disbursement, at least in 2003, of 18,000, almost
Q. Now did that come to pass? Did
21
22 $19,000?
22 somebody gift to your kids?
23
A. That very well could be. I don't know
23
A. No, sir.
24 that that's accurate, but it sounds good.
Q. Did they gift to you and. gift to your
24
7c.
Q. Okay-..
2541dr4
Page 68
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MR. COPPLE: That's four years ago:
1
Q. (BY MR. MALLET) In other words, you
2
3 received a disbursement that year. You are just
3 he gifted to his children and gifted to my
4 not sure if that's right to the dollar amount?
4 children. He gifted from his part in my entity
5
A. Yes, exactly.
5 to my children.
6
Q. Okay. Now, this disbursement, this
Q. And you gifted from your part in his
6
7 money would be -- it's not income from the Lazy J
7 entity to his children?
8 Mobile Home Park; is it?
8
A. Yes, I did.
9
A. No, it's rent.
Q. When did that happen?
9
Q. So the Canyon Vista Family, Limited
1
0
A.
Right
off
the
bat,
I
startedgifting
to
10
1
Partnership
receives a rent check, and that's
1 I my children and my grandchildren. I think inaybrn
1 2 supposedly how it got disbursed this year?
12 it was the next year I started gifting to his
13
A: Yes.
13 children. Then when he got grandchildren, I
Q. And is that how it's still done today?
1
4
1 4 gifted to all of them.
A. Yes, I believe so.
15
MR. COPPLE: We've been going an
15
Q. And I can assume it was done that way
16
16 hour-and-a-half. Do you \want take a break?
17
in
2Q04
as well?
17
MR. MALLET: Yes, let's do it. Let's
A. Yeah. Right now, she's getting more
18
18 take a real break.
1 9 rent.
19
(A recess was had.)
Q, I'm talking about how the rent is
20
MR. MALLET: Back on the record.
20
Q. (BY MR. MALLET) I think we've gone 21 split-up now. We all talk about that as being
21
22 over the profits of the mobile home park, how 22 your sister's parcel, the Canyon Vista parcel?
A. Correct.
23
23 they are split. I wanted to talk more about the
Q. But the partnership that owns it, you
24
24 rents.
25 actually are a limited partner in that
25
A. Okay.
M & M COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC. - (208) 345-96 I I
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1
2 also gifted to my brother's ohildren. In return,
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1 partnership; correct?

1
A. It could have come from Mom and Dad's
2 share.
A. Right.
3
Q. This is just something I wanted to ask
Q. And as part of your rights as a limited
4 partner, you receive what it looks like, an equal 4 you about. In 2004, it looks like -- and these
5 are still the Canyon Vista Family, Limited
5 share of rents to your brother and sister?
6
Partnership returns. It looks like the
6
A. Yes.
7 partnership showed some income from the rental of
7
Q. A lot of these old tax returns, I've
8 got 2001 here tabbed, for example, it shows the 8 the house. Do you see that?
A. I don't see it, but I know they did,
9 profit sharing as just under 33 percent. Now, do 9
10 yes.
1 0 you see that in this 2001 return?
A. The profit sharing -- what am I looking 11
Q. The house rental, it would be under B,
11
12
line
B.
1 2 at? This is Lazy J's?
13
Q. No, this is the Canyon Vista Family,
A. Yes, right up here (indicating).
13
Q. Yes.
14
1 4 Limited Partnership's tax return.
1
5
A.
Uh-huh.
15
A. Okay.
Q. Now, the house is not part of the Lazy
16
Q. And it's a 2001 return. And this is
16
17 one for the limited partner named Linda Wills, 17 J Mobile Home Park, then?
18
A. No.
1 8 which is you; right?
Q. It's separate?
19
A. Right.
19
20
A.
It's gone.
Q.
And
it
shows
that
you
have
an
equal
20
Q. We're talking back before it was gone?
21
21 share, 32.3 percent share in the limited
22
A. Yes. Yes. Okay.
2 2 partnership?
Q. You, as the manager of the mobile home
23
A. Yes.
23
24 park, did you manage that house -- .
Q. While that was true in 2001, was it
24
35
'4. 4
1
2&-tweirr2QorCa~11?
Page 7 0 Page 7 2
2
3

1
2
3

4
5
6
7
8
9

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

1
Q. -- or how did that work?
A. Yes.
2
A. Christie owned that house.
Q. Is it true as we sit here today?
Q. While Christie had prepared those
3
A. I believe so.
4 documents before, it looks like there is a 2004
Q. You had talked about your parents
5 tax form for the Canyon Vista Family, Limited
having what you believe is a small share. It
6 Partnership, and it looks like your distribution
looks like in 2001, J. C. Williams had a 1.55
7 that year would have been 18,868. Does that
percent share. Do you see where it says that?
8 sound accurate?
A. Yes.
9
A. That could be. I don't think they've
Q. And does that sound right?
10 changed anything, because I believe my own
A. Yes.
11 accountant.
Q. And I see one to your mother.
12
Q. Okay. I was going to say, unless
A. She would have been the same, uh-huh.
1 3 somebody lied to the IRS, that probably is
Q. And at some point, as far as you know,
14 correct; isn't it?
has your mother divested herself fiom -15
A . Yes.
A. She gifted it off.
Q. On the KLS & M parcel, does the KLS & M
Q. And we see some documents, tax
16
documents for that Canyon Vista Family, Limited 17 Family, Limited Partnership receive any rental
18 income?
Partnership in 2003. This one relates to you?
19
A. No.
A. Okay.
Q. So although some of the mobile homes
20
Q. And it shows you have a higher
21 are wholly or partly on that property, the rent
ownership now, it's 33.08 percent?
22 distribution doesn't go at all to that entity?
A. Yes.
Q. And I assume that that higher
23
A. Un-huh.
percentage would have been obtained through soma24
MR. COPPLE: Say no.
125
THE WITNESS: No.
sort of gifting or inheritance?
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LEGAL ARGUMENT
A. The Order of Condemnation is Admissible and Relevant
and Can Be Applied Retroactively in this Case.
The State contends that the Order of Condemnation is not relevant to the issue of just
compensation despite the fact that the Order sets forth the rights that are being sought and
acquired by the State for its project. This is interesting since in this case the Complaint and the
Order of Condemnation are consistent with one another. The State is apparently seeking to
minimize the fact it is condeiming access rights. This Order of Condemnation issue is addressed
at length, as well as its impacts, in the Trial Brief, Part 11, lodged in this case on April 11, 2007.
Defendant asks that the court refer to that brief in dealing with this argument, as it is extensive
and on point
The State neglects to advise this Court that pursuant to Idaho Code 5 7-707, the statutory
provision reads in pertinent part:
Complaint. -The complaint must contain:
6. An order of condemnation, or resolution, or other official and binding
document entered by the plaintiff which sets forth and clearly identifies all
property rights to be acquired including rights to and from the public way, and
permanent and temporary easements known or reasonably identifiable to the
condemning authority.
The State relies on the case of Ada County Highway Dist. v. Sharp, 135 Idaho 888,26
P.3d 1225 (2001) for the propositioli that the complaint supercedes an administrative order for
purposes of defining the rights that are being condemned. The State, in essence, argues that since
the colnplaint in this matter was filed (December of 2004) prior to the statutory amendment
requiring the inclusion of the order of condemnation, that the statutory amendment cannot be
applied retroactively. Also, in -there

was conflict between the Order of Condemnation and
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the Complaints, in this case the two are consistent.
Idaho Code 5 40-310 sets forth the powers and duties of the Idaho Transportation Board
and specifically states that "[Tlhe order of the board that the land sought is necessary for such use
shall be prima facie evidence o f that fact." (Emphasis added). Idaho Code 5 40-3 1O(1). The

Idaho Transportation Board has been entering Orders of Condemnation in every case in which it
constructs a public project requiring land from property owners for decades.
Although Idaho Code § 7-707 was amended in 2006 requiring a complaint to include the
order of condemnation or a similar binding document, the State's reliance on the Sharp decision
is no longer the law in Idaho and the statutory provision can be applied retroactively in this case
because it is a procedural in nature rather than substantive. Idaho courts have addressed the
application of legislation being applied retroactively.
Typically, retroactive application deals with legislation amendments of the law. The
general rule on retroactive application of legislative amendments is that "[s]tatutes will not be
applied retroactively absent express legislative intent to do so." Floyd v. Board of Comm 'rs, 131
Idaho 234,238, 953 P.2d 984, 988 (1988). In addition, legislation that is remedial or procedural
may be applied retroactively, whereas legislation that is substantive or that affects vested rights
may not. Id.; Tuttle v. Wayment Farms, Inc., 131 Idaho 105, 108,952 P.2d 1241, 1244 (1998).
The Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Currington, set forth the distinction between
procedural and substantive law, as follows:
Substantive law prescribes norms for societal conduct and punishments for
violations thereof. It thus creates, defines and regulates primary rights. In
contrast, practice and procedure pertain to the essentially mechanical operations of
the courts by which substantive law, rights and remedies are effectuated.
108 Idaho 539, 541, 700 P.2d 942,944 (1985) (quoting State v. Smith, 527 P.2d 674,676-77
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S SECOND MOTION IN LIMINE-ORDER OF CONDEMNATION - 3

(1974)).
The question for the court in determining whether a statute may operate retroactively,
absent express legislative intent, is "whether the new provision attaches new legal consequences
to events completed before its enactment." Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 51 1 U.S. 244,26970 (1994). This reasoning was applied by the Idaho Supreme Court inFloyd v. Board of
C o ~ n m'rs, 131 ldaho 234, 238, 953 P.2d 984, 988 (1988). There, the Court considered whether
statutory changes in the standard of review to be applied in a case were substantive or
procedurallremedial. Id. at 237, 953 P.2d at 987. The district court held that the amendments
would adversely affect the substantive rights of the plaintiffs if applied retroactively because the
scope of review would be limited under the new provisions and thereby the rights of appellants
would be affected. Id. at 236, 953 P.2d at 986. Thus, the district court declined to apply the
statute retroactively. Id.
The Idaho Supreme Court disagreed and considered the statutory amendments to be
procedural. Id. at 238,953 P.2d at 988. In reaching its conclusion, the Court reasoned that the
statute did not "give the parties a right to pursue some cause of action or to present a defense."
Id. Rather, the statute merely prescribed the operations or processes of the court, but did not
change the right of the parties to have a decision reviewed. Id. Because the statutory
amendments did not affect the parties' rights of review, the Court held that the new provisions
would apply retroactively. Id.
I-Iowever, in Grant v. City ofTwin Falls, 120 Idaho 69 (1991), the Idaho Supreme Court
reviewed whether the United States Supreme Court's decision in Graham v. Connor, regarding
the standard to be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment could be applied retroactively. The
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S SECOND MOTION IN LIMINE-ORDER OF CONDEMNATION - 4

Idaho Supreme Court held that standard pronounced in the Gvaham case could be applied
retroactively.
The Court elaborated as follows:
"The general rule . . . is that an appellate court must apply the law in effect at the
time it renders its decision." (Citations omitted). Thus, "ordinarily a decision
reformulating federal civil law will be applied retroactively." (Citations omitted).
However, there are some cases in which "application of this retroactivity precept
produces inequitable results, penalizing parties who ordered their affairs in
reasonable reliance on a rule of law that was later invalidated." Citation omitted).
In such cases, a decision reformulating federal civil law will be applied
prospectively only if the decision satisfies the three factors set forth in
Chevron Oil v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97,92 S.Ct. 349,30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971).
Those factors are: (1) Whether "the decision to be applied nonretroactively
establish[es] a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent
on which litigants may have relied, or by deciding an issue of first impression
whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed", (2) whether, in light of "the
prior history of the rule in question, [and] its purpose and effect, .
retroactive operation will further or retard its operation"; and (3) whether
the decision "could produce substantial inequitable results if applied
retroactively." (Citation omitted).

..

..

Id. at 72 (emphasis added).
"We find this application of Chevvon to the issue of Graham's retroactivity to be wellreasoned and sound. We therefore hold that the standard enunciated in Graham should be
retroactively applied to cases such as this one which were pending at the time Graham
announced." Id. at 73.
Applying the Chevron factors adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court, the Court must
evaluate the circumstances to detennine the retroactive application of Idaho Code $ 7-707.
As noted, Idaho Code $ 7-707 is merely a procedural provision which sets forth what
information must be included with the complaint. Similarly, Idaho Code $40-3 10 recognizes
that the order of condemnation is prima facie evidence of what the Board is acquiring from the
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PLAWTIFF'S SECOND MOTION IN LIMINE-ORDER OF CONDEMNATION - 5

landowner.
The Idaho Transportation Board's Order of Condemnation in this matter reads in
pertinent part as follows:
The Board, having considered the report and recommendations of the State
Highway Administrator and having duly considered the matter, finds:
4. That all rights of access to, from and between the right of way of the public
way and all of the contiguous remaining real property of the record owner(s) shall
be extinguished and prohibited except for access, if any, as provided and shown
on the said project plans referred to in Paragraph 2 above.

In its Amended Complaint, the State asserts that access shall be limited to that as shown
on the plans attached as an exhibit to the complaint. The attached exhibit provides no access on
Pole Line Road on the Canyon Vista property. Thus, the State's own amended complaint is
consistent with the Board's Order of Condemnatioil of the subject property and therefore
discussing the Order of Condemnation is not confusing nor would it mislead the jury.
The State provides no rational reason that the Order should be excluded from mention,
and there are many reasons it needs to be mentioned. The State has continualIy advocated that it
is not condemning the access rights to Canyon Vista's property which the Order of
Condemnation states otherwise. Idaho Code 5 40-310 specifically expresses that the Board's
order is prirna facie evidence. If the State now wants to conceded and stipulate that it is in fact
taking the access rights of Canyon Vista, then Defendants will stipulate to excluded the order of
condemnation.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing argument and case law, Defendants respectfully request that it
enter its Order denying the State's Motion in Limine to exclude the Order of Condemnation.
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S SECOND MOTION IN LIMINE-ORDER OF CONDEMNATION - 6

DATED this
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ORIGINAL

The State has filed its Motion in Limine to Exclude the Testimony of Roger Dunlap on
the grounds that Mr. Dunlap appraised the property utilizing the development approach method
which was prohibited in the case of City of Caldwell v. Roark, 92 Idaho 99,437 P2d 615 (1968).
That simply is not the case, Mr Dunlap did appraise the whole property and did consider what a
prospective purchaser would pay for the whole property. The State's misunderstanding how Mr.
Dunlap arrived at his opinion of just compensation. The bands or zones of value approach is
simply not identical to the development approach addressed in Roark. The development
approach assumes a hypothetical future subdivision of lots and hypothetical sales prices of lots,
skipping the development costs and development process itself. The bands or zones of value
approach, in contrast, values raw mound as one aiece, but also recognizes that due to the physical
characteristics, some parties of the whole may be worth more than others. No specific lots or
subdivisions are assumed and no hypothetical developed lots prices are used. The latter approach
is widely accepted in condemnation while the development approach is not.
Prior to the taking, the Canyon Vista property consisted of 19.7149 acres and all of the
witnesses, boththe State's and the property owners, have agreed that the highest and best use of
the property was for commercial purposes before the taking. It was Mr Dunlap's conclusion that
while the entire property was commercial, the front 4.186 acres was more valuable than the rear
15.5289 because it had the potential for commercial pad sites. This is best illustrated by the pad
development along Blue Lakes in Twin Falls.
There is nothing unique about the application of this zones of value method of appraisal,
other jurisdictions throughout the country which have addressed this methodology have done so
approvingly. Mr. Dunlap has

assumed a hypothetical subdivision of the parcel; he is saying
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even if a large pays a blended rate for the whole piece, some portions of the property are worth
more than others.
The Plaintiff, State of Idaho, has requested the Court to enter its Order excluding any
evidence of valuation that is based upon placing separate values on different portions of the
Defendant's property on the grounds that Defendant's valuation witnesses did not appraise the
entire property as one unit, but simply added up amounts from different areas. That simply is a
misrepresentation by the State, as each valuation witness did appraise the whole property and
evaluated merely what a prospective purchaser would consider in determining how much he
would pay for the property as a whole unit.
Almost every case that has considered this issue has recognized the validity of the use of
a "band of valuation" appraisal in finding that there may be different values on the property as a
whole. In Los Angekes County Flood Control Dist. v. McNulty, 379 P.2d 493, the Court stated:
The court instructed the jury that in determining the market
value of the parcel condemned it is not proper to attribute a persquare-foot value to defendants' entire property and then apply the
value to the parcel condemned unless each square foot of
defendants' land has the same value and that, if the parcel
condemned is different in quality from the rest of the land, it
should be assigned a different value. There was a conflict in the
evidence as to whether 2.55 acres of the 2.62 acres taken were
worth as much per acre as the remainder of defendants' land, and
the instruction correctly states the applicable principles of law.
(People ex rel. Dept. of Public Works v. Neider, 195 Ca.App.2d
582, 590, 16 Cal.Rptr. 58; Hayward Union High School Dist. of
Alameda County v. Lemos, 187 Cal.App.2d 348,353, 9 Cal.Rptr.
750; People v. Loop, 127 Cal.App.2d 786,796-800,274 P.2d 885;
4 Nichols on Eminent Domain (3d rev, ed. 1962) 6 14,231, p. 545.)
Los Angeles Couniy Flood Control Dist. v. McNulty, 379 P.2d 493.
In People v. Loop, 274 P.2d 885 (1954), the State objected to valuation evidence on the
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grounds the value was not an average value of the whole parcel. The Court heId that a uniform
value across every foot of a parcel of property is only a proper method of valuation when it can
be said that each and every square foot of a parcel has the same value as each and every other
square foot.
The square foot method of valuation is based on the
assumption that each and every square foot of a parcel of property
has the same value as each and every other square foot. It is not a
mandatory method of valuation. The square foot method is a
proper method of valuation only when it can be said that each and
every square foot of a parcel has the same value as each and every
other square foot.
Nichols, a leading authority on the law of eminent domain,
says: "In assessing the value of the land taken as part of the entire
tract it is not proper merely to compute the percentage value on the
basis of an artificial average unit value for the entire tract unless
the actualities of the case accord with such coverage value. It may
be that the part taken is the most valuable part of the tract
considered from a qualitative point of view. To attribute an
average unit value thereto which is based in part on the lower value
of the balance of the tract is inequitable to the owner in a doubIe
aspect of the situation. It attributes a value to the part taken which
is lower than its actual value and it attributes a higher ultimate
value to the remainder area than its actual value, thereby reducing
his recovery as to both factors below his actual damages." (4
Nichols on Eminent Domain, 3d ed., 330, § 14.231.)
People v. Loop, 274 P.2d 885, 892-895,
A band of value approach was also approved in llnited States v. I , 629.6 Acres of Land,

etc., State ofDel., 360 F.Supp. 147 (1973). It stated:
The Government's second objection that the Commission
improperIy determined two highest and best uses for separate parts
of the condmned acreage, and then valued the portions separately
under an improper summation approach is also without foundation.
An examination of the Commission's report evidences that the
Commission was continually aware of its obligation to value the
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE THE TESTIMONY OF ROGER DUNLAP
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property as a whole. The Commission's conclusion that the
highest and best use of the property was 1,266.2 acres of farm and
recreation land utilized in the manner the landowner was using it
and 366 acres utilized for a sand and gravel pit was permissible
under the evidence, the Court's instructions and the applicable law
See Cade v. United States supra, 213 F. 2d at 140; TIingit & Haida
Indians v, United States, 389 F.2d 778, 182 Ct.Cl. 130 (1968);
Cunningham v. United States, 270 F.2d 545 (4" Cir. 1959); United
States v. 2,208.88 Acres of Land, 330 F.Supp. 1045
(E.D.Mo.1971); Wilson v. United States, 350 F.2d 901 (loLhCir.
1965). Moreover, the Commission specifically avoided any
duplication of valuation by not attributing two highest and best
uses to the same acreage and by not accepting conflicting and
incompatible uses. see e. g., United states v. Cumingham, 246
F.2d 330, 333 (4" Cir. 1957); and United States v. Carroll, 304
F.2d 300 (4IhCir. 1962).

Whenever various portions of a condemned parcel are susceptible
to different highest and best uses and no comparables are available
for valuation of one or both portions, a form of summation will
necessarily be employed. However, when, as the Commission did
here, the determination of just compensation is reached by viewing
the property as a single whole parcel with compatible component
highest and best uses, the ascertainment of different per acreage
values for the various different parcels and the ensuing calculation
of overall damages does not involve an impermissible valuation
technique. See Cade v. United States, supra. 213 F.2d at 140;
United States v. 1,955.00 Acres of Land, 447 F.2d 673,674-676
(lothCir. 1971); United States v. 2,208.88 Acres of Land, supra;
and Cunningham v. United States, 270 F.2d 545, supra.
In Brady-Stannard Motor Co., Inc. v. State, 352 N.Y.S.2d 68, the State condemned 1.6
acres of the property owned and located at the rear of the property. One-third (113) of the taltiilg
was level, filled land and the remaining consisted of low, wet, wooded land considerably below
grade. On appeal, the only issue was the validity of the use of the "band of valuation" approach.
The New York Supreme Court held that the use of the approach was proper:
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The only issue before this court is the validity of the use of
the "bands of valuation" approach to value and the finding of a
different value for the 1.135 acres of land at the rear of claimant's
property which necessitated fill to make it usable.

In the instant case the "bands of valuation" approach was
employed on the basis of a difference in quality of land with the
same highest and best use and, absent any involvement with
improvements, is proper. (Acme Theatres v. State of New York,
supra at 388-389,310 N.Y.S.2d at 498-500,258 N.E.2d at 913914). Furthermore, such a method valuation has been used to
establish value for land taken along a highway or a city street, and
the result herein is consistent with the principles set forth in prior
case law.
The Brady-Stannard case was cited in the subsequent New York cases of 124Fervy St.
Realty Corp. v. State, 369 N.Y.S.2d 224 and Oneonta Center Associates v. State, 388 N.Y.S.2d
57 (1976). In the 124 Ferry decision, the Court said:
The primary issue presented on this appeal is whether the
trial court was justified in evaluating the front and rear portions of
the parcel separately although the entire parcel's highest and best
use was determined to be a single joint commercial use. We
believe that it was.
Claimant's appraiser employed a single unit of valuation
for the entire tract, based on a combination single highest and best
use. By means of the interpolation of comparable sales the State's
appraisers determined that the rear land used for the ear wash
operation had a lesser value than the front portion used for gas
station purposes. The court, noting that the evidence indicated the
two uses were separate, both as a personnel and operation, and that
the zoiling patters and cornparables indicated a higher unit value
for the frontage land than the rear land, amved at a value for the
gas station area of $5 per square foot and $3 per square foot for the
car wash area. The assignment of different values to separate
segments of a single tract with a single highest and best use, when
based on a difference in quality and location of land, is a proper
method of valuation. (See Brady-Stannard Motor Co, v. State of
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New York, 43 A.D.2d 994,352 N.Y.S.2d 68). The court's
determination to divide the parcel taken into two segments for
valuation purposes was a factual finding, well supported by the
record and should not be disturbed.
I24 Ferry St. Realty Corporation v. State ofNew York, 48 A.D.2d 959,369 N.Y.S.2d 224,226.

In Oneonta, the Court said:
The appraisers for both parties agreed that the highest. and
best use of the property was as a shopping center. However, while
claimant's exDert arrived at a unit value of $12,865 per acre for the
entire parcel, ;he appraiser for the State found that the rear
undeveloped area had only a limited commercial development use
because of problems of access and topography. Accordingly, he
valued the front acreage
- at $10,700 per acre and the rear acreage
- at
$800 per acre.

In its decision, the court found the highest and best use of
the property to be as a shopping center with excess acreage.
Rejecting the claimant's appraisal as based upon improper
valuation methods, it adopted the State's differing valuations for
the front and rear acreage and granted claimant a total award of
$3 1,200 in direct damages for the land and improvements
appropriated. This appeal ensued.
We find that the judgment of the Court of Claims must be
affirmed. The bands of valuation approach advocated by the State
and adopted by the court is justified in this instance because of the
differences in quality and location of the front and rear segments of
claimant's parcel (124 Feny St. Realty Corp. v. State of New York,
48 A.D.2d 959, 369 N.Y.S.2d 224, mot. for lv. to app, den. 38
N.Y.2d 705,381 N.Y.S.2d 1025,343 N.E.2d 774; Brady-Stannard
Motor Co. v. State of New York, 43 A.D.2d 994,352 N.Y.S.2d
68).
Oneonta Center Associates v. State ofNew York, 54 A.D.2d 993,388 N.Y.S.2d 57, 58,
In E-470 Public ITighway Authority v. 455 Company, 983 P.2d 149, a 1999 Colorado
Court of Appeals decision was reversed on the grounds the court said the following about
valuations based upon different highest and best use:
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In determining the value of property in condemnation
proceedings, the commissioners are to consider evidence of the
most advantageous use to which the property may reasonably be
applied. Goldstein v. Denver Urban Renewal Authority, 192 Colo.
422,560 P.2d 80 (1977). Opinion evidence as to value requires
that the unique and different characteristics of individual pieces of
property be analyzed. Denver Urban Renewal Authority v.
Berglund-Cherne Co., 193 Colo. 562, 568 P.2d 478 (1977).
When the highest and best use of property is not uniform
throughout a tract in question, courts in other jurisdictio~lshave
permitted appraisers to testify to the highest and best use for the
different portions of the full tract involved for purposes of
determiningjust compensation. See Departinent of Transportation
v. H.P./Meachum Land Ltd. Partnership, 245 111.App.3d 252, 184
II1,Dec. 351,614 N.E.2d 485 (1993); Oughton v. Gaddis, 683
So.2d 390 (Miss.1996); City of Dallas v. Rash, 375 S.W.2d 502,
(Tex.Civ.Appll964); see also United States v. 1,629.6 Acres of
Land, 360 F.Supp. 147 (D.De1.1973) (upholding valuation based
on testimony attributing different highest and best uses to two
separate portions of condemned parcel), aff d in part, rev'd in part
on other grounds, 503 F.2d 764 (3d Cir.1974); 124 Ferry St. Realty
Corp, v. State, 48 A.D.2d 959,369 N.Y.S.2d 224 (1975)
(assignment of different values to separate segments of parcel was
a property method of valuation.)
E-470 Public fIighway Authority v. 455 Company, 983 P.2d 149, 155.

In Oughton v. Gaddis, 683 So.2d 390 (1996), the Mississippi appellate court held that
"when the highest and best use of property taken is not uniform throughout, the appraiser may
testify to highest and best use for different portions of the tract." The court further held that:
In order to make the fair market value assessment, "all the facts as
to the condition of the property and its surroundings, its
improvements and capabilities, may be shown and considered in
estimating its value." Hillman, 189 Miss. At 850, 870, 198 So. at
571. The lower court is not limited to just the property's highest
and best use for the moment, but may consider the value of the
property with reference to any use for which the property is
reasonably adaptable. Potters 11,608 So.2d at 1227 (within
commercial properties, there are many uses of differing values);
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Daniels v. Board of Supervisors of Clarke County, 323 So. 2d 748,
749 (Miss.1975); Mississippi State Highway Comm'n v. Hancock,
309 So.2d 867 (Miss.1975) (part of condemned land had
residential purposes as highest and best purpose); State Highway
Comm'n v. Brown, 176 Miss. 23, 33, 168 So. 277,279 (1936)
(property may have several available uses and purposes, and
consideration must be given to the fair market value of each use
and purpose.)

When the highest and best use of the property is not uniform
throughout the tract in question, an appraiser may testify to the
highest and best use for the different portions of the full tract
involved. This rule makes sense in light of the purpose of the "just
compensation" provision in the constitutions . . .
Here, the State seeks to take a portion of the full tract that iilcludes
a larger percentage of buildable, nonwetland property than does the
tract as a whole. Consequently, the application here of the State's
proposed rule, that an appraiser must offer only one valuation
considering the total value of the entire parcel, would misrepresent
the value of the specific land portion to the taken. Dep't of Transp.
V. HPIMeachum Land Ltd. Partnership, 245 111.App.3d 252, 185
I11.Dec. 351,614 N.E.2d 485,488 (1993) (citations omitted).
"[~]enerall$, the market value of the p&icular part of a tract
expropriated
is determined by the actual market value of the
- portion taken, and not by its average per-acre or square-foot value
as a pro rata portion of the parent tract." State Through Dept. of
Highways v. LeDoux, 184 So.2d 604,610 (La.Ct.App.1966).
This Court holds that the lower court was in error for
excluding Cook's testimony that the Oughton land where the
easement was being laid, was in a more valuable region
- than the
agricultural land which was the dominant part of the property.
Oughton v. Caddis, 683 So.2d 390,393-395

-

In The Department of Transportation v. HP/Meachum Land Limited Partnership, 614
N.E.2d 485 (1993), the Illinois court held that "when highest and best use of property is not
uniform throughout tract in question, an appraiser may testify to highest and best use for different
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portions of full tract involved, for purposes of determining just compensation." The court said:
When the highest and best use of the property is not
uniform throughout the tract in question, an appraiser may testify
to the highest and best use for the different portions of the full tract
involved. (Department of Public Works & Buildings v. First
National Bank (1973), 9 IIl.App.3d 633,636,272 N.E.2d 487; see
also Department of Transportation v. Mullen (1983), 120
IIl.App.3d 268,281,75 I11.Dec. 803,457 N.E.2d 1362; Department
of Public Works & Buildings v. Hufeld (1966), 68 IlI.App.2d 120,
128, 215 N.E.2d 312.) This rule makes sense in light of the
purpose of the "just compensation" provision in the constitution
that "'[tlhe owner is to be put in the same position monetarily as he
would have occupied if his property had not been taken."' (Almota
Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States (1973), 409
U.S. 470,473-74,93 S.Ct. 791,794,35 L.Ed.2d 1,7, quoting
United States v. Reynolds (1970), 397 U.S. 14, 16, 90 S.Ct. 803,
805,24 L.Ed.2d 12, 15; City of Chicago v. Farwell (1918), 286 Ill.
415,421, 121 N.E. 795.) In addition, this rule does not conflict
with the principle of valuing the portion taken as part of the whole
and not as a separate parcel. The valuation of the part taken as part
of the whole is designed to provide just compensation to the
landowner where the land sought to be taken is of greater value
when considered as part of the whole than if considered as a parcel
by itself. Tri State Park District v. First National Bank (1975), 33
Ill.App.3d 348,351,337 N.E.2d 204; see also Forest Preserve
District v. Draper (1944), 387 111. 149, 157-58, 56 N.E.2d 410 (and
cases cited therein).
Here, the State seeks to take a portion of the full tract that
includes a larger percentage of buildable, nonwetla~dproperty than
does the tract as a whole. Consequently, the application here of the
State's proposed rule, that an appraiser must offer only one
valuation considering the total value of the entire parcel, would
misreprese~~t
that value of the specific land portion to be taken.
We find that that rule does not follow the law of this State and,
thus, that the court's denial of the owner's first motion was in
error. The Department of Transportation v. HP/Meachum Land
Limited Partnershdp, 614 N.E.2d 485,488.
Clearly, the methodology utilized by Mr. Dunlap to arrive at his opinion ofjust
compensatio~lis an accepted methodology which has passed judicial scrutiny. The State
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE THE TESTIMONY OF ROGER DUNLAP
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incorrectly argues that Mr. Dunlap applied a development approach method which was
prohibited by the Idaho Supreme Court in Roark.
In City of Caldwell v Roark, 92 Idaho 99,437 P2d 61 5, the property consisted of 9.48
acres of land within the City of Caldwell. The portion of the land sought to be taken was platted
by the property owner and was designated as the Third Parkside Addition. As platted, the
property consisted of 80 lots of which the city was condemning 49 lots. Streets and alleys had
been laid out but the comers of the lots were not staked and the property had utilities available,
On appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, the property owner argued that the jury should
have been required to find the value of the lots in the portion of the platted area condemned
separately, as separate parcels of property rather than the aggregate value of the lots as one
parcel. The Court said:
"However, where the entire parcel of land, as a unit, is taken at one time
by condemnation, the jury is required to fix the value of the entire parcel as a
unit as of the time the summons is issued. LC. 5 7-712. This value cannot
properly be determined by aggregating the individual sales value which
separate lots may bring when sold to individual prospective home builders
over a period of time in the future, for the reason that such a basis of valuation
would pennit the jury to speculate upon future developments. The jury was
properly permitted to consider the prospective value of he property for that
purpose in determining its value as a single parcel at the date of the summons.

"* * * The test is not what the lots will bring when and if 62 willing
buyers come along, but what the tract, as a unit, and as is, platted or not, and
in whatever state of completion, will bring from a willing buyer of the whole
tract."(authority omitted).
"* * * The valuation must be on the basis of what a willing purchaser
would pay now and not what a number of purchasers might be induced to pay
in the future for the land in smaller parcels." (authority omitted).
" * * * They are not to determine how it could best be divided into
building lots, nor to conjecture how fast they could be sold, nor at what price
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per lot. A Speculator or investor, in deciding what price he could afford to
pay, would consider the chances and probabilities of the situation as they
actually existing. A jury should do the same thing. They are not to inquire
what a speculator might be able to realize court of resale in the future, but
what a present purchaser would be willing to pay for it in the condition it
is no in." (authority omitted).
The State also complains on page 7 that this method generates higher damages. Article 1
Section 14 of the Idaho Constitution states that "private property may be taken for public use, but
until a just compensation to be ascertained in the manner prescribed by law, shall be paid
therefore." I.C. 7-71 1 reads in part as follows:
"The coui-t, jury or referee must hear such legal testimony as may be offered by any of the
parties to the proceeding, and must thereupon ascertain and assess:
1.The value of the property sought to be condemned........
In this case, the value of the part condemned consists of the area where the commercial
pads would have been located together with all of the access from Pole Line Road. Because the
frontage area of the property is more valuable than the rear 15 acres the State should be required
to pay the value of what they sought to condemn - not an average spread across the entire
property.
Mr. Dunlap repeatedly said in his deposition that the average price per foot in the before
condition was $5.50 per foot and even if the State were correct in its interpretation and view of
the Roark case, Mr Dunlap disclosed that in his opinion at $5.50 a foot, the fair market value of
the property in the before condition was $4,723,296. He further disclosed that the size of the
remainder in the after condition was 17.836 acres with a value of $1,659,011. The difference
between the before and after, utilizing the blended rate is exactly the same, ie $3,064,285 - the
identical amount the State is trying to exclude by misunderstanding the methodology utilized as
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the development approach.
Further, exclusion of Mr. Dunlap's entire testimony is improper. Mr. Dunlap valued the
entire property on a blended rate. We believe his methodology is well supported by the cases
cited herein and appraisal methodology. The bands of value approach has been used and accepted
in other condemnation cases in Idaho Courts we have tried (not appealed). Should the court
disagree, Mr. Dunlap should still be able to present at a minimum his blended rate analysis
DATED this the 11"' day of May, 2007.

n

E Don Copple, of the firm
Attorneys for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1lthday of May, 2007, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served upon the following:
Joseph Mallet
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
33 11 West State Street
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1 129

U.S. MAIL
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HEATHER A. CUNNINGHAM - ISB # 5480
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Attorneys at Law
Washington Mutual Capitol Plaza
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Telephone: (208) 342-3658
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TI-IE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS
TI-IE STATE O F IDAHO, ex rel.,
CHARLES L. WINDER, JOE-IN MCHUGH
BRUCE SWEENEY, MONTE C.
MCCLURE, GARY BLICK, NEIL
MILLER and JOIW X COMBO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
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CASE NO. CV 04-6336

AFFIDAVIT OF ROGER DUNLAP
IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE
THE TESTIMONY OF ROGER
DUNLAP

)

Plaintiff,
VS.

CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP INC.
Defendants.

)

1
1
1

ROGER DUNLAP, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
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ORIGINAL

I submit this Affidavit

ill

opposition of the Plaintiff's Motion in Limine to exclude all

testinlony of Roger Dunlap,
I am a certified general real estate appraiser. I have over 20 years of experience in real estate
val~~ation
and eminent domain work, both as an appraiser and as a real estate analysist for a law fim.

1 have worlted on hundreds of eminent domain cases cases in Arizona, Maryland and Idaho. I have
testified as a real estate valuation expert in trials in Superior Court in Yavapai County and Maricopa
County, Arizona and Nampa, Idaho. A copy of my curriculuin vitae is attached hereto as Exhibit A
and incorporated herein by this reference.

I have been hired by the defendants to give expert testimony in the condemnation trial with
the following caption: ITD v. Ca~zyonVista, etc.
The plaintiff has con~plainedthat the nlethod I employed to measure the estimated
con~pensationdue to the defendant inflates the conlpensation estimate. This is not tile case.
I have employed a "zone of value" techniq~le,because I believe it most accrtrately mirrors
what a potential buyer of the subject property would consider if be were to consider buying the
subject property, taking into account the involu~ltaiytaking of a portion of the land and all of the
access to Pole Line Road. In illy opinion, the land fronting on Pole Line Road has a higher value
than the land in the rear of the property and should be valued separately in conlputing the value of
the taking. I therefore valued the entire property at $5.50/SF as a blended overall rate and then
estimated the value for the fi-ontageby using sales of similar land in the conlpeting area including
sales imr~~ediately
across the street fro111 the subject.
FIowever, even if I had considered the subject as having one overall value of $5.50/SF, the
coinputatioll ofestinlated compensation would be nearly the saine, and the rounded estimate would
be exactly the same. A summary of co~llpeilsationis presented as follows. My opinion of just
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Surnmarv
Total value before $5.50 X 858,781 (19.715 net acres)
Value of take $5.50/SF X 81,266 SF (1.8784 acres)
Permanent Easement $5.50/SF X 13,970 (.3207 acres) X 50%
TCE $5.50/SF X 9,344 SF (.2145 acres) X 10%
Total Value of Taking
Value of reinainder before
Value of remainder after
Severance damage
Total Estimated Compensation
Rounded

$4,723,295

3,"

DATED this -day of May, 2007.

n
Roger rinlap

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me his&

4

day of May, 2007.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

&

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of May, 2007, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served upon the foliowiilg by the method indicated below:
Joseph D. Mallet
Deputy Attor~ieyGeneral
Idaho Transportation Department
33 11 West State Street
Post Office Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1 129

-U.S. MAIL
Hand Delivery
~ a c s
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E DON COPPLE - ISB # 1085
HEATHER A. CUNNINGHAM - ISB # 5480
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COX
Attorneys at Law
Washington Mutual Capitol Plaza
199 North Capitol Boulevard
Suite 600
Post Office Box 1583
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 342-3658
Facsimile:
(208) 386-9428

Attorneys for Ddendants
Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership
and Lazy J. Ranch, Inc.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS

1
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel.,
CHARLES L. WINDER, JOHN MCHUGH )
BRUCE SWEENEY, MONTE C.
1
MCCLURE, GARY BLICK, NEIL
1
MILLER and JOHN X COMBO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
)
1

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. CV 04-6336

DEFENDANTS' MlEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO BIFURCATE

j
CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED
)
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J. RANCH, )
INC.
)
'

Defendants.

COME. NOW the Defendants, Canyon Vista Family Limited Pafinership and Lazy J.
Ranch, Inc., by and tlxough its attorneys of record ofthe firin Davison, Copple, Copple & Cox,
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO BIFURCATE - 1

and hereby submit this Memorandum in Opposition to the Plaintiff's Motion to Bifurcate the trial
to resolve the issue of the larger parcel in this matter prior to the presentation of the issue of just
compensation.

I. INTRODUCTION
After nearly two and a half years since the filing of this condemnation action, the State
now contends that through the discovery process and recent exchange of pretrial motions that "it
has become clear that there is a dispute between the parties regarding the 'larger parcel' issue in
this case." Plaintifs Briefin Support of Motion, p. 2.
Not only is this representatioil to the Court misleading and false in reflecting the State's
understanding of this case and the other three cases in which it now contends it desires to
consolidate into one larger parcel, but the State's own actions further indicate that it made a
deliberate decision in separating the cases into four distinct parcels.
Since at least October of 2001, the State has been hlly aware that the fainily members
intended to divide a 60 acre parcel into three distinct parcels for estate planning purposes.
Despite having this knowledge and three years afterwards, the State filed four separate
condemnation lawsuits against the properties, appraised each individual parcel as a separate
parcel of property and ultimately resolved t h e e of the four parcels short of trial. Not once did
the State file with the Court that the three cases of State v. KLS&M(Case No. CV 04-6334, Fifth
Judicial District, Twin Falls County, Idaho), State v. BCM&W (Case No. CV 04-6335, Fifth
Judicial District, Twin Falls County, Idaho) and State v. Lazy J. Ranch (Case No. CV 04-6337,
Fifth Judicial District, Twill Falls County, Idaho) constitute one larger parcel for purposes of
determining just compensation, In each case, just compensation was settled for $380,000,
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$817,500 and $150,000, respectively. In each of those cases, the property owners were required
to disclose their opinions first and they always advocated each parcel was a separate and distinct
piece of property. The State, too, in assessing just compensation appraised and valued the
properties separately.
It is only now, after the State recognizes that this case is going to trial, that the State
attempts to utilize the settled three cases to mitigate the damages arising from the Pole Line Road
project to the subject property, the fourth and final parcel.
It is difficult to see how the State's efforts to inject this issue after taking inconsistent
positions previously in the three other cases can be anything other than bad faith and one must
question whether the intent of this motion is anylhing more than an attempt to delay the jury trial
which has been set for nearly two years.
Based upoil the authority set forth herein, Defendants' respectfully request that this Court
enter its Order denying the State's Motion to Bifurcate.

11. LEGAL ARGUMENT

A. The Other Three Parcels Were Condemned SeparateIy
and Adiudicated and Should Not be Included in the Subiect Case.
Previously, Defendants provided the Court with authority in Defendants' Motion in
Limine to Exclude Evidence, Testimony and Argument regarding the Development of the subject
Property with Adjacent Properties that held that res judicata and collateral estoppel applied when
the goveriunent attempted to introduce valuation evidence of other parcels, which had been
adjudicated previously, with the subject parcel of the suit. The Illinois court affirmed the trial
court's decision to exclude the proposed valuation evidence.
In Department of Transportation v Chicago Title and Trust Co , 707 N.E.2d 637 (1999),
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the Appellate Court of Illinois was faced with the issue of whether valuation evidence of other
parcels, which were condemned separately and adjudicated, should have be included with the
property at issue under the larger parcel concept. The Court rejected the Transportation
Department's arguments and explained its holding as follows:
A prior judgment may preclude a subsequent action under both res judicata and
collateral estoppel. (Citation omitted). The doctrine of resjz~dicataprovides that
a final judgment on the merits is conclusive as to the rights ofthe parties in that
case and constitutes an absolute bar to a later action involvillg the same claim.
(Citation omitted). The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies when a party
participates in two separate cases arising on different causes of actions, as here,
a i d some controlling fact or question material to the determination of both cases
has already been adjudicated against that party in a prior case. (Citation omitted).

Housing Authority, (citation omitted), involved a dispute over the ownership of a
parcel of land. However, the courl in that case found that the ownership of the
parcel had already been determined long ago in a 1932 federal condemnation case.
The court in Housing Aulhority thus determined that the two cases were
substantially the same. (Citation omitted).
Here, the ownership and valuation of the other parcels has already been
adjudicated. As to the East Parcel, the circuit court in that case entered an order
on February 28,2989, that Marco Muscarello was the owner. The final judgment
order was entered in that case on June 19, 1997. The liotice of appeal for the
instant case was filed on September 30, 1997, but no appeal was taken from the
final judgment in the East Parcel case. A just compensation award was paid to
Marco Muscarello, as trustee. (Citation omitted).
As to West Parcel I, the circuit court in that case entered final judgment order on
May 22, 1990, for a just compensation award to Gershon Hammer as the owner of
the property. . . .
The remainder damages as to these parcels have already been determilled and
awarded to the appropriate parties. IDOT cannot now argue that the remainder
damages of any of the parcels have decreased due to a subsequent acquisition to
these properties. The issue of who held title to the other parcels, as well as the
valuation of those parcels, was properly determined by the circuit courts as of the
date of filing of the complaints to condemn.
Id. at 647-48.
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Although there is no Idaho appellate case directly on point, Idaho courts have adopted and
applied the doctrine of judicial estoppel which is clearly applicable to situations and
circumstances now raised by the State. The Chicago Title court's application of collateral
estoppel is consistent with the elements of judicial estoppel adopted by the Idaho appellate
courts.
In Robertson S7lpply, Inc. v. Nicholls, 131 Idaho 99,952 P.2d 914 (1998), the Idaho Court
of Appeals explained the judicial estoppel doctrine as follows:
The Idaho Supreme Court considered and adopted the doctrine of judicial estoppel
in Loomis v. Church, 76 Idaho 87, 277 P.2d 561 (1954). In Looinis, the Couit
stated:
It is quite generally held that where a litigant, by means of such
sworn statements, obtains a judgment, advantage or consideration
from one party, he will not thereafter, by repudiating such
allegations and by means of inconsistent and contrary allegations
or testimony, be permitted to obtain a recovery or a right against
another party, arising out of the same transaction or subject matter.

Id., 76 Idaho at 93-94,277 P.2d at 565. Essentially, this doctrine prevents a party
ikom assuming a position in one proceeding and then taking an inconsistent
position in a subsequent proceeding. (Citation omitted). There are very important
policies underlying the judicial estoppel doctrine. One purpose of the doctrine is
to protect the integrity of the judicial system, by protecting the orderly
administration of justice and having regard for the dignity ofjudicial proceedings.
(Citation omitted). The doctrine is also intended to prevent parties from playing
fast and loose with the couits. (Citation omitted).

Id., 131 Idaho at 101.
In Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242,92 P.3d 492 (2004), the Idaho Supreme Court
reaffirmed the application of judicial estoppel
'The application ofjudicial estoppel is one of discretion. Ill McKay v. Owens, 130
Idaho 148, 152, 937 P.2d 1222, 1226 (1997), the Court referred to the Risselfo t ~ .
Plumbers and Steamjtters Local, which applied the doctrine oljudicial estoppel
and stated the doctrine and the policies behind it:
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Judicial estoppel, sometimes also lmown as the doctrine of
preclusion of inconsistent positions, precludes a party from gaining
an advantage by tatting one position, and then seeking a second
advantage by taking a n incompatible position.
(Citation omitted). There are also important policies behind judicial estoppel. In
Risetto, the Ninth Circuit stated that:
The policies underlying preclusion of inconsiste~ltpositions are
general considerations of the orderly adniinistration of justice and
regard for the dignity of judicial prdceedings. . . ~udiciaiestoppel is
intended to protect against a litigant playing fast and losses with
the courts. . . Because it is intended to protect the dignity ofthe
judicialprocess, it is an equitable doctrine invoked by a court at
its discretion. (Citations omitted).

-

Id., 140 Idaho at 252.
Other Idaho cases which considered the doctrine ofjudicial estoppel, include Smith 1)

US.R. Y Properties, LLC, 141 Idaho 795, 118 P.3d 127 (2005) and A&J Construction Co., Inc.
v. Wood, 14 1 Idaho 682, 116 P.3d 12 (2005).
The State attempts to disguise its motion to bifurcate as an issue of law on its face by
neglecting to advise this Court of its own voluntary actions in the other cases which now become
part of the issue raised before this Court. The State postures as if it has treated each individual
case on its own merits and that what transpired in the other cases is irrelevant in the instant case,
despite now attempting to raise the issue ofthe larger parcel in this case. The State is now trying
to back door Canyon Vista, by incorporating other parcels which may have constituted the larger
parcel, but the State elected to proceed in a different manner with them.
The State cites Rueth v. State, 100 Idaho 203 (1978) and State ex re1 Flandro v. Seddon,
94 Idaho 940 (1 972) for the proposition that tlie larger parcel is a question of law to be resolved
by the court. In neither Rzieth nor Flandro was tlie court faced with the issue of whether other
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properties which had been previously adjudicated could be incorporated into a larger parcel issue
on a pending case that had yet to be adjudicated. Even if the State's proposition that the larger
parcel is an issue of law is correct, which we do not disagree, it is remarkable that the issue can
now be heard after judgments have been entered on the other cases and the time for appeal in
those cases has expired and three weelcs prior to the trial in this matter. This radical shift in
positions comes after significant time and expense has been spent preparing for trial and if
granted would substantially prejudice the Defendants.

B. If The Court Finds The Larger Parcel to Inelude Adiacent Prooerties
Are the Judgments Previously Entered Void.
Assuming the Court decides that the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel and/or
judicial estoppel do not apply and that the larger parcel in this case consists of one or more
adjacent parcels for purposes of just compensation in this case, the issue then becomes are the
judgmellts entered against the other properties void. The entire premise for seeking a larger
parcel ruling is the State's attempt to mitigate the damages incurred to Canyon Vista's property
as a result of the Pole Line Road project. The State's theory is that if the adjacent properties
which have direct access to Pole Line are included, then Canyon Vista would then have
reasonable access to Pole Line Road, albeit not directly from its physical boundaries but way of
the larger parcel concept.
Defendants disagree and dispute that the State's proposed theory would render Canyon
Vista's property with reasonable access to Pole Line Road. However, what has not been
contemplated by the State is that if this were the case, do the damages tile other adjacent
properties may incur to provide Canyon Vista's property with access which were nevei
contemplated in the judgments entered by the Court in those cases, open the door for Lazy I.
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Ranch, KLS&M and/or BCM&W to seek new damages.
The State cannot use the judgments previously entered against the adjacent properties as a
shield and then subsequently utilize those properties to cure the subject property under the cloak
of the judgmeilts without any further recourse by those owners. The State's proposed theory in
this case goes directly against the doctrines referenced herein that have been established since the
inception of the law. Finality would not exist in the condenlnatio~lworld if government agencies
were permitted to use adjudicated cases to its advantage to cure other properties whose case is
pending.
Should the Court be inclined to allow for evidence which includes the adjacent properties
that have beell adjudicated as part of the larger parcel, then Defendants request a ruling on the
new issue raised of whether the judgments previously entered by this Court no longer have the
effect of res judicata.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the case law and arguments provided herein, Defendants' respectfully request
the Coui-t entered its Order denying the State's Motion to Bifurcate arid find that the State is
estopped from asserting an inconsistent position.
In the alternative, sliould the State's Motion to Bifurcate be granted, then Defendants'
respectfully request a ruling from this C o w that the judgments previously entered in the three
other cases be set aside and the cases be set for trial.

-
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DATED this g d a y of May, 2007.

. A

,

Attorneys for Defendants

-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
d a y of May, 2007, a true and correct
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the foregoing was served upon the following:
Joseph Mallet
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
33 11 West State Street
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1 129

cop^

of the

-U.S. MAIL
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E DON COPPLE - ISB # 1085
HEATHER A. CUNNWGHAM - ISB # 5480
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COX
Attorneys at Law
Washington Mutual Capitol Plaza
199 North Capitol Boulevard
Suite 600
Post Office Box 1583
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 342-3658
Facsimile:
1208) 386-9428

Attorneys for Defendants
Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership
and Lazy J. Ranch, Inc.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS
CASE NO. CV 04-6336

THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel.,
CHARLES L. WINDER, JOHN MCHUGH
BRUCE SWEENEY, MONTE C.
MCCLURE, GARY BLICK, NEIL
MILLER and JOHN X COMBO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,

DEEErnANTS' OBJECTION TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
BIFURCATE

Plaintiff,
VS.

1

CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J. RANCH,
INC.

)
)
)

)

Defendants.

1
1

COME NOW the Defendants, Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership and Lazy J
Rancli, Inc., by and through its attorneys of record of tlie firm Davison, Copple, Copple & Cox,
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and hereby submit its objection to Plaintiffs Motion to Bifurcate the trial on the grounds and for
the reasons that:
1)

Plaintiff is judicially estopped from asserting the larger parcel issue in this case;

2)

The doctrine of res judicata applies to Stute v. KLS&M (Case No. CV 04-6334,
Fifth Judicial District, Twin Falls County, Idaho), State v. BCM&W (Case No. CV
04-6335, Fifth Judicial District, Twin Falls County, Idaho) and State v. Lazy J.

Ranch (Case No. CV 04-6337, Fifth Judicial District, Twin Falls County, Idaho)
on the larger parcel issue; and
3)

Plaintiff is collaterally estopped from asserting the larger parcel issue in this case.

This Objection is made and based on the records and files herein, and the authorities cited
in Defendants' Brief in Opposition to the Plailltiff's Motion to Bifurcate.
DATED this

:

I Sday of May, 2007.

.

Attorneys for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
foregoing was served upon the following:
Joseph Mallet
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
33 11 West State Street
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1 129

day of May, 2007, a true and correct copy of the

____ U.S. MAIL
Hand Delivery
Facsinlile Transnxission
-- O v e r n i y

J
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E DON COPPLE - ISB # 1085
HEATHER A. CUNNINGHAM - 1SB # 5480
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COX
Attorneys at Law
Washington Mutual Capitol Plaza
199 North Capitol Boulevard
Suite 600
Post Office Box 1583
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 342-3658
Facsimile:
(208) 386-9428

Attorneys for Defendant
Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF TI-IE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel.,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
PlaintiffiAppellant,

)
)
)
)

\

-VS-

CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J RANCH,
INC.
DefendantsIRespondents.

Case No. CV-04-6336

SECOND STIPULATION AND
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL
CLERK'S RECORD

j

1
1

1

The Appellant, by and through its attorney, Joseph D. Mallet, Deputy Attorney General
and Respondents, by and through its attorney, Heather A. Cunninghatn, of the firm Davison,
Copple, Copple, and Cox, in the above entitled proceeding hereby requests pursuant to Rule 19,

SECOND STIPULATION AND REQUEST FOR
ADDITIONAL CLERK'S RECORD -Page 1

I.A.R., the inclusio~lof the following material in the clerk's record in addition to that required to
be included by the I.A.R. and the notice of appeal.
IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED between the parties that the following
iteins shall be included in the clerk's record:
Clerk's Record
a.

Defendant's Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion in Liinine to Exclude the
Testilnony of Roger Dunlap (lodged May 14,2007);

b.

Affidavit of Roger Dunlap in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motioil in Linline to
Exclude the Testimony of Roger Dunlap (filed May 14,2007);

c.

Defendant's Trial Brief - Part I (lodged April 9, 2007);

d.

Defendant's Trial Brief - Part I1 (lodged April 11, 2007);

e.

Defendant's Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs Second Motion in Limine (lodged
May 14,2007); and

f.

Plaintiffs Trial Brief (filed on or about May 25,2007).
i 4 ~ 6 ~ W
DATED t h i s ~ % y of*,
2008.
For the Appellants:

Dep'uty Attorney General
DATED this

&day of July, 2008.

For the Respondents:

P

ofthe firm, Davison, Cop e
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opple & Cox

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

day of July, 2008, 1 caused to be served a true and

correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
John Lezamiz
133 Shoshone St N
PO Box 389
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0389

mU.S. Mail
n ~ a n Delivered
d
movernight Mail
NTelecopy (Fax) 208-734-41 15

Joseph D. Mallet
Deputy Attorney General
33 11 W. State Street
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1 129

~ u . s Mail
.
01-Iand Delivered
movernight Mail
@Telecopy (Fax) 334-4498
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E DON COPPLE - ISB # 1085
HEATHER A. CUNNINGHAM - ISB # 5480
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COX
Attorneys at Law
Washington Mutual Capitol Plaza
199 North Capitol Boulevard
Suite 600
Post Office Box 1583
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 342-3658
Facsimile:
(208) 386-9428

Attorneys for Defendant
Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel.,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
PlaintiffIAppellant,

1
)

)
)

Case No. CV-04-6336
ORDER ON SECOND REQUEST FOR
ADDITIONAL CLERK'S RECORD

-VS-

CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J RANCH,
INC.
DefendantsIRespondents.

1
1
1
1

THIS MATTER, having come regularly before the Court upon PlaintiffIAppellant's and
DefendantIRespondent Stipulation, with Joseph D. Mallet, Deputy Attorney General for the
Idaho Transporlation Department appearing for PlaintifflAppellant and Heather A. Cunningham
of the firm Davison, Copple, Copple & Cox, appearing for DefendantIRespondent; the Court
ORDER ON SECOND REQUEST FOR
ADDITIONAL CLERK'S RECORD - Page 1

having reviewed the Second Stipulation and Request for Additional Clerk's Record, and in
furtherance thereof and good cause appearing therefore:
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS I-IEREBY ORDERED, AND THIS DOES ORDER that the
following items shall be included in the clerk's record:
a.

Defendant's Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion in Limine to Exclude the
Testimony of Roger Dunlap (lodged May 14,2007);

b.

Affidavit of Roger Dunlap in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion in Liinine to
Exclude the Testimony of Roger Dunlap (filed May 14,2007);

c.

Defendant's Trial Brief - Part I (lodged April 9,2007);

d.

Defendant's Trial Brief - Part 11 (lodged April 11,2007);

e.

Defendant's Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs Second Motion in Limine (lodged
May 14,2007); and

f.

Plaintiffs Trial Brief (filed on or about May 25,2007).

DATED t h i s 1 day of August, 2008.

District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on t h e d day of August, 2008, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
E Don Copple
Heather Cunningham
Davison Copple Copple & Cox
P.O. Box 1583
Boise, Idaho 83701
Joseph D. Mallei
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
Legal Section
P.O. Box. 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1 129

ORDER ON SECOND REQUEST FOR
ADDITIONAL CLERK'S RECORD - Page 3

m . ~ . Mail
U ~ l a n dDelivered
novernight Mail
U ~ e l e c o p y(Fax)
~ u . s Mail
.
UHand Delivered
a ~ v e r n i g hMail
t
a ~ e l e c o p y(Fax)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel.,
CHARLES L. WINDER, JOHN
MCHUGH, BRUCE SWEENEY, MONTE
C. MCCLURE, GARY BLICK, NEIL
MILLER, AND JOHN X COMBO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,

)

1

SUPREME COURT NO. 34485

)
)
j
)

1
VS.

1
1
1

CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J RANCH
INC.,

)
)
)
j

Plaintiff1Appellant,

CLERK'S SUPPLEMENTAL,
CERTIFICATE

I, KRISTINA GLASCOCK, Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Twin Falls, do hereby certify that the
foregoing CLERK'S RECORD on Appeal in this cause was compiled and bound under my
direction and is a true, correct and complete Record of the pleadings and documents requested by
Appellate Rule 28.

I do further certify that all exhibits, offered or admitted in the above-entitled
cause, will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court.
WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said Court
this 25"' day of August, 2008.
KRISTINA GLASCOCK

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel.,
1
CHARLES L. WINDER, JOHN
MCHUGH, BRUCE SWEENEY, MONTE )
C. MCCLURE, GARY BLICK, NEIL
)
MILLER, AND JOHN X COMBO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, )

SUPREME COURT NO. 34485

PlaintiffIAppellant,

1
VS.

CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J RANCH
INC.,
DefendantIRespondent,

SUPPLEMENTAL
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

)
)
)

1

I, KRISTINA GLASCOCK, Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Twin Falls, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or mailed, by United States Mail, one copy of the CLERK'S RECORD and
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows:
Joseph Mallet
Deputy Attorney General
P. 0 . Box 7129
Boise, ID 83707-1129

Don Copple
Heather Cunninghain
Davison, Copple, Copple & Cox
P. 0 . Box 1583
Boise, ID 83701

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said this 25Ih
day of August, 2008.
KRISTINA GLASCOCK
Clerk of the District Court

Certificate of Service

1

